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Doubt, Ethics and Religion: An Introduction 
 
LUIGI PERISSINOTTO AND VICENTE SANFÉLIX VIDARTE 
 
It will soon be the sixtieth anniversary of Wittgenstein’s death in 1951. 
Since then there have been substantial changes in the way in which we read 
and understand the work of the Austrian philosopher. Wittgenstein is no 
longer regarded just as an analytic philosopher, or as a logical atomist and 
natural interlocutor of Frege and Russell or even as the pioneer of a new 
style of ordinary language philosophy; he has become a classic in the 
history of philosophy in his own right. In spite of his self-doubts on this 
issue, Wittgenstein was an extremely original thinker, highly personal in 
his philosophical and writing styles. Examining his work in relation to 
some of the great thinkers of the western philosophical tradition is both 
natural and necessary, not only because this serves to shed light on 
Wittgenstein’s texts, but also because it enables us better to understand the 
(quite pessimistic) diagnosis he makes of the western civilisation. 
Aware of the recent shifts in Wittgensteinian scholarship, over five 
years ago a group of European and Latin American specialists set up a 
research project with the aim of contributing to the now far more wide-
ranging hermeneutical debate on the Viennese philosopher1. Our work has 
crystallised in a series of collective publications2 – publications which are 
the product of a series of regular seminars in which we discussed the work 
of members of the project and of other scholars specifically invited for the 
                                                 
1 Our team has enjoyed and continues to enjoy the generous funding that the Spanish 
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación has granted the research project FFI2008-
00866/FISO: “Cultura y religión: Wittgenstein y la contra-ilustración”. 
2 N. Sánchez Durá (Ed.), Cultura contra civilización; C. Moya Espí (Ed.), Sentido y 
sinsentido and A. J. Perona (Ed.), Wittgenstein y la tradición clásica, all of which were 
published by the Valencian publishing house Pre-textos in 2008, 2009 and 2010 
respectively. 
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occasion, and of a series of annual conferences that focused on different 
aspects of Wittgensteinian philosophy. 
  Taking advantage of the generous offer made to us by Jesús Padilla 
Gálvez and Alejandro Tomasini Bassols, editors of the Aporía collection 
within the publisher Ontos Verlag, we are delighted to present a selection 
of the papers that emerged in connection with our most recent conference3 
This selection of texts aims to situate Wittgenstein’s work within some of 
the most important currents of modern Western philosophy. The piece 
by Jean Pierre Cometti compares the Wittgensteinian approach to the 
philosophy of religion and to ethics with that of other key authors 
belonging to the pragmatist tradition. The pieces by Vicente Sanfélix and 
Joaquín Jareño pursue that comparison further by contrasting 
Wittgenstein’s work with those of other classics of philosophy and of 
Western culture, notably David Hume. The pieces by Julián Marrades and 
Chon Tejedor continue this task by focusing on the relation between 
Wittgenstein’s work and that of Schopenhauer. The texts by Joan B. 
Llinares and Isabel Cabrera consider the relations between Tolstoy’s work 
and Wittgenstein’s thinking. Finally, the piece by Luigi Perissinotto 
draws a contrast between Wittgenstein’s concepts of doubt and certainty 
and those belonging to the Enlightenment tradition. If this book serves to 
further the debate about Wittgenstein’s thinking, we will judge our aim to 
have been more than fulfilled. 
 
                                                 
3 IV encuentro internacional cultura y civilización. Wittgenstein: duda, religión y ética. This 
was heald at the Facultad de Filosofía y CC.EE. at the Universidad de Valencia on the 27th 
and 28th of May 2010. 
 
Doubt, Ethics and Religion. Wittgenstein and the Counter-Enlightenment, (Eds. Luigi 
PERISSINOTTO and Vicente SANFÉLIX), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2010, 9-26. 
Is Wittgenstein a Religious Thinker? 
 
JEAN-PIERRE COMETTI 
 
The soul answers never by 
words, but by the thing 
itself that is inquired 
after.1 
R.W. Emerson 
 
It might seem unusual to associate Wittgenstein with religiousness. 
However, many of Wittgenstein’s thoughts, like those of Kierkegaard, 
Pascal, Augustine or Tolstoi, have been conditioned by his interrogations 
about God and faith, to such an extent that one may legitimately wonder 
whether this is somehow relevant to our understanding of his philosophy. 
Such will be my perspective in the next few pages, but I will also examine 
how this aspect of Wittgentein’s writings may originally contribute to our 
thoughts on religious belief -in particular because Wittgenstein’s 
reflections in this domain echo the positions such pragmatist philosophers 
as Peirce and James have sometimes adopted in relation with their own 
religious creeds. 
 
1. Wittgenstein and Religious Belief 
Wittgenstein’s major texts about religious belief have been collected in 
Lessons on Religious Belief, a volume Cyrill Barrett edited in 1938 from 
notes taken by Y. Smithies, R. Rhees and J. Taylor. But there exist other 
texts about these questions, among which more personal notes one may 
found in interviews and in his notebooks2. I will not examine them all here 
                                                 
1 Emerson, 1926, 200. 
2 Cf. Wittgenstein, 1991 and 1997. On this subject, see also Cometti, 1998. 
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for they have been abundantly commented upon, neither will I consider all 
of their aspects. I will focus my attention on a small number of questions 
that will enable me to see in a common light what I purport to be 
Wittgenstein’s position, on the one hand, and the position of the founders 
of Pragmatism, on the other hand. 
 From the beginning, it appears that Wittgenstein and James have had 
in common the fact that they both wrote about religion, as philosophers or 
psychologists are apt to do, and also lived through a personal religious 
experience which is not irrelevant when one tries to understand their 
writings on the subject. This is why one may not assert that Wittgenstein 
was “religionless”, as this was done in the preface to a paperback edition of 
the Lessons on Religious Belief. Wittgenstein’s family had given up 
Judaism in favor of Protestantism but he never worshipped, in the common 
sense of the word, neither as a Protestant, nor as a Jew -and he always had 
mixed feelings about Catholicism. However it now seems clear that the 
religious question has always been in his mind, as his diaries testify3. The 
Vermischte Bemerkungen is the other place where Wittgenstein adopts a 
more personal stance and where he expresses “religious thoughts” as well 
as thoughts about religion. 
 However amazing this may seem too many, this will not surprise the 
reader who is familiar with Wittgenstein’s ideas about culture, science and 
philosophy, for Wittgenstein considered these questions as personal 
problems and nothing was to be excluded from the range of such personal 
problems. 
 Naturally, to say that problems were personal does not mean that 
they were existential, neither does it mean that they had some 
psychological meaning. In his mind, philosophical problems originated in 
linguistic misunderstandings, or at least in our inappropriate usages of 
language. But beyond that, questions of language are related to forms of 
                                                 
3The notebooks published in Denkbewegungen are very noteworthy in this respect. 
The beauty and powerfulness of many texts justify the comparison with Pascal and 
Kierkegaard. About these authors, see Drury’s notes in Rhees, 1981. 
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life. Furthermore, such problems, which are food for high-flown 
philosophical debates, are not directly accessible to all: they are the objects 
of specific compulsions which, as Wittgenstein suggests, cannot therefore 
be dealt with from an exclusively “conceptual” viewpoint. “Authorized” 
French commentators tend to weaken the thrust of Wittgenstein’s thought 
by insisting that the difference between he and other philosophers resides 
in his conception of philosophy as a form of conceptual analysis whose 
major key and tool is his concept of “grammar”. This mistake comes in 
handy to those who wish to use Wittgenstein much as they use other 
philosophers recognized as such by the community of philosophy 
professors. 
 This should remind us of Wittgenstein’s energetic rejection of the 
very idea that his thought could one day become a doctrine and that other 
people might one day call themselves “Wittgensteinians”. Simultaneously, 
this should help us better grasp the link that existed between his religious 
and philosophical interests. 
 As I suggested, the very fact that philosophical problems do not exist 
of themselves and yet are forcefully imposed upon us through some 
specific compulsions justifies the parallels between philosophy and 
psychoanalysis occasionally made by Wittgenstein. This is precisely what 
excludes the very idea of a “conceptual analysis”, but also what explains 
two major aspects of the Wittgensteinian approach, or of the meaning he 
ascribed to it: firstly, the fact that to him dealing with philosophical 
problems required an exertion of the will; secondly, the fact that 
philosophy should be considered as work on oneself.4 
 These two ideas are intimately related. Philosophically, as anyone 
will agree, to work on oneself means to give oneself the intellectual means 
to tackle the questions one wishes to study. But this also means to give 
oneself the required mental means, i.e., to overcome and to habituate one’s 
mind to overcome the pulsions and obstacles that limit our vision and in 
                                                 
4 Cf. Wittgenstein, 1980: “Philosophy like architecture is first and before all a work on 
oneself.” 
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which most of our mistakes originate. Wittgenstein has not dwelt much 
upon this point, but his conception seems to have been that images spring 
from our language’s grammar which lead us astray. However, we are led 
by strong compulsions toward some of theses images rather than others. 
Language, which permanently permeates thought though it be but its tool, 
exerts a specific suggestive force to which our usages -the language games- 
add their own strength related to our actions and our forms of life. This is 
the reason why -although the case of science is different- the resulting 
problems call for a type of clarification which requires an exertion of the 
will beyond the sole intellectual means at hand. In this sense, there is in the 
practice of philosophy something in the order of exercise, for no outcome 
will result without the adequate will. Somehow, to think philosophically is 
to act. 
 But then, one may raise the following question: “What exactly does 
philosophical thought act upon?”. Furthermore, if this be the case, how is it 
related to religious questions and belief? Some of Wittgenstein’s notes in 
his notebooks then become to make sense, although this is open to 
discussion. To my mind, these notes are relevant for one who wishes to 
evaluate Wittgenstein’s philosophy as regards religious matters and others. 
They very clearly show that he personally was unable to separate his 
“work” -as he said- from his religious and moral interests. He 
systematically relates his work -his successes and failures- with what we 
may describe as his mental or psychological state defined according to 
what he called his “decency”. To him everything seemed as if his capacity 
to work successfully in the philosophical field necessitated conditions of 
will and decency -and only God could answer his calls for such potential 
strength. 
 I believe it would be a mistake to once more push aside this strange 
combination as a mere uninteresting mark of strictly personal 
“eccentricity”. However tempted we could be to dissociate Wittgenstein’s 
general thoughts about religion one finds in other texts, from the generally 
more personal ones he expresses in his notebooks, I believe we should 
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make the effort to explore their possible interrelation. As we shall see, this 
is precisely what James very originally calls for. But how is this to be 
done? 
 There is at least one way of understanding why these two aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts about religion should not be set apart. We know 
the Lessons on Religious Belief establish a very fundamental relation 
between what specifically belongs to religious belief and what manifests 
itself in a form of life. However apparently banal, the assertion of such a 
relationship does not only mean that every community has its beliefs or 
that the key to such beliefs is to be found in the culture or the society, or 
even in the illusions they breed. Certainly, such an anthropological point of 
view is not absent from Wittgenstein’s thought, as his remarks on Frazer’s 
The Golden Bough5 clearly indicate, but the link he establishes between the 
religion and the form of life goes deeper than that. In particular, what he 
means is that questions of religion must not be dealt with like doctrines or 
systems of ideas which need to be discussed from a theoretical, or even 
from a strictly intelellectualist point of view. On the contrary, one must 
gauge how the are rooted in common and shared practices. 
Simultaneously, this link indicates that religion -or religious pratices- is not 
just the reflection of a mistaken awareness of reality -an “illusion” or an 
“opium”. Intellectualist sophistry works at both ends. One may not discuss 
religion from a scientific viewpoint and a religious belief is not the 
expression of a theoretical view gone awry. 
 These are well-known tenets and we know what types of approaches 
of religious belief they aim to contradict. However, how may they be 
related to the type of experience Wittgenstein describes in his notebooks? 
Basically, I believe the relation Wittgenstein posits between religion and 
forms of life has two major consequences. Firstly, the engagement belief 
implies is a both religious and ethical engagement in a form of life which 
manifests itself in a specific language and experience and which conditions 
“will” -in the sense suggested above. This does not mean that our 
                                                 
5 Wittgenstein, 1993.  
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intellectual capacities and choices are necessarily determined by our 
religious beliefs, although they may be, but this does mean that our 
religious experience, and perhaps especially its ethical components, are 
able to communicate with our capacity to deal with philosophical 
problems, at least as long as we admit that they are not scientific problems 
but problems which essentially require that our linguistic usages and the 
nature of their links with forms or modes of life be clarified. 
 But such is not the most important consequence. Religious belief is 
unwavering, as both the Lessons and the Notebooks demonstrate. It escapes 
both scientific and historical evaluation, but it also belongs to a specific 
mode of certainty which, in a way cannot be questioned. One may be 
tempted to say that this is precisely the most questionable aspect of 
Wittgenstein’s approach. In order to avoid all mistakes, it is necessary, 
however, to be more precise. On the one hand, the certainty we are dealing 
with is subjective -which may be surprising but is explained by reasons we 
are familiar with and which I will leave aside6- and it may consequently 
lead to other, competing certainties. But on the other hand, this certainty is 
precisely not only a certainty of thought, an interior or intimate certainty, 
so to speak. It cannot be set apart from a vital engagement, it point towards 
a form of life and its consequences in this context give it worth and truth. 
In other words, the link between belief and form of life unexpectedly 
confirms the pragmatic principle and seems to support William James’s 
conclusion to The Varieties of Religious Experience7. Naturally, one should 
lead us to ask what Wittgenstein’s thought shares with James’s analysis of 
religious belief. 
 
2. Pragmatism and Religion 
In the past few years, Hilary Putnam has become interested in James’s and 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts, with a special interest for their ethical and 
religious dimensions. It is not immediately clear how pragmatism -as 
                                                 
6 Think of course of the question of private language.  
7 James, 1985. 
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James suggests it- seems to be the best attitude available as regards 
religious belief. One could try and proceed through elimination, as I have 
partially done above. One may also try to understand this directly through 
a quick review of Peirce’s and James’s views.8 
 It is well known that Peirce was a deeply religious man, and 
Christopher Hookway has insisted on this point and on how much his 
metaphysical conceptions derived from this state of fact. Peirce’s most 
original text on this subject is “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of 
God”9. Peirce’s presents belief in God as one of the outcomes of what he 
calls “musement”, thus allowing it to escape all practical considerations -
and also theoretical, in a sense- since it has nothing to do with scientific 
aims or the quest for truth. 
 In a way, there is something like a hypothesis in Peirce’s 
argumentation, for the suggestion it makes is abduction-based10. It cannot 
be tested like the hypotheses of science, but is there really no possible 
testing of such a hypothesis? Strangely enough this problem may be solved 
by using a principle which is explicitly presented as pragmatist. As Peirce 
indicates in another passage of the Collected Papers,  
“If a pragmatist is asked what he means by the word “God”, he can only 
say that just as long as acquaintance with a man of great character may 
deeply influence one’s whole manner of conduct […] so if contemplation 
and study of the physical-psychical universe can imbue a man with 
principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man’s works 
or conversation, then that analogue of a mind - for it is impossible to say 
that any human attribute is literally applicable-  is what he means by 
”God” ”11. 
                                                 
8 On this several points, see H. Putnam, 1992, 1994, and my own remarks in Cometti, 
2001.  
9 Peirce, 1980, 452-485. See also Hookway, 1985, 276-281 
10 Cf. Peirce, 1980, § 2 “The Hypothesis of God”. As Hookway, 1985, 278 reminds us, 
pragmatism is to be an inquiry «which produces, not merely scientific belief, which is 
always provisional, but also a living, practical belief».  
11 Peirce, 1980, 502, in Hookway, 1985, 278. 
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 These remarks raise many questions I will not dwell upon here. 
However, I will single out one of their aspects which is apt to cast some 
light on a possible pragmatist conception of religious belief Peirce shares 
with James, and which is analogous with a major dimension of 
Wittgenstein’s own analyses. 
 Obviously, in this text, Peirce seems to perceive as essential a 
relationship between belief in God and the believer’s life. He seems to 
think that what justifies belief has nothing to do with the kinds of proofs 
theologians generally seek, nor with what their rationalist adversaries 
criticize. Peirce’s pragmatism, as well as that of James and Wittgenstein, 
changes the issues of the debate and keeps religious belief safe from the 
main models of justification and criticism it is usually submitted to. More 
or less, one may say that this changing of the issue is pragmatist because it 
is all about what makes the difference, whereas such debates are usually 
mired in confusion and miss the essential. However, as James’s own 
position testifies, the pragmatist principle is not without encountering its 
own obstacles. 
 I will concentrate on two views developed in The Forms of Religious 
Experience and in The Will to Believe12. Under one aspect at least, James’s 
and Peirce’s viewpoints converge, i.e., the question of belief defines a 
category of problems whose meaning must be evaluated in the light of 
choices that concern the believer’s life and engage his present and future 
conduct. The conceptions developed in The Will to Believe are very clear in 
this respect. A belief’s legitimacy depends on choices that depend on 
nothing else, it is based on a type of certainty that has nothing to do with 
the guarantees we seek when dealing with theoretical or practical 
hypotheses. This is the reason why it was meaningless for James -as well 
as for Peirce and Wittgenstein- to consider religion as a “vestige” of 
bygone ages13. James’s singular viewpoint gives sentiments -and even 
passion- a role that has contributed to cloud its originality and interest. But 
                                                 
12 James (1985) and (1987) 
13 Cf. James, 1985. 
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inasmuch as religion absolutely cannot be evaluated in the light of our 
knowledge of the world or of our sole reasoning, theories play but a 
“secondary role” in it.  
“At this purely subjective rating, therefore, Religion must be considered 
vindicated in a certain way from the attacks of her critics. It would seem 
that she cannot be a mere anachronism and survival, but must exert a 
permanent function, whether she be with or without intellectual content, 
and whether, if she have any, it be true or false”.14 
 In The Forms of Religious Experience, James’s psychological 
vantage point leads him to introduce the idea of a finite god whose 
manifestations he purports to discover in the variety of well-known and 
identified forms of experience. Two things, however, are likely to be 
questioned by the reader at this point. 
 Indeed, as Peirce suggests -at least in the passages I have chosen to 
comment upon- pragmatism, more than any other philosophy, may help us 
to understand that religious belief finds its meaning and legitimacy, and 
even its “truth”, in the effects it has on the believer’s conduct in his life. 
One may wonder, however, if this shields religious belief from doubt, and 
if the related choices exclusively concern the believer. In other words, if 
we translate the question in the terms of the Wittgensteinian problematic of 
the rule: Is it possible to believe alone? Finally, if we remember what 
James tried to demonstrate in The Will to Believe, isn’t religious belief a 
particular case of wishful thinking?15 
 I will get back to the first two points when I deal with Wittgenstein, 
for the two related questions concern a point he broadly shares with James. 
However, the wishful thinking criticism concerns James -especially in The 
Will to Believe. Let’s turn the question differently. To what extent may 
someone who chooses a belief as a response to what James calls a “living 
                                                 
14 James, 1985, 507. 
15 See; Wernham, 1987. The idea that James is arguing in the defense of something 
like a willful blindness, we can find it in J. Hick, 1963, quoted by Wernham, 1987, 7. 
Hick takes the James’ essay as an “encouragement unreserved to wishful realities”. 
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choice”, durably and effectively engaging his life in the paths this belief 
helps him define, claim the very same paths justify the belief that was there 
origin? Needless to say this question is intimately related to the two first 
aforementioned points. The part James ascribes to sentiments makes it 
even more legitimate. Would religion, among other things, be but a way of 
engaging in wishful thinking? 
 At first sight, it is difficult to imagine how a pragmatist thinker who 
espouses James’s views in The Will to Believe may avoid the debate on 
doubt and truth. All the more so as one cannot see clearly how the 
difference this is all about would really make a difference since it solely 
depends on the projection of desires. But at this point several threads must 
be disentangled. 
 The original question was about the effects one may expect from a 
belief and whether these effects may, from a pragmatist point of view, 
acquire a belief-justifying status. In other words, the question is whether 
pragmatist principles -the “pragmatist maxim”- is applicable to religious 
belief, as Peirce and James obviously thought -although their positions did 
not entirely overlap. We have now reached a point where we are asking 
whether the relation between the belief and the believer’s life -and the 
choices this relation supposes- must be held as a case of straightforward 
and voluntary self-deception. This question has implications regarding the 
relations between belief -in the pragmatist sense-and conduct. It is also 
related to the idea we have of belief and of its conditions. If we restrict our 
reflections to what James suggests, it appears that he would be adopting an 
utterly indefensible view if he were saying that a living choice, motivated 
by the will to believe -in the passionate sense- would suffice to justify 
belief as long as this choice leads to durable consequences in the believer’s 
conduct that could be ascribed to it. In such a case, to believe would as 
absurd as to follow a rule alone. However, it seems that on that account 
James was misunderstood. 
 Despite the fact that, in his mind, one should always get back to the 
individual -in this context, the believer facing his belief- James never 
Is Wittgenstein a Religious Thinker? 19
thought that a belief could lead a life of its own. Certainly, this may 
sometimes happen, but such cases must be considered as exceptions. I have 
already mentioned the parallel with rules based on the principle that a 
belief, defined as a “habit of action”, has the status of a rule. I think we can 
say that when James invokes the relation between belief and the believer’s 
conduct he clearly understands that a belief is nourished by and proves 
itself in contact with the conditions it faces. The very idea of a “living 
choice” that he exposes in The Will to Believe allows us to understand this. 
He calls “living choice” the choices our will faces in a context of shared 
beliefs. Among the conditions of this choice is a context of common 
possibilities which excludes that anyone may “believe alone”, religiously 
or otherwise. In this respect, James shares Putnam’s idea of a “linguistic 
division of labor”16. This precisely means that choices in matters of belief 
cannot really be “private” choices and that they are experienced through 
the effects they produce -not only on the representation one has of oneself 
and of one’s conduct, but on what may know about it in a given context of 
shared values and criteria. 
But in this case, why is religion reputed “indestructible”? How should 
one consider the varieties and apparent incompatibilities of beliefs? 
Wittgenstein’s writings address these questions in a manner that should 
allow us to further our reflection and to show what he and James have in 
common. 
 
3. James and Wittgenstein 
Wittgenstein knew very well James’s book on the varieties of religious 
experience and he valued its teachings as well as its wealth of analyses. It 
is striking that, dealing with the question of religious “certainty”, 
Wittgenstein and James share the very same idea. In a letter to Rankin 
where he mentions the lectures that would ultimately lead to the 
publication of his book, James wrote: “The religion is strictly 
                                                 
16 Cf. Putnam,1988. There is also a brief essay from James called «Tigers of India», 
that is a good illustration of his convictions on this subject.  
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indestructible”17. This is exactly what Wittgenstein says in his Lessons 
About Religious Belief. What is the source of this indestructibility? James’s 
reasons for it are not very different from Wittgentein’s argument about 
what he describes as unshakeable in religious belief. Furthermore, the 
reasons given allow us to understand how the apparent incompatibility of 
beliefs greatly differs from the religious relativism James and Wittgenstein 
could be suspected to support. 
 These questions are raised in one of Wittgentein’s interviews with 
Drury. Drury, who mentions Wittgenstein’s admiration for James’s 
Varieties of Religious Experience, pointedly quotes the following words 
which Wittgenstein wrote in Remarks on Frazer’s The Golden Bough: 
“Was Augustine in error, then, when he called upon God on every page of 
the Confessions? But – one might say – if he was not in error, surely the 
Buddhist holy man was – or anyone else – whose religion gives expression 
to completely different views. But none of them was in error, except when 
he set forth a theory”18. This reflection is in the same spirit as James’s 
when he rejected in his letter to Rankin what he called the conceptual 
interpretation of philosophy and theology. Indeed, for both James and 
Wittgenstein, to worry about the diversity of religions is a sign of 
confusion. Naturally, if one considers in each religion what looks like a 
doctrine, a theory or a worldview, then it goes with religions as with all the 
rest: plurality leads to incompatibilities which lead us to think, as in the 
case of cultures, that they cannot all be simultaneously true and that, as 
Wittgenstein suggested, either Augustine or the Buddhist monk is right. 
But who ever said that religions should be viewed as theories? Two 
theories which do not affirm the same thing about the same problem or 
notion cannot be simultaneously true -although the problem obviously is 
more complicated than this. But two different modes of life or ways of 
acting are not contradictory in any way. The question doesn’t even exist, 
and this is the reason why it is absurd to speak of the incommensurability 
                                                 
17 June 16 1901. 
18 Wittgenstein, 1993, 119. 
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of cultures. A culture, like a religion, is not a theory, even with we may 
have reasons to believe that they may be associated to a worldview. One 
should not focus on the ideas and concepts in a belief, as Frazer did. One 
must try and understand what a belief means as a habit of action, i.e., one 
should take into account the effects in one’s conduct, and in the case of 
beliefs that concern the meaning men give to their lives or what is 
sometimes called values or God, one must judge on the basis of the stakes. 
 Certainly, this leads us to minimize how we consider other people’s 
beliefs. But there is a difference between thinking that who believes and 
lives differently is wrong, and stating, as philosophers are most wont to do, 
that the plurality of beliefs raises a problem that must be solved 
theoretically, i.e., in some other way than by the kinds of pragmatic 
arrangements that actually allow, most of the time, to make different 
beliefs coexist without fears of rational chaos. This is probably the reason 
why James and Wittgenstein clearly think that the plurality of religions 
does not contradict the idea we may have of religion. The reasons that lead 
them to this common thought are different, but they spring from a common 
ground: as long as religious belief bases its certainty and justification on 
other resources than theoretical, philosophical or theological pretentions, 
then nothing can be opposed to it. And this is in no way to be associated 
with any sort of relativism. Anyhow, if these few reflections are in some 
way justified, then one should also admit that the link one establishes 
between religious belief and the conduct of life grounds a position that 
allows to give up the debates in which both philosophy and theology have 
often wasted their energies. James’s religious pragmatism thus concurs 
with Wittgenstein’s Lessons on religious belief—in which one may in turn 
also perceive how the pragmatist criterion of belief is being applied to the 
belief in God. 
 The relation between belief and a form of life is twofold. The 
anthropological approach is paramount in the Lessons. An approach we 
might term existential prevails in the Notebooks and allows us to describe 
Wittgenstein as a religious thinker. In the first case, the relation with a 
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form of life is actualized in shared beliefs. In the second case, Witgenstein 
is perhaps closer to how James gives more weight to the mystical 
experience, the relation with a form of life takes a more personal turn and 
expresses itself in choices and in prayers. I will not here apply the wishful 
thinking objection which was used to criticize James, but I believe it is 
necessary to question anew the reasons we might have to describe as 
“unshakeable” what expresses itself through this experience. 
 In Wittgenstein’s thought, the anthropological and existential 
viewpoints combine in the link that unites belief with a form of life -i.e., 
with a pattern of conduct and a context made of rules and shared practices. 
To say that a belief is “unshakeable” consists in setting it within a horizon 
of certainty which is that of forms of life, and hence to this particular figure 
of arbitrariness and necessity that constitutes the strength of the rule. 
Simultaneously, it is a way of acknowledging its effects on both conduct 
and shared practices, according to a principle one may describe as 
pragmatist -although it is not without an appearance of circularity. On the 
other hand, on a more existential -and apparently subjective- level, the 
religious belief’s unshakeablility appears to be grounded in what one might 
call a “right to believe” -as James did- which nothing can compel to be 
submitted to conceptual evaluations -as the case of mystique exemplifies. 
Such a subjective certainty, depending on how we see it, may easily 
however be perceived as a form of stubbornness -however noble. What 
exactly is the case? How may one link two forms of certainty when 
certainty is first expressed in a personal attitude of meditation and prayer 
apart from any context of shared values, as is the case in many passages of 
Wittgenstein’s Notebooks? To what extent may one stretch the “pragmatic 
principle”? 
 One easily understands that nothing can shake he whose life so 
closely fits his belief that jeopardizing the one would amount to 
jeopardizing the other. One also easily understands that in such a case the 
“right to believe” will justify the “will to believe”. Respect for sainthood 
probably is similar, and indeed the only criticisms a saint or a mystic may 
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fear are those aimed at his life rather than at his belief. This allows us to 
better understand that the unshakeability of belief is not that of interior 
certainty -and this certainly is important in Wittgenstein’s case, as his 
actions testify. But here again, how may we represent to ourselves the 
choices of a form of life of which unshakeability testifies in relation with 
what a form of life, in the case of Wittgenstein, presupposes as shared- on 
an anthropological level? 
 To say the truth, we here face a major difficulty with no clear 
solution in view. It is not certain that the problem is not meaningless, but it 
should at least allow us to make a distinction between James and 
Wittgenstein, as I will briefly show in my conclusion. 
 The difficulty is the following: unless one chooses to revive the 
viewpoint of the Tractatus which, it seems to me, is not extant in the texts I 
mentioned, considering what a form of life is for the second Wittgenstein 
and the criticism he makes of all solipsist notions of interiority, how can 
one imagine that a belief may find its meaning in its effects, at least if this 
means in a model of conduct that corresponds to a choice of life only for 
the one who believes? At this juncture, I think there are two possibilities. 
Either one admits that this choice of life and the effects of belief, somehow 
or other, combine with forms of shared life, or one chooses to see in it a 
particular variation of the attitude which consists in rushing out of the 
boundaries of language. 
 I believe this last hypothesis is worth considering. I have no space 
left to do so, now, but I can add two things on this subject. Firstly, in 
accordance with what we might be tempted to spontaneously think, this is 
all about meaning and meaninglessness. Obviously, as demonstrated by the 
language of mysticism or of religious authors, religious belief, alongside 
philosophy, for example, is a special case of deviant usages to which a 
healthy grammatical therapy may be applied. Should one choose to be 
more Wittgensteinian than Wittgenstein himself and believe religious 
belief is to him what grammatical confusion is to philosophers? This 
question, to be dealt with seriously, would need to be put in the light of 
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what Wittgenstein called secondary usages, as Cora Diamond has 
suggested in a text I can here but briefly mention. However, we can see 
that the difficulty here stems from a certain language, if I may say so, and 
from how this language is articulated with a form of life of which it seems 
only one life testifies. In other words, the difficulty is akin to that met by 
philosophy every time a philosopher is a religious thinker at the same time. 
Such authors always resort to personal experience, as is the case with 
Kierkegaard, Augustine, Pascal and Wittgenstein. 
 
4. God’s Action in the World 
By insisting on what brings Wittgenstein close to pragmatist thinkers, 
especially to James for which he had much consideration, I hope these 
reflections have allowed me to foreground Wittgenstein’s originality in 
questions of religious belief. Although, as I will try to show now, these 
convergences do have their own limits, they do allow to show that the 
pragmatist “turn of mind” of the second Wittgenstein which best expresses 
itself in the role he gives to usage and language games in the analysis of 
language and of philosophical problems, unexpectedly endures in his 
reflections on religious belief and perhaps also, in some measure, in his 
own “religiosity”. It goes with Wittgenstein as it does with a great number 
of pragmatist thinkers: the question will have to be raised, one day, 
whether religion did not find a place in their thought which it never had 
anywhere else in philosophy. In a way, the paradox manifests itself in the 
fact that this place suffers from a double exclusion: it is located neither in 
philosophy, nor in theology. Clearly, Hilary Putnam is a good interpreter, 
today, of what James meant when he wrote that “pragmatism seems to be 
the best attitude towards religion”. Naturally, this does not solve all the 
problems, neither does it eliminate all reasons for perplexity, as the 
different attitudes of James and Wittgenstein testifies. Indeed, while both 
consider that the scientific and the historical viewpoints on religious belief 
are irrelevant, that it is absurd to see religion as a vestige of bygone social 
and cultural stages, and that there is something specifically “unshakeable” 
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in religious belief, Wittgenstein, contrary to James, gives the play of 
institutions and practices an importance James refused them, no doubt 
because to him the psychology of religious experience was the only valid 
viewpoint. In a sense, Wittgenstein’s point of view is more metaphysical. 
This reason why the relation with a form of life bears different meanings in 
their respective thoughts, and why it causes more problems in Wittgenstein 
than in James. This is also the reason why James’s God is different from 
Wittgenstein’s. James’s God is finite, Wittgenstein’s is infinite. However, 
they do agree on two major points. Firstly, their religiosity and their 
analyses of religion never lead them to reject the plurality of religions. 
Secondly, a major part of their analyses is devoted to overcome Kant’s 
interdiction that God act in the world. In Wittgenstein, and to a certain 
extent in James, this interdiction is lifted by ethical means and by the 
pragmatist principle which gives conduct and forms of life the function to 
authenticate belief and, in a particular sense, lets them manifest its own 
“truth”. 
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1. From Enlightenment to Counter-Enlightenment 
Various writers have found affinities between certain aspects of the 
philosophies of Hume and Wittgenstein (for example, Strawson, 1985, or 
Fogelin, 2010). Yet Hume is not an author to whom Wittgenstein used to 
refer, and, in fact, if he did mention him at all it was rather to confess his 
lack of familiarity with him. 
 Moreover, with regard to the philosophy of religion in particular, it 
seems that one can hardly speak of an affinity between Hume’s and 
Wittgenstein’s points of view. Ultimately, their attitude to it appears, on 
the face of it, to be very different. Hume does not seem to have been a very 
religious man, whereas Wittgenstein, despite saying of himself that he, too, 
was not religious, nevertheless confessed that he could not avoid seeing 
everything in a religious perspective. One might, therefore, think that our 
proposal to relate Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s viewpoints on religion is 
arbitrary or, at least, that it needs some justification. 
 In one of his “against the current” essays Isaiah Berlin (1997) 
revealed how, through his influence on Hamann, “the magus of the north”, 
Hume became one of the sources of German anti-rationalism. The 
Enlightened Scotsman converted into the inspirer of the German Counter-
Enlightenment! Yet it is an acknowledged fact that Hamann, and 
Kierkegaard, whom he influenced, had an influence, in turn, on 
Wittgenstein and on his way of understanding religion. So it is no longer 
arbitrary to suppose that, albeit indirectly, Wittgenstein’s philosophy had 
something to do with ideas that ultimately derived from Hume. 
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2. A god on permanent sabbatical 
In his analysis of the discussion between Leibniz and Clarke (1956) (one 
might just as well say Newton, since he supervised Clarke’s replies), the 
great science historian Alexandre Koyré (1957) hit on a brilliant title to 
condense the ultimate meaning of that dispute: it was a confrontation 
between two different conceptions of divinity, the god of the Sabbath on 
the one hand, and the work-day god on the other. Hume is commonly 
described as a Newtonian philosopher, but if one analyses Hume’s 
positions against the background of this argument one is in for a surprise. 
 The very title with which Clarke published his correspondence with 
Leibniz signifies its content: “A collection of Papers … relating to the 
Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion”. With regard to those 
principles, Leibniz and Clarke/Newton were in agreement on one point: 
there is an order in nature which can be considered proof of an intelligence 
that created it. The difference lies in the fact that for Newton this was not 
enough. We could admire a God who was simply the creator of the natural 
order, but not reverence or adore him. To move from admiration to 
adoration and reverence it was necessary to explain his dominion over the 
world, his (“particular”, in Hume’s terminology) providence over it; in 
other words, his constant intervention in it, for as Newton himself (1999) 
declared in the “General Scholium” in Book 3 of his Principia, a God 
without dominion or providence is nothing else but “Fate and Nature”. 
 Now, it was precisely to make a place for this particularly provident 
god that Newton adjusted his conception of nature in a way that clashed 
with Leibniz’s conception, which left god outside the world, as a purely 
otherworldly intelligence. And thus Newton, and his spokesman Clarke, 
thought that the physical world has an essentially entropic nature, that is, 
that there is a constant loss of energy and an ever-present threat of 
disorder, which is only avoided thanks to the provident intervention of the 
deity. Or else he stripped matter of all active power, so that it was 
suggested that the principle of all action that occurred in the natural 
environment was of a spiritual nature. Or he conceived space and time in 
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an absolute, infinite way, thereby facilitating their assimilation into the 
divine “sensorium”. Or he argued that the universe was a basically empty 
environment, so that the gravitational interaction of the masses dispersed in 
it became an action at a distance, not mechanical but, it was again 
suggested, spiritual. 
 Hume did not develop a systematic philosophy of nature, but from 
his discussion of the ideas of space and time in his A Treatise of Human 
Nature (2007) and from many of the observations with a cosmological 
bearing that are found in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 
(2008) one thing is clear: Hume takes great care to close all the doors by 
which Newton and Clarke allow God to enter the system of the world. 
Thus he does not believe in the void, nor in the absolute nature of space 
and time, but in their relative nature; he does not strip matter of any active 
principle, nor does he consider that chance is an ontological category but a 
mere expression of our lack of knowledge of causes, which, for that very 
reason, operate in a determinist manner, with an inexorable necessity that, 
as Newton indicated, is equivalent not to divine intervention but to nature 
pure and simple. 
 Thus, when Hume denied all particular providence in the realm of 
nature, he was merely closing ranks with Leibniz against Newton and 
Clarke. Banishing God from the natural world. Granting him, after his 
exhausting labour of creation, a well-deserved – and permanent! – 
Sabbatical. After his exhausting labour of creation? Did Hume really think 
it reasonable to believe in the existence of a god who had designed and 
created the inexorably ordered world of nature? Did he oppose a particular 
providence as conceived by Newton but grant the likelihood of a general 
providence? The issue that these questions raise is the delicate matter of 
Hume’s position with regard to the argument of design. 
 First of all, we must not forget that Hume constantly distinguishes 
between two types of religion: vulgar and philosophical or rational. The 
first type works with a concept of God (or gods, in its polytheistic version) 
as a particular providence, that is, as a being who occasionally intervenes 
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in the world. Newton is one example of the many thinkers who have vainly 
tried to provide a rational foundation for this conception, in his case on the 
basis of natural philosophy. The second type works with a strictly 
cosmological concept of God as a general providence, that is, as the 
principle of the general laws that govern the physical world. Is it rational to 
believe, on the basis of the evidence that the world presents, that such a 
principle exists? And, supposing that the answer to this first question is 
affirmative, can we specify its nature? 
 As I understand it, Philo’s famous conclusion in the Dialogues 
expresses the strictly Humean point of view. On the basis of the empirical 
evidence one can only infer an ambiguous proposition concerning the 
existence of one or various causes of the order of the universe, and all we 
can say about the nature of those causes is that they probably bear some 
remote analogy to human intelligence and to it alone, that is, not to any 
other of our faculties; and all this solely – the most important point, 
perhaps – provided we do not lose sight of the fact that one cannot draw 
any lesson about human life from this proposition, and that assent to it will 
really only be conceded by those who are already religious. 
 Stripped of its rhetoric, the concession that Philo/Hume makes to the 
deist or theist is very slight, limited to saying that his belief in the existence 
of a principle of order in the universe is not absurd, but that in any case its 
foundation lies not in empirical evidence but in that empirical evidence 
seen from the viewpoint of faith, and, above all, that this conclusion does 
not justify him in drawing up any kind of moral system on this basis. On 
this point, Newton was right after all. A God conceived as a general 
providence might be deserving of theoretical admiration, but not of 
reverence or adoration. The only worship that a religious man might 
reasonably render to God is that of mere belief in his existence. 
 If we turn from Hume to Wittgenstein we soon realise that, however 
different their philosophies may be, they come together on this point. 
Wittgenstein would agree with the severe epistemological criticism to 
which Hume subjects religious belief. Although he follows a different 
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route from Hume’s, more logical than epistemological, Wittgenstein’s 
conclusion is the same as that of the Scottish thinker. As we read in the 
Tractatus, “God does not reveal himself in the world.” And this is not a 
conclusion of which the mature Wittgenstein repented. As he made clear in 
his 1938 classes on religious belief (Wittgenstein, 1966), someone who, 
like Father O’Hara, tries to justify his belief in God on the basis of factual 
evidence seems to him to be simply someone who is cheating himself. 
Religious belief that seeks such a defence is, in Wittgenstein’s eyes, pure 
and simple superstition. The question of the existence of God is not a 
scientific question. And if it is treated in this way, its fate is determined 
from the very outset. 
 
3. Against the existence of miracles 
But God is on a sabbatical that applies not only to nature but also to 
history. In other words, not only does he not interfere in the course of 
things, he also does not interfere in the course of human affairs. Just as it is 
not possible to believe rationally that the deity occasionally intervenes in 
the order of physical reality, it is also not rationally credible that he 
intervenes in the process of historical events. One cannot rationally believe 
in the existence of miracles. 
 In the first part of the tenth section of the first Enquiry, Hume (2004) 
offers a famous a priori argument against the credibility of testimony that 
attests to miraculous events. 
 Hume sets out from two premises which have a clearly empiricist 
bias. According to the first, the intrinsic probability that we must concede 
to a type of event is proportional to the uniformity of the experience of its 
happening. When that uniformity is absolute, without exceptions, then we 
are dealing with what Hume calls proof: this, in his view, is the case with 
the laws of nature that are established by “firm and unalterable 
experience”. The second premise of Hume’s argument is that the 
trustworthiness of a witness depends on various circumstances which 
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ultimately also come down to the degree of uniformity of the experience 
that we have of the agreement between his testimony and the truth. If our 
experience is that someone has never previously given false testimony, the 
trustworthiness that we should attribute to him must be absolute; that is, as 
high as the probability that an event predicted by a law of nature may 
happen. In other words, we could consider that his trustworthiness is 
proven. 
 Setting out from these two premises, Hume’s argument is that the 
credibility that we must give to testimony that a particular event has 
happened must be in relation to the intrinsic probability of the attested 
event and to the trustworthiness of the witness who attests it. When an 
absolutely trustworthy witness testifies to the happening of an event that 
conforms with a law of nature we should attribute the greatest credibility to 
his testimony; or, in other words, we could consider his testimony as proof 
of the happening of that event. But as the trustworthiness of the witness 
and/or the intrinsic probability of the attested event decrease, the credibility 
of the testimony must also decrease. 
 In the case of miracles, since this category can only be aspired to by 
events that contradict a law of nature, and since these laws are proven, 
however great the trustworthiness of the witness may be his testimony can 
never enjoy credibility. What we would come to at most, if the witness 
were absolutely trustworthy, is the opposition of two proofs – the 
trustworthiness of the witness, on the one hand, and the event predicted by 
the law of nature, on the other – which, for that very reason, would destroy 
each other, obliging us to suspend our judgement. Yet this is an extreme 
case of the theory and one that never occurs in practice, since we will never 
find witnesses whose trustworthiness is proven. So it will never be rational 
to believe in testimony that attests the happening of a miraculous event. 
 In my opinion, if Hume’s argument is understood as presenting a 
general thesis about the way in which we establish the credibility of 
testimony, its validity is rather slight and presents numerous problems. 
Perhaps all the problems can ultimately be traced back to the 
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oversimplified nature of the empiricist principles by which Hume was 
inspired. For is it really true that our belief in the validity of the laws of 
nature is inspired by the uniformity of our experience, or that we calculate 
the trustworthiness that we attribute to a witness on the basis of the 
percentage of true testimony that he has given us? 
 Rather than put forward examples of laws of nature that we have 
never corroborated, let’s consider the number of deaths that we have 
actually witnessed which we take as a basis for considering it proven that 
all men are mortal. If we reflect a little, it is clear that the vast majority of 
the laws of nature and general truths that we take for granted and that, put 
in a late-Wittgensteinian way, constitute the bedrock of our world-picture 
have not been learned by us from experience, nor have we ever seriously 
put them to the test. Rather, they have been transmitted to us by testimony 
(from our parents, teachers, books and so on). 
 Similarly, it is not very realistic to think that the reliability that we 
attribute to people is related to the experience that we have of the truth of 
their testimony. The general attitude towards our interlocutors is, and can 
only be, one of trust. Doubt about the truthfulness of testimony is 
necessarily an exceptional, parasitic attitude. 
 These general defects in the crudely empiricist assumptions of 
Hume’s argument are followed by many other particular but no less 
important defects. Nevertheless, I understand that when Hume’s argument 
is interpreted as a specific argument against the rational credibility of 
miracles, and not as a general argument about the way in which we 
attribute credibility to testimony, it works perfectly. 
 Indeed, when the application of the argument is interpreted thus, it 
can be reconstructed in terms that are far less technical (for example, we do 
not need to contaminate it with any theory of calculation of probabilities), 
but perhaps for that very reason far less convincing. For what it is really 
telling us is that no testimony is capable of compelling us to give a 
supernatural interpretation of an event. 
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 It is not that there is no possibility of the occurrence of an event that 
contradicts what is prescribed by the laws of nature that we hold as true, 
nor that we cannot imagine conditions in which testimony in favour of the 
occurrence of such an event would not be totally believable. The point is 
that in such a case nothing obliges us to adopt a miraculous interpretation 
of what has happened. In the presence of an inexplicable event, the rational 
response is to acknowledge our ignorance of its natural causes but not 
therefore to renounce the principle that such causes must exist. 
 Of course, we could also say that it is a miracle, that is, that the event 
is the result of the intervention of God in the world, either directly or by an 
interposed agent. But what is really crucial from an epistemological point 
of view is to perceive that nothing compels us rationally to interpret the 
evidence in this sense. 
 The same thing happens here as with the argument of design. If 
someone interprets an extraordinary event as a miracle, this is due not to 
the nature of the evidence that supports it but to his religiosity. Where the 
religious person sees a miracle, the non-religious person simply sees, at 
best, an event that cannot be explained by what he knows. 
 Let’s go back to Wittgenstein. As we have suggested, his 
epistemology, at least as outlined in his last work, On Certainty 
(Wittgenstein, 1969), is much more plausible, because less crudely 
empiricist, than Hume’s. Nevertheless, whatever differences they may have 
in the terrain of epistemology, once again they are in total agreement with 
regard to incredulity about miracles. “God does not reveal himself in the 
world.” Neither in the physical nor in the historical world. 
 Towards the end of “A Lecture on Ethics”, Wittgenstein (1993) 
speaks of one of those events that in everyday life we might describe as 
miraculous, thereby understanding an event the like of which we have 
never seen before. The example that he gives is that of the sudden 
transformation of someone into a lion. Well, not even such an 
extraordinary event as this must have an intrinsically miraculous meaning 
in the sense of religious. Of course, Wittgenstein notes, no such meaning 
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would be preserved if we decided to seek the natural explanation of the 
event. If we looked at things in this way all the miraculous aspect would 
disappear, and if we continued to described the event as miraculous all that 
it would mean would be that the event was one that had not yet been 
explained by science, that we had not yet succeeded in placing this event 
with others in a systematic scientific corpus. 
 Furthermore, what is clearly at stake in this whole discussion of the 
credibility of testimony of miracles is the possibility of considering 
religious discourse that incorporates such testimony as a rationally credible 
historical account. Well, Wittgenstein could not be more explicit and 
forthright on this point. As he says on several occasions and in several 
places (for example, in Wittgenstein, 1980), Christianity, as a religious 
belief, cannot find a foundation in any historical basis. A conclusion to 
which our Scottish sceptic would certainly not have been unwilling to 
subscribe. 
 
4. The miracle of existence 
Scepticism is a two-edged weapon, for if, on the one hand, it proscribes the 
rational justification of beliefs of a certain kind, in this case religious, on 
the other hand, if it is consistent, it prevents one from attacking them by 
appealing to rational foundations. What is situated beyond reason cannot 
be questioned by reason. 
 It is possible that when Hume, in the voice of Philo towards the end 
of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, said that to be a 
philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step 
towards being a sound, believing Christian he was using irony. The 
celebrated conclusion with which he ended his discussion of the credibility 
of testimony about miracles, namely that whoever is moved by faith is 
conscious of a miracle in his own person, must also have been ironical. 
And yet, as Berlin reminds us, the Counter-Enlightenment thinkers 
Hamann and Jacobi, though conscious of Hume’s ironic intention, took his 
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declaration quite seriously. For them, as later for Kierkegaard, faith was a 
true miracle. 
 Wittgenstein, who of course felt a much greater respect for religion 
than Hume, was moved by that same scepticism. As he confesses in his 
“Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough” (1993), he also felt the need to 
plunge again and again in the water of doubt. Religious belief, for him, was 
certainly not something rational. Yet he was also not prepared to call it 
irrational, because of that epithet’s pejorative connotation. 
 His entire philosophy of religion sets out, in a way, like that of many 
of the Counter-Enlightenment thinkers, from the very point where Humean 
scepticism concludes: religious belief cannot be justified, or refuted, by any 
evidence … although we might say, if we make the appropriate 
qualifications, that it is based on certain experiences. 
 And those qualifications are necessary because speaking of beliefs 
and experiences may again cause us to make the mistake of taking religion 
as a kind of knowledge, as a theory, and considered thus, Wittgenstein 
thought, it is clearly utterly absurd and puerile and any pretension that it 
should compete with scientific theory would be preposterous. 
 This may be why, in his reflections on Culture and Value, he referred 
to the immense harm that the word “believe” has done to religion. For, 
supposing religious belief is taken as a doxastic state, if religious opinion 
were a belief it is evident that it would be a mistaken opinion … so 
mistaken that the magnitude of the mistake makes it hard to believe that 
anyone could commit it and, therefore, that religious belief really does 
constitute a doxastic state. An argument that Wittgenstein put forward in 
his Lectures on Religious Belief. 
 But then, what kind of belief is religious belief? And what kind of 
experience is the experience on which it is based? And what is this 
relationship, how are this experience and religious belief related? In a very 
late remark, made in 1950, Wittgenstein (1980) says that what shows us 
the existence of God is not visions or any other sort of sensory experience 
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but, for example, suffering of various kinds, and that these experiences do 
not show him to us in the same way that a sensory impression shows us an 
object or allows us to conjecture it. 
 For him, the relationship between religious belief and the 
experiences on which it is based is not an epistemic relationship. 
Experience does not justify religious belief in the way in which a visual 
experience justifies a cognitive belief. Also, religious experience is not a 
sensory experience of either an external or internal sense. For what 
Wittgenstein sets against visual experience is not pain but suffering 
(Leiden). These are what we might call emotional, vital or even spiritual 
experiences. They are experiences which, in some way, imbue all that 
happens to us, the whole of our experience. We could also say that they 
give a kind of overall meaning. 
 In the remark he made in 1950 Wittgenstein gave suffering as an 
example of religious experience, and in “A Lecture on Ethics”, in 1929, he 
gave three other examples of such experiences, namely: feeling absolutely 
safe, feeling guilty, and feeling wonder at the existence of the world (his 
experience par excellence). 
 These three experiences are characterised by their global nature. 
Feeling absolutely safe means feeling safe not from anything in particular 
but from everything, whatever happens. It is the feeling that anything that 
may happen to me, even being struck by lightning, would not be bad. 
Similarly, the experience of feeling guilty to which Wittgenstein seems to 
refer is not the experience of feeling that we should apologise for 
something or other but of feeling that our whole life is worthless. And the 
same applies to wondering at the existence of the world. It is not being 
surprised at something abnormal that happens, but feeling that anything 
that happens, however customary, is wonderful. 
 Now Wittgenstein says of these three experiences that they can be 
expressed in religious terms. And so we can say that “we are in God’s 
hands”, or that “God condemns our conduct”, or that “God created the 
world” to express each of them, respectively. It would also not be difficult 
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to understand what is involved in the suffering as a religious experience to 
which Wittgenstein was referring in 1950. Very probably, feeling that our 
pain is not gratuitous or arbitrary but that it has some meaning, that it is not 
pointless. And we might express this by saying something like “God is 
putting us to the test”. 
 Perhaps we are now in a position to form a clearer idea of the status 
that Wittgenstein concedes to religious belief. It is certainly not a doxastic 
state caused by a sensory experience that can, in itself, be asserted as a 
justification of its truth. Rather, religious belief is a way of expressing 
certain spiritual experiences. 
 This expressive quality that Wittgenstein attributes to religious 
beliefs enables us, on the one hand, to understand some other 
characteristics that he attributes to them, such as, for example, not coming 
into contradiction with each other. Since they are not states of a doxastic 
nature, they do not have a representative character. To say that a religious 
belief is mistaken would be like saying that crying is a mistaken expression 
of happiness. The fact is that crying can be as natural an expression of 
happiness as laughing. Or singing, or dancing. 
 For Wittgenstein, it is innate in man to act in certain ways when he 
has certain experiences. For example, beating the ground with a stick when 
he is furious. He does not do this because he believes that he can achieve 
anything by doing so, or because he thinks that the ground is to blame for 
what makes him furious and he wants to punish it. These, he says, are what 
we might call instinct-actions. 
 Religious practices must be understood as one type of this kind of 
action. They are the crystallisation of the human tendency to 
symbolisation, to the expression of experiences of a certain kind. And 
religious beliefs can only be understood as being embedded in these 
practices. They themselves form part of the ritual, they are rituals. 
 It is this practical dimension, we might add, that can enable us to 
understand the fact that with regard to them we still speak of belief, 
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defying the danger of confusion of which Wittgenstein warned. For 
ultimately, as the American pragmatists clearly saw, beliefs are not so 
much representations as guidance for action. But what, indeed, could 
religious belief be other than impassioned guidance for action? In his 
Lectures on Religious Belief Wittgenstein discusses what believing in the 
Last Judgement might mean. His thesis is that believing in something like 
this cannot mean making a prediction, based on evidence, about a series of 
events that will happen in the future. What the adoption of such a belief 
means is, rather, beginning to govern one’s whole life by it; for example, 
deciding to act as if we had to render an account for what we do. Belief in 
the Last Judgement expresses this global way of experiencing our own 
actions. This belief provides us, as it were, with an image that serves as a 
guide and reminder in our conduct. 
 Clearly, understood thus, religious belief does not need to be based 
on any empirical evidence, neither on the verification of order in the 
physical world, nor on the recognition of a miraculous event in the sense of 
the term that refers to the unusual and improbable nature of something that 
happens. For the religious man, the mere existence of the world is more 
than miracle enough. 
 
5. Between superstition and enthusiasm 
Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief has the undoubted merit of 
representing a sharp reminder for the naively positivist and evolutionist 
conceptions which interpret that belief as the outcome of some kind of 
epistemic deficiency and which therefore consider that science’s 
systematic and efficient method of cognitive production will wipe out 
religion. Yet even Wittgenstein himself constantly admits that, as he 
metaphorically expresses it, science sends the religious sensibility of 
mankind to sleep. 
 Similarly, according to Wittgenstein, religious beliefs do not come 
into contradiction with each other and this is due to their expressive nature, 
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their quality of symbolic crystallisation, of allegorical manifestation of 
certain experiences. But the fact is that the history of humanity has been 
and, to a large extent, still is the history of a struggle between religions. 
 Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion seems incapable, therefore, of 
doing justice to certain historical phenomena. And this inability prompts us 
to wonder about the status of his theses. Are they really descriptive or 
prescriptive? Do they tell us what religious belief is for most of mankind, 
or what it should be (perhaps on the basis of what it is for a few)? In 
Humean terms: is Wittgenstein providing us with a characterisation of 
vulgar religion, or is what he is doing, knowingly or not, providing us with 
a philosophical religion that is, in fact, erected on clearly sceptical 
foundations? 
 On the face of it, the characterisation that Wittgenstein gives of 
religion does not seem to correspond to vulgar religion, that is, to religion 
as lived and understood by most people. The only option that remains, 
therefore, is to say that Wittgenstein is putting forward a philosophical 
religion. But, it is only fair to admit, a rather strange philosophical religion. 
At least in the eyes of a Humean. 
 In fact, when Hume speaks of philosophical religion he tends to think 
of a religious feeling based on a fundamentally intellectual experience: the 
realisation of the general order of the world, the experience that underlies 
the argument of design. Moreover, as has already been said, the 
philosophers’ God is an essentially cosmological concept, without moral, 
or rather political, consequences. For the religious philosopher could 
certainly experience various kinds of emotion with his view of the order of 
the universe as a sacred order – wonder, satisfaction, consolation and so 
forth – which might prove of great importance in the overall context of his 
life. What it does not seem that one could deduce from this experience is a 
set of precepts with regulatory power for others. This philosophical 
religion, if that is what it really is, would be incapable of engendering any 
clerical power. And this, limiting the power of the clergy, is something that 
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Hume saw as a maxim that was both philosophically and politically 
healthy and reasonable. 
 Of course, if we are to judge by its consequences, it is obvious that 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion also has this – in Hume’s eyes – 
healthy consequence. His instinct leads him to mistrust Saint Paul, as he 
says in his reflections on Culture and Value, because he has a tang not of 
the Gospels but of the Church, of hierarchy, rank and responsibilities. 
Moreover, the fact that Wittgenstein’s philosophy has these consequences 
may be a symptom of its strictly philosophical nature … but at the same 
time, and for this very reason, of its unsuitability as a theory of vulgar 
religion, for what would have to be explained, and what Wittgenstein’s 
theory certainly does not explain, is the tendency of religious belief to 
generate clerics, hierarchies, responsibilities and so on. 
 But let’s go back to the particular character that a Humean would 
find in what he would consider Wittgenstein’s philosophical religion. Since 
it is not based on its consequences, as we have just seen, it would have to 
be based on the origin that is postulated for religious belief. And so indeed 
it is. For Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion does not postulate an 
intellectual experience as the origin of religious belief, but rather a series of 
experiences that are more of an emotional nature. Yet for Hume this is 
precisely what the origin of vulgar religion is. 
 Indeed, Hume also considers that religious belief is practically innate 
in mankind, although in his “Introduction” to The Natural History of 
Religion (2008) he points out that it cannot spring from an original instinct 
or primary impression of human nature because it is not completely 
universal and far less is it uniform in the specific form it takes. Similarly, 
he considers that something very similar to poetic imagination, the ability 
to give allegorical and prosopopoeial expression to certain experiences that 
have to do with the emotions aroused by the events of human life, lies at 
the basis of religious belief. 
 However, there are two important aspects that differentiate Hume 
from Wittgenstein. The first is that, although Hume recognises that the 
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emotions that form the basis of religious belief may be either positive 
(hope, gratitude, etc.) or negative (suffering, fear, etc.), he insists that the 
emotions from which it originates are more often the latter. As for 
Wittgenstein, although the experiences that we have mentioned as being 
situated by him at the basis of religious belief are also positive (feeling 
safe, wonder) and negative (the feeling of guilt, suffering), the fact is that, 
as I have discussed elsewhere (Sanfélix, 2007), his religious experience 
was fundamentally pessimistic and unhealthy. 
 The other great difference between Hume and Wittgenstein is that for 
the former this emotional basis would not in itself be sufficient to generate 
a popular religion, and it would be necessary for ignorance to be added to 
it. This is a point that would separate Hume from the expressive 
conception of religious belief and would place him closer to cognitive 
conceptions such as those of the positivists. In this case, Wittgenstein’s 
arguments against Frazer would equally serve against Hume. But in this 
regard it must be said that many of the arguments that Wittgenstein puts 
forward against the cognitive conception of religious belief can turn back, 
like a boomerang, against his own expressive conception of it. For 
example, when he says that primitive people do not really believe that their 
priest can make it rain because if it were so he would perform his 
ceremony in the dry periods and not, as he does, in the rainy season, one 
might reply that, for the same reason, one cannot consider their belief as 
merely expressive, for then the time of year when the ceremony was 
performed would be a matter of utter indifference to them. 
 At a certain point in his criticism of Frazer Wittgenstein seems to be 
aware of this kind of difficulty and says that the notion of supernatural 
power to control the course of nature that a people recognises in its ruler is 
adapted to the experience of that people and of the ruler himself (for 
example, we might say, by not making him invoke rain except in the rainy 
season); and that this implies a certain hypocrisy, the same as is involved 
in most of the things that people do. 
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 In other words, it is as if men needed to believe that their religious 
beliefs were true but at the same time were too afraid that they were false 
to put them to the test. And it is clear to me that this shows that the correct 
position in this matter is a complicated intermediate point between the 
cognitive and the expressive conceptions of religious belief. However, 
whatever the position on this point may be (and, in any case, it would have 
to be developed in greater detail), I think we are now well placed to 
understand what Hume would find strange in Wittgenstein’s conception of 
religion, namely the fact that the version of it that he presents is devoid of 
all superstition. 
 Wittgenstein’s believer is like the muzhik in Tolstoy’s novels: simple 
but honest. There is a sort of nostalgia for purity and simplicity1 which 
lead to a kind of primitivism2. The origin was better than what we have 
come to. This can be seen clearly when Wittgenstein reproaches Frazer for 
his inability to imagine a priest who is not like an English parson of our 
time, with all his stupidity and vapidness. But, we have to ask ourselves, 
why does Wittgenstein suppose that priests of some other time would be 
any less stupid or vapid? 
 Basically, Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion remains a 
sophisticated intellectual defence of a religious belief idealised as simple 
and innocent. That, I think, is why Hume would have considered 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion as a case of false consciousness: 
when it sought to describe a popular religion, basically it was simply 
putting forward a philosophical religion. As Hume did not have that 
beatific view of ordinary people, he was under no illusion about the 
mercenary, superstitious nature of many of their religious beliefs. Of 
course the peasant is giving expression to an emotional state when he prays 
to God or, more frequently, to a saint or virgin (an inevitable lapse of the 
                                                 
1 Scorn for all theology and all attempts to rationalise or intellectualise religious belief 
is a clear consequence of Wittgenstein’s proposals and another of the points in which 
his philosophy does not do justice to the phenomenon of religion. 
2 It is worth recalling here that when Wittgenstein wished to emigrate to the USSR he 
wanted to go not to the cities but to the more primitive and rural far east. 
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monotheistic creed into polytheism) for it to rain; but this does not make 
him any less convinced that his prayer can help to bring rain (and I would 
venture to add that this conviction is a transcendental condition of the 
seriousness of his ritual practice). 
 At any rate, although Hume would consider that Wittgenstein’s was 
a philosophical religion malgré lui, he might also add that it is a 
philosophical religion that has affinities with a certain variety of vulgar 
religion. For Hume, superstition is not the only possible degeneration of 
true religion3; there is also enthusiasm, a variety of popular religion which 
originates in emotions that are the opposite of those that are generated by 
superstition and which maintains that same contrariety in its consequences: 
an individualism, intimism and anti-clericalism that seem to bring it close 
to what Wittgenstein proposes4. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have seen how Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies of religion 
intersect. Perhaps not by chance, given the direct influence of the former 
on certain authors who, immediately or intermediately, influenced the 
latter. We have also seen how they diverge. For ultimately they are two 
very different attitudes: non-religious (not to say anti-religious) in one 
case; philo-religious (not to say clearly religious) in the other; though in 
the end, as we know, philosophy is a question of character. 
 I have the impression that, precisely because Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of religion shares a sceptical basis with Hume’s and because of 
                                                 
3 What Hume may understand by this is something that I shall not go into here. I shall 
only note that his position would most probably be very close to that of an Erastianism 
that might philosophically be founded on deism or, as in his case, on scepticism. 
4 Although Wittgenstein was buried in accordance with the Catholic rite, the most 
conspicuous example of Christian superstition for Hume, we might well say of him 
what the Scottish philosopher said of the Jansenists in his essay “Of Superstition and 
Enthusiasm”: that they “are enthusiasts, and zealous promoters of the passionate 
devotion, and of the inward life; little influenced by authority; and, in a word, but half 
catholics”. (Hume, 1994) 
To get rid of the Torments of the Mind.  
Hume and Wittgenstein on Religion 
45
its emotive, expressive nature, it would have little to oppose to Hume’s 
agnosticism or atheism. Wittgenstein could see in Hume someone who, as 
he notes in his diaries “Movements of Thought” (2000), has got rid himself 
from religion and thus from the torments of the mind. And this image 
would be correct, since philosophy, for Hume, was undoubtedly a way of 
achieving the tranquillity of the soul. 
 Hume, in turn, would probably have seen Wittgenstein as a religious 
person, and therefore spiritually tormented, but also, we might say, as 
someone who professes the least harmful, and therefore most respectable, 
form of religion. After all, Hume already knew that enthusiasm was more 
likely than superstition to become a friend of freedom and tolerance, 
despite its flirtations with egalitarian and revolutionary radicalism. All of 
which, incidentally, might also be applied to Wittgenstein, not only 
because of his particular pious Bolshevism (in this regard, see Sanfélix, 
2008) but also because, ultimately, he never ceased to see philosophy as a 
fight. 
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The Existence of God  
(According to Wittgenstein) 
 
JOAQUÍN JAREÑO ALARCÓN 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally acknowledged as one of the most 
renowned philosophers in history. A thinker deeply concerned with 
philosophical problems, he was highly interested in the status of religious 
beliefs and the role they play in our lives. As a central idea as the concept 
“God” is for such kind of belief, Wittgenstein paid special attention to its 
meaning and discussed the role that rational argumentative processes 
played on it. 
 Wittgenstein’s view on religion is, so to speak, anti-intellectualist1, 
something that will not change throughout his life in spite of changes in 
Wittgenstein’s ideas on meaning. In what follows, I will analyse to what 
extent attempting to rationally probe the existence of God is, according to 
Wittgenstein, a mistake.  
 What Wittgenstein understands with the term “God” is a complex 
and disputed issue. Though the depth of his reflection urges him to deal 
with the matter in different ways, it is true that there is a unitary 
background in his conception of a divine being, as by education and 
cultural environment Wittgenstein inherits Judaeo-Christian tradition. His 
reflection on it, at least as it abruptly begins on 11.06.1916 in his 
Notebooks, shows that the analysis of such a religious concept is a delicate 
matter and that the personal experience it is attached to plays a key role in 
the discussion and requires careful consideration.  
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Wittgenstein, 2000, 19.04.1937. Also 15.11 (or 12). 1931: 
“Christianity is really saying: let go of all intelligence”. 
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 God escapes from our understanding of facts. That is the basic reason 
why it is so difficult to specify who or what he is. Experiences in the 
trenches of First World War and readings that grab Wittgenstein’s attention 
make him associate the idea of God to mystical experience, but the 
traditional conceptualization of God as having a paternal (providential) 
behaviour is still present in Wittgenstein’s conception. God becomes the 
answer to the problematic character of human life, and can be identified 
with the meaning of life. It is so that we can speak of facts surrounding us 
as something given, and such quality of being given shows that there is 
something (a will) alien to us. Something alien from a metaphysical –
constitutive – perspective, though we experience an ontological 
dependence on it. So, we are speaking of two ontological poles we cannot 
separate. This is what allows Wittgenstein to say that God is also the world 
independent of our will (Notebooks, 08.07.1916). The Tractatus doctrine 
shows that it is, however, a concept with no reference, and it cannot take 
part in any state of affairs. But, can we believe in something that does not 
exist? 
 This debate on the question of the meaning of life leads Wittgenstein 
to take into consideration the epistemological status of religion and ethics. 
In the Tractatus we find that the only meaningful language is the scientific 
one. We find no place in such language to talk meaningfully about God, 
nor can we argue about his existence. Why such argumentation is not 
possible is a topic strongly discussed. How God remains out of any 
argument is something to be treated here in what has to do with the 
possibility/impossibility to demonstrate his existence. Wittgenstein directly 
deals with the cosmological and ontological arguments in an attempt to 
show their fallacious character. 
 
1. The need to argue about God. The dogmatic value of arguments 
about his existence. 
The arguments about God’s existence have usually been posited as a sort 
of rational guarantee for religious beliefs, in an attempt to justify them. 
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They have not been used to convince sceptics, though have been put 
forward to refute their doubts.  
 By means of its definition, the idea of dogma implies the 
impossibility of any doubt, criticism, or answer by rational argument2. It 
has to be accepted without any kind of intellectual counterparts. Accepting 
a dogma implies submitting to an authority and represents –so Wittgenstein 
thinks- the end of any argumentation. A dogma governs thinking, and 
limits its freedom of movement. A dogma allows no discussion and leads 
doctrinal developments and the specific understanding of how personal and 
group behaviours must go. Wittgenstein critically reacts to the demands 
derived from dogmas, given that they eliminate the possibility for debates 
and hold reason –so Wittgenstein thought- to unnatural limits. However, 
there is some ambiguity in Wittgenstein’s approach to this problem, due to 
the fact that regarding religious discourse rational argumentation must be 
left aside; first, because it brings paradoxes that cannot be rationally 
accepted3; second, it undermines the existential meaning of religious 
statements. 
 Consequently, Wittgenstein rejected that the demonstration of the 
existence of God was considered a dogma by the Catholic Church. It is in 
the First Vatican Council (1869-1870), when it is dogmatically proposed 
that the existence of God can be known with certainty by natural reason. 
Such dogma comes to help natural theology, though it does not exclude 
compatibility between faith and reason. It is the authority coming from its 
being a dogma what makes Wittgenstein react negatively, as he pointed out 
in a conversation with Maurice O’Connor Drury: 
It is a dogma of the Roman Church that the existence of God can be 
proved by natural reason. Now this dogma would make it impossible for 
me to be a Roman Catholic. If I thought of God as another being like 
                                                 
2 See Wittgenstein, 1980, 11.09.1937. 
3 Cf. Idem 24.09.1937: “Religion says: Do this! –Think like that! But it cannot justify 
this and it only need try to do so to become repugnant; since for every reason it gives, 
there is a cogent counter-reason” (italics in the original). 
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myself, outside myself, only infinitely more powerful, then I would regard 
it as my duty to defy him.4 
 Apparently, Wittgenstein’s reaction shows the philosopher’s typical 
attitude of disagreement before dogmatic obstacles. But it is more accurate 
to say that such attitude is expressing a justification of the supernatural 
character of the key concept of religion. A demonstration of God’s 
existence would limit his very divine condition, and Wittgenstein’s own 
words show what would be a distortion of God’s essential ineffability, 
because in such case God would be “another being like myself”, what 
would compel us to discuss with Him any issue our reason finds 
incomprehensible –or unjustifiable- if we take for granted that God must 
be omnipotent and omniscient. 
 Rational argumentation is something Wittgenstein wants to leave 
apart from religious discourse, so that we can speak of a God who is 
‘spirit’, a God to whom we pray and who listens to our prayers; a God who 
acts as loving father and who redeems us. All this without any 
contradiction. The result of it is the submission of reason to belief, and to 
avoid arguments –as they are useless- to make room for faith: 
“Go on, relieve! It does no harm. ‘Believing’ means, submitting to an 
authority. Having once submitted to it, you cannot then, without rebelling 
against it, first call it in question & then once again find it convincing.5 
 A review of Wittgenstein’s work as well as of his personal comments 
will help us see what kind of interest Wittgenstein had on traditional 
arguments used to demonstrate God’s existence. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Rhees 1981, 123:  See, in this sense, the remark appearing in Movements of Thought  
dated on 17.03.1937: “I want to quarrel with God”, and also the one dated the 
following day: “If you want to quarrel with God, that means that you have a false 
concept of God. You are superstitious. You have an incorrect concept when you get 
angry with fate. You should rearrange our concepts. Contentment with your fate ought 
to be the first command of wisdom”. 
5 Wittgenstein, 1980, ca. 1944. 
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2. Cosmological Argument 
In the Tractatus the only possible demonstration is logical demonstration. 
Something that does not increase our knowledge specifically. Deductions 
can only be made a priori (*5.133), and we cannot infer a state of affairs 
from another state of affairs. Wittgenstein is clearly explicit in his rejection 
of the logical nature of causal nexus. Paragraphs 5.136 and 5.1361 clearly 
show his point of view and they lead to a statement not only critical in its 
content but it sounds –so to speak- programmatic in its intention: 
“Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus”6 (italics in the original). All 
this shows the logical autonomy of states of affairs to the extent that it can 
be said that by the fact that today the sun is out we cannot deduce it will be 
out tomorrow. The only existing necessity is logical necessity (*6.375).  
 Let us briefly remember that the cosmological argument is the 
argument stressing the importance of connection between cause and effect, 
which leads us to conclude that there is an ‘uncaused cause’ as the origin 
of the sequence of causes and their related effects. It is Aquinas’ Second 
Argument, one of his Five Ways (Argument from Efficient Cause), and it 
has been amply used to deal with the existence of God!. The sequence 
cause-effect seems to demand the existence of a First Cause which would 
give a logical solution to the illogical nature of an unending sequence. The 
existence of such Cause allows us to explain the universe from its origin. 
Taking into account its existence we can get to its cause by means of a 
logical explanation. Here, we are speaking of an a posteriori 
demonstration; that which goes from effect to cause. What for Wittgenstein 
is clearly problematic is the status of a logical connection concerning states 
of affairs. Understanding such issue we can derive a Wittgensteinian 
rejection of cosmological argument in terms of logic. But the thing is that –
as Wittgenstein points out-religious statements do not refer to states of 
affairs. Are we giving a special epistemological status to such kind of 
                                                 
6 See, also, Wittgenstein, 1998, (15.10.1916): “But it is clear that the causal nexus is 
not a nexus at all”. 
! See, for instance, Hawking, 1988. Hume, 1980. Mackie,1982. Rowe,1975, etc. 
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statements (“God exists”, “God is the First Cause”)? Such is not the case. 
We have only accepted the impossibility of a logical deduction that 
obviously cannot be valid for a senseless picture, that which has no 
possibility either being true or false (religious statements). So, once the 
nonsensical character of religious discourse has been argued, we are lead to 
ask what we do with such kind of statements; between them “God exists” 
has a key role. The consequence coming from the Tractatus is that such 
statements are not proper statements, so “we must pass over in silence” 
(*7). 
 In Wittgenstein’s Second Philosophy the cosmological argument 
does not find support if we consider his interpretation of the use of 
“cause”. Using causality in the religious realm is attempting to make 
religious language perform a task it is not able to: speaking of the world as 
scientific theories can do. The idea of cause is understood by means of the 
role it plays when it is used. It belongs to the domain of relationships 
between facts and we learn its use when we connect (or see connected) 
events. There is a language game where we learn how to connect cause and 
effect, that is, how to use both terms. We establish such connection by 
means of an impulsive –basic, natural- reaction that is at the back of its 
meaning. Such reaction allows us to use the connection as a fundamental –
primary- certainty on how objects behave or the relationships there are 
between them. So, the very idea of cause is conceived in the game as that 
element of it which cancels the possibility of a continuous doubt on how 
things behave: “Doubting –I might say- has to come to an end somewhere. 
At some point we have to say –without doubting: that happens because of 
this cause”8. Doubt is always something coming after previous certainties. 
We use the concept even where we do not see connection, but we foresee 
there is. As a primitive fact of our behaviour we have learnt to play with 
the idea of ‘cause’: “The simple form (and that is the prototype) of the 
cause-effect game is determining the cause, not doubting”9. It is not the 
                                                 
8 “Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness”; in: Klagge/Nordmann (eds.), 1993, 377. 
9 Ibid., 397. 
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case of a special knowledge but a use derived from something we always 
have at hand, as we talk about a very basic reaction. 
 To what extent can we relate this to religious language and the 
proposal of cosmological demonstration? In this case we have to take into 
account two circumstances. The first is that logical connection cause-effect 
gives way to how we use the terms. That is, logical relation belongs to the 
language game of logic, and the relationship between cause and effect 
appears in the use we make of it –as a basic certainty- when speaking of 
facts. Moving its meaning to religious language is something illegitimate if 
we want to maintain the connotations of such use. In a remark of 1950, 
Wittgenstein himself asks:  
“If the believer in God looks around & asks ‘Where does everything I see 
come from? Where does all that come from?’, what he hankers after is not 
a (causal) explanation; and the point of his question is that it is the 
expression of this hankering. He is expressing, then, a stance towards all 
explanations. –But how is this manifested in his life?”10 
 We cannot use the connection cause-effect as we do when we refer to 
ordinary events. First, because – as we have pointed out – such connection 
is directly linked to basic reactions guaranteeing our uses. Second, 
speaking about God is not like speaking about ordinary events. We are 
dealing with something extraordinary and supernatural. If we could speak 
about God as we do about facts, God would be an object like others, what 
would deprive Him of his divine attributes. He, then, would not be God. In 
a certain sense we can notice a sort of Humean background regarding the 
idea of cause, as we acquire a steady certainty with -so to speak- merely 
subjective support because of our tendency to trust regularities11. So, such 
confidence is associated with experiences of very basic connexions, but has 
                                                 
10 Wittgenstein, 1980, 1950. 
11 Cf.  Brenner, 2004, 54. 
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nothing to do with supernatural issues12: their use is fixed by the role they 
play in our lives (in the human form of life).   
 
3. Ontological Argument 
This kind of argument has also an illustrious past, and has been currently 
reformulated13, what shows the fecundity coming out from its inner 
coherence. It is the prototype of an a priori argument; it proceeds from the 
concept of God to the existence of such being named by the concept. But it 
is a kind of argument where one is not actually talking about the existence 
of anything. Wittgenstein writes: 
 God’s essence is said to guarantee his existence –what this really means 
is that here what is at issue is not the existence of something. 
For could one not equally say that the essence of colour guarantees its 
existence? As opposed, say to the white elephant. For it really only 
means: I cannot explain what ‘colour’ is, what the word ‘colour’ means, 
without the help of a colour sample. So in this case there is no such thing 
as explaining ‘what it would be like if the colours were to exist.14 
 We cannot think of God as a nonexistent being, given that the use we 
make of the concept is shaping its own characteristics. We cannot conceive 
God as nonexistent, so a demonstration of Him is absurd. The very use of 
the concept ‘God’ shows that we cannot say  “what it would be like if there 
were God”15, because the possibility of his absence (inexistence) is 
something not included in the language game that has such concept as a 
key concept. 
                                                 
12 Indeed, for Wittgenstein, the idea of ‘cause’ is strongly problematic any time we 
want to use it in theology. See MS 130, 9-10 (Nachlass. The Bergen Electronic 
Edition. Accessed via Oxford University), 26.05.1946 (?): “As far as I can see the 
concept of causality plays a devastating role in theology. If one speaks, for example, of 
the supernatural effects of prayer or of the sacraments, what does “effect” mean in this 
context –or what does it mean when we don’t understand God’s intentions? What does 
“intention” mean in this context?” (English translation by Margaret Breugelmans). 
13 Millican, 2004; Leftow, 2005; Dombrowski, 2006; Lowe, 2007. 
14 Wittgenstein, 1980, 17.03.1949. 
15 Ibid., 17.03.1949. 
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 Attempting a demonstration of God’s existence in this context is like 
attempting to demonstrate that colours exist. The presence of them in the 
language game of facts is unavoidable if we want to play the game 
appropriately. We learn how to use the terms with which the language 
game becomes coherent from specific usages. God’s essence includes his 
existence as one of the characteristics that make comprehensible the use of 
such term. So, there is no logical derivation to undoubtedly demonstrate 
God’s existence. This is the condition of use of the religious language 
game such as we know it. This is how we play the game. The existence of 
God is assumed as a special certainty of the language game in which it is 
being used. 
 
4. “Historical” Argument 
Before analyzing how we can speak of God properly, let us briefly evaluate 
what we could call the “historical argument” or the argument based on 
“historical evidence”. In principle, such argument faces an obstacle in the 
impossibility to find a reference for the term “God”. In the Tractatus, we 
found that speaking of ‘super-facts’ or of facts of supernatural character 
was inconsistent. But in his subsequent reflections, Wittgenstein also 
stresses that treating God as a mere object16 is paradoxical, what however 
does not preclude speaking of Him, something Wittgenstein frequently 
does. But we speak of God in so far as it is possible to do so within the 
proper language game. Let us analyse to what extent –according to 
Wittgenstein- we can speak of “historical evidence” to justify the existence 
of God. Two are the issues to address here: textual and testimonial 
evidence and evidence coming from miracles. Let us begin with the last 
one. 
                                                 
16 Cf. Wittgenstein, 1983, 59: “If the question arises as to the existence of a god or 
God, it plays an entirely different role to that of the existence of any person or object I 
ever heard of”. Cf., also, Wittgenstein, 2000, on the paradoxical character of God’s 
existence as another historical fact. 
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 The evidential value of miracles is something discussed by 
Wittgenstein in a relatively early text. We use to understand the existence 
of miracles as evidence of God’s action in the world. The acceptance of 
such exceptional circumstances as miracles are, would seem to guarantee 
that a supernatural Being is guiding events so that they behave in 
accordance to his will. The existence of such circumstances points at an 
origin transcending typically human ways of knowledge and control of 
reality. But Wittgenstein himself asks: Can experiences, facts, have 
supernatural value? In his “A Conference on Ethics” Wittgenstein deals 
with the matter and concludes that such a consideration of facts is 
paradoxical: “It is a paradox that an experience, a fact, should seem to have 
supernatural value”1!. Wittgenstein’s definition of miracle may seem to be 
somehow inaccurate, but it helps him to make the aforementioned 
criticism: “an event the like of which we have never yet seen”18. Such 
definition could evidently include many facts that in ordinary language we 
would never consider as proper miracles, but Wittgenstein uses it to stress 
that we have different ways to look at things. 
 We can imagine an actually extraordinary fact. Wittgenstein gives 
the example of someone in the audience whose head suddenly grows as a 
lion’s one and begins roaring. If the matter is scientifically investigated, 
analysing the causes producing such surprising mutation, we do not need to 
call it ‘miracle’ anymore. If we look at it from a scientific perspective, 
anything miraculous disappears. It has nothing to do with any kind of 
“providential” intervention. If by miracle we mean “a fact has not yet been 
explained by science which again means that we have hitherto failed to 
group this fact with others in a scientific system”19, we are simply saying 
that our analysis is denying –from the beginning- the possibility to treat 
such fact as something supernatural. There are no facts that can be 
considered miracles in the absolute sense of the word. In a remark of 1929, 
Wittgenstein will write: “Only something supernatural can express the 
                                                 
1! “A Lecture on Ethics”; in Wittgenstein 1993, 43. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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Supernatural”. It is here where language fails to do its work. We cannot 
find any kind of evidence to use it as an argument.  
 Wittgenstein’s later reflection on miracles is still stressing that they 
are extremely rare facts, but facts after all, and they must be understood as 
such. The interpretation of their absolute character is given by that way of 
looking at them as gestures from God, so that such special consideration 
comes from how religious faith gives an interpretation of them. The two 
ways to look at the event –as a fact in material terms and as a miracle in 
supernatural terms- differ in essence as in practice. We cannot forget the 
symbolic character of miracles nor the influence that as such may exert on 
our conduct, but they cannot be accepted as evidence of anything beyond 
themselves as brute facts. Talking about the miracle of the Wedding at 
Cana, Wittgenstein writes:  
What is magnificent is also not that Jesus provides wine for the people at 
the Wedding & also not that he gives it to them in such an unheard of 
manner. It must be the marvellous that gives this action content and 
meaning. And by that I don’t mean the extraordinary or the unprecedented 
but the spirit in which it is done and for which the transformation of water 
into wine is only a symbol (as it were) a gesture. A gesture which (of 
course) can only be made by the one who can do this extraordinary thing. 
The miracle must be understood as gesture, as expression if it is to speak 
to us. I could also say: It is a miracle only when he does it who does it in a 
marvellous spirit. Without this spirit it is only an extraordinary strange 
fact. I must, as it were, know the person already before I can say that it is 
a miracle. I must read the whole of it already in the right spirit in order to 
sense the miracle in it.20 
                                                 
20 Wittgenstein, 2000, 06.05.1931 and 1980, ca. 1944: “A miracle is, as it were, a 
gesture which God makes. As a man sits quietly & then makes an impressive gesture, 
God lets the world run on smoothly & then accompanies the words of a Saint by a 
symbolic occurrence, a gesture of nature. It would be an instance if, when a saint has 
spoken, the trees around him bowed, as if in reverence. –Now, do I believe that this 
happens? I don’t. The only way for me to believe in a miracle in this sense would be to 
be impressed by an occurrence in this particular way. So that I should say e.g.: “It was 
impossible to see these trees & not to feel that they were responding to the words”. 
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 So, miracles must be discarded as evidence to guarantee the 
existence of any supernatural power, given that their value is prejudged 
beforehand by our attitude towards facts. To see them as miracles we have 
to do it in the right spirit, which means that they are in direct dependence 
of religious discourse, where there is a specific predisposition to live life 
and to interpret it. 
 Another line of argument is that which refers to textual/testimonial 
evidence, that is, the one we can find in those texts where –in terms of 
historical but also theological valuation- it is spoken about God’s existence 
and about Christ’s consideration as God himself. The New as well as the 
Old Testament are the basic and singular references for that, and 
Wittgenstein treats them discussing some of their details. Let us see how 
Wittgenstein deals with them.   
 In principle, neither the New nor the Old Testament own historic 
relevance, which does not make them be unimportant. There can perfectly 
be historic background, but in terms of what “God exists” means such 
background is not actually relevant. In a conversation with M. O. Drury, 
Wittgenstein calls the Old Testament “Hebrew folklore”, a term that 
conditions the value of those stories in such part of the Bible. Analysing 
the role folklore has in a culture may help determining the scope of its 
meaning and understanding the connexion between symbols and human 
behaviour. But it is the symbolic value the one which predominates, fixing 
the criteria of belonging (individually and communally) to a specific 
culture. Wittgenstein uses the expression folklore to stress the narrative 
importance of what the Old Testament is telling:  “For me too the Old 
Testament is a collection of Hebrew folklore –yes, I would use that 
                                                                                                                                                        
Just as I might say “It is impossible to see the face of this dog & not to see that he is 
alert & full of attention to what his master is doing”. And I can imagine that the mere 
report of the words & life of a saint can make someone believe the reports that the 
trees bowed. But I am not so impressed”. See, also, Culture and Value, 08.09.1946: 
“The purely corporeal can be uncanny. Compare the way angels and devils are 
portrayed. A so-called “miracle” must be connected with this. It must be as it were a 
sacred gesture” (italics in the original). 
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expression”21. The important thing here is how religious feelings are 
expressed; they respond to our basic and fundamental interests. Something 
Wittgenstein sets clearly in his comments to Frazer’s The Golden Bough, 
where he debates the approaches of James George Frazer’s positivistic 
anthropology.  
 The New Testament shows the evidence provided by testimonies of 
the first Christian communities regarding Christ’s life and teachings. 
Though they do not intend to have only historical value, they are a good 
reflection of how the early Christians felt about Jesus Christ, who was 
believed to be God himself. So, the New Testament appears as testimonial 
evidence of the real and concrete presence of God in history. Wittgenstein 
gave them enormous value, because of their meaning in terms of historical 
and cultural influence and because of the impression they made on him, 
what compelled Wittgenstein to write: “The Old Testament seen as the 
body without its head; the New T.: the head; the Epistles of the Apostles: 
the crown on the head”22 
 But such interest and high esteem are not in contradiction with his 
criticism to the historical value of the Gospels to support divine 
credentials, which makes their use difficult as textual evidence in spite that 
there can be a unitary background based on the conviction manifested in 
early Christians’ faith. Wittgenstein’s criticism concerns not only the 
contradictions found in texts, but also the implications of associating 
supernatural value to concrete facts. Such consideration is, by definition, 
contradictory in the terms we commonly use to speak of facts and objects. 
As we have previously seen when we analysed the issue of miracles, it 
does not make any sense to attribute eternal meaning to a fact or an 
event23. Such difficulty appears specifically in the dogma of Incarnation, a 
miracle that was something impossible (and unconceivable) according to 
human parameters24 due to the fact that it implies that God –the eternal- 
                                                 
21 Rhees, 1981, 116 (1929). 
22 Wittgenstein 1980, 1939-1940. 
23 Cf. Wittgenstein, 2000, 19.04.1937. 
24 Cf. Rhees, 1981,177-178. Cf., also, Bouwsma, 1986, 57-58.  
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has become man –the temporal. Only in terms of faith can this coexistence 
of different natures be understood: “You can’t call Christ the Saviour 
without calling him God. For a human being cannot save you”25 
Wittgenstein writes. 
 The narrative model of the Gospels is not uniform, and has some 
contradictions, though Wittgenstein admits that they may have some 
historical coherence and background. But such coherence cannot be 
adduced as something decisive, which makes interpretative activity 
something essential for the meaning we want to give the Gospels in the 
context they belong to:  
God has four people recounting the life of the incarnate God, each one 
differently, & contradicting each other –but can’t we say: It is important 
that this narrative should not have more than quite middling historical 
plausibility, just so that this should not be taken as the essential, decisive 
thing, so that the letter should not be believed more strongly than is 
proper & the spirit should receive its due. I. e.: What you are supposed to 
see cannot be communicated even by the best, more accurate, historian; 
therefore a mediocre account suffices, is even to be preferred.26 
 In a text written not long after, Wittgenstein is even more rotund 
when evaluating the weight of historical testimonies in religious matters. 
As such, those testimonies do not convince us of God’s existence. That is, 
there is no logical sequence guaranteeing such derivation nor they have 
enough strength to convince us by means of their conclusive character; 
only belief is what allows us to conclude that there exists a God, who is 
provident and has become incarnate in Jesus Christ. The way we read the 
documents is of specific importance here:  
Christianity is not based on a historical truth, but presents us with a 
(historical) narrative & says: now relieve! But not believe this report with 
the belief that is appropriate to a historical report, -but rather: believe, 
through thick & thin you can do this only as the outcome of a life. Here 
                                                 
25 Wittgenstein, 2000, 21.11.1936. 
26 Wittgenstein, 1981, 22.10.1937, italics in the original. 
The existence of God (According to Wittgenstein) 61
you have a message! –don’t treat it as you would another historical 
message! Make a quite different place for it in your life. –There is no 
paradox about that! 
(…) 
Queer as it sounds: the historical accounts of the Gospels might, in the 
historical sense, be demonstrably false, & yet belief would lose nothing 
through this: but not because it has to do with ‘universal truths of reason’! 
Rather, because historical proof (the historical proof-game) is irrelevant to 
belief. This message (the Gospels) is seized on by a human being 
believingly (i. e. lovingly): That is the certainty of this “taking-for-true”, 
nothing else.2! 
 As David Hume explained when he talked about the difficulties of 
individuals’ testimonies to work as reliable proof in the case of miracles –
how many testimonies would be enough to give full value to the existence 
of miracles? –, in Wittgenstein’s case we can also question to what extent 
testimonies are of value. If we understand them with the spiritual strength 
and specific engagement with religious belief they have, then we can 
realise their importance to back the existence of miracles as such. This 
could make us think that for Wittgenstein the content of what we believe is 
of no particular importance; that only the strength of our commitment 
makes the content be valid. But it is clearly not so. Wittgenstein himself 
admitted that the existence of Jesus Christ we have learned from the 
Gospels and from historical research was something evident28. The 
problem arises when we give such narrations some special status, that is, 
when we call them Revelation. But what it is clear is that we are speaking 
of a very particular kind of belief: religious belief; that which has specific 
interest as it is incardinated in the most intimate aspirations of human 
beings.  
 
 
                                                 
2! Ibid., 08-09.12.1937, italics in the original. 
28 Cf. Rhees, 1981,116. 
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5. The evidence on God’s existence 
In the light of all we have said before, we can now ask what kind –if there 
is any- of evidence there is to demonstrate the existence of God. How we 
must understand it and how our convictions about it arise. Wittgenstein 
explicitly defines the scope of such evidence when he states: “Anything 
that I normally call evidence wouldn’t in the slightest influence me”29. 
Reasons attempting to back or justify beliefs of religious kind would not be 
enough if we understand such reasons in terms of logical argumentation on 
the content of beliefs. If we compare what we call evidence for religious 
issues with evidence shown by science, we easily realise that we are not 
talking of evidence at all30. So, we must deal with the issue in a different 
way. Cannot, then, our knowledge properly deal with God? Is rational 
knowledge the only one able to establish boundaries in these matters? “Is 
God bound by our knowledge?”31, so that we cannot talk about Him in 
terms of truth or falsehood? 
 The unavoidable consequence coming from considering those 
questions is that believers walk along a very fragile path. According to 
Wittgenstein, a believer is someone who lives like a tightrope walker:  
The honest religious thinker is like a tightrope Walker. It almost looks as 
though he were walking on nothing but air. His support is the slenderest 
imaginable. And yet it really is possible to walk on it.32 
 In a letter to Y. Smythies, Wittgenstein speaks of the kind of 
requirements involved in a believer’s life. Such requirements make the life 
of faith be something really difficult, due to the fact that they show the 
enormous degree of confidence needed to accept so fragile foundations:  
                                                 
29 Wittgenstein, 1983, 56. 
30 There is a particularly meaningful text in this sense: “A dispute about religious belief 
cannot exist for you since you don’t know what the dispute is about”; Wittgenstein, 
2000, 27.01.1937; underlines in the original. See, also: “there is no sense talking about 
religious truth in general. What religious? What truth?” in Bouwsma, 1986, 54-56. 
31 Wittgenstein, 1969, *436. 
32 Wittgenstein, 1980, 05.07.1948. 
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Deciding to become a Christian is like deciding to give up walking on the 
ground and do tight-rope walking instead, where nothing is more easy 
than to slip and every slip can be fatal.33 
 These statements set clear the difficulties linked to religious beliefs. 
Difficulties experienced by Wittgenstein first-hand. With such kind of 
beliefs we are not talking about hypothesis, probability or knowledge, 
something Wittgenstein wanted to emphasize in a conversation with Drury: 
“Can you imagine St. Augustine saying that the existence of God was 
‘highly probable’!”34 
 What kind of evidence, if any, can we claim there is to probe God’s 
existence? Taking into account all we have said before, there remains small 
room –if any- for such evidence. However, we need some kind of evidence 
if we want to speak meaningfully of God’s existence. In this sense, it is of 
some help to use some of the arguments concerning the philosophy of 
psychology developed by Wittgenstein, which are connected to works like 
On Certainty. Let us remember that Wittgenstein himself had written: “If 
someone can believe in God with complete certainty, why not in Other 
Minds?”35  
 The argument we retake here comes from what has been published 
under the title Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol.2, the 
Inner and the Outer36. As M. Ter Hark points, in this work we are dealing 
with a typically philosophical problem: scepticism about the existence of 
other minds, which is nothing but the outcome of an inadequate conception 
of the “inner” and the “outer”37 .We may conjecture that a solution for 
scepticism in one case can help us to give credit (validate) to our belief –or 
our arguments- in the other. 
 What kind of evidence can we have concerning others’ feelings and 
thoughts? How can we know what there is inside them? To what extent can 
                                                 
33 McGuinness, 2008, 07.04.1944. 
34 Op. cit., 105. 
35 Wittgenstein, 1980, 03.07.1948. 
36 Wright and Nyman, 1992 
37 Ter Hark, 1990, 140. 
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we be certain that they are not deceiving us and are being honest? In the 
language game of psychological concepts insecurity is a constituent part, 
and the evidence we may have is linked to such insecurity. Even that 
evidence which allow us to say that others are pretending may not be the 
same for different people; or may be enough for one and not for the other. 
In any case we cannot speak of conclusions valid for everybody38, though 
we can perfectly assert that we know that someone has a pain or is 
pretending to have it. Pretending, so to speak, is a more complex state of 
such primitive language game where the expression of pain is real39. How 
do we know that such expression is authentic? There are human basic 
reactions whose coincidence between different individuals allows us to 
speak of primitive language games from which the rest of games arise. 
Such primitive coincidences are the ones from which any communicative 
exchange develops. They are our forms of life, conditions of understanding 
anything surrounding us: rejoicing, suffering, obeying orders, is part of the 
human form of life. We found them as the rocky floor from which our most 
basic certainties arise. 
 Such certainties are the axis of our language games. Due to the 
existence of those certainties we can speak of knowledge and doubt, as 
doubt always presupposes certainty. We say we know when we are 
speaking of such certainty, which admits of no criticism because it is the 
foundations for any criticism. So, those basic certainties become 
fundamental conditions to play the game. Here it is where the concepts 
“attitude” and “opinion” play a special role. We have an opinion of what 
we have criteria to decide about its value or absence of it. An attitude is, so 
to speak, something more basic, fundamental. Knowing that someone has 
inner life is having the attitude that he/she has a soul. That is, taking for 
granted that he/she is a human being (with all that it implies): “Instead of 
“attitude toward the soul one could also say “attitude toward a human”40, 
Wittgenstein writes. Attitude comes before an opinion, and this is settled 
                                                 
38 Cf. Ibid., 154-155. 
39 Cf. Valdés, 1996, XXII. 
40 Wright & Nyman, 1992, 38. 
The existence of God (According to Wittgenstein) 65
(based) on that. We are certain that there is a human being before us, what 
means that we use psychological concepts associating them to those 
certainties related to the existence of inner life. 
 How is all this related to the existence of God and the evidence for 
it? A Wittgenstein’s remark gives us a clue: “Isn’t belief in God an 
attitude?”41 It is quite clear that if there is a fundamental concept in the 
religious language game that is the concept “God”. The question, then, 
becomes unavoidable: how does such concept arise? If we accept that we 
cannot have direct evidence nor experience of it, as happens with objects, it 
must arise differently. For Wittgenstein is life itself, some particular 
experiences, which make such a concept, arise. The religious language 
game ultimately refers to human beings’ very basic or primitive 
experiences. We may presume that the development of a game like the 
religious one is due to progressive and complex cultural relationships, 
arising as a practice where elements of different kinds intertwine. Though 
it is true that the religious language game share many elements with other 
language games (as social practices), there is in its origin very basic 
interests and experiences shaping its development. In this sense, 
Wittgenstein’s criticisms to Frazer appear relevant. Basic experiences 
concerning different kinds of sufferings, the need of moral and spiritual 
rest, the wonder at the basic drives –instincts- of life, the feeling of 
dependence before the world surrounding us, the overwhelming enigma of 
death…; all these are elements that combine to make our belief in God 
arise: 
Life can educate you to “believing in God”. And experiences too are what 
do this but not visions, or other experiences, which show us the “existence 
of this being”, but e.g. sufferings of various sorts. And they do not show 
us God as a sense experience does an object, nor do they give rise to 
conjectures about him. Experiences, thoughts, -life can force this concept 
on us.42 
                                                 
41 Idem, 38 (italics in the original). 
42 Wittgenstein, 1980, 1950. 
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 Reflections of this kind can make us connect such arguments with 
Wittgenstein’s experiences during the First World War and see an 
underlying unity in the philosopher’s view. The entries of Notebooks and 
Secret Diaries clearly show what is influencing Wittgenstein’s conception 
of religious belief. Religion arises as an answer to the problem of life… 
because life is intrinsically problematic: 
I may well reject the Christian solution of the problem of life (salvation, 
resurrection, judgement, heaven, hell) but this does not solve the problem 
of my life, for I am not good & not happy. I am not saved.43 
 Our fears disappear only with religious belief44, which places human 
beings before God: “I understood what it means that belief is bliss for a 
human being, that is, it frees him from the fear of others by placing him 
immediately under God”45. 
 All this allows us to understand the role the concept “God” plays in 
our lives; his existence (God’s existence) is a prerequisite for the religious 
language game to work. Playing it implies taking for granted such 
existence, which works as a fundamental certainty where the language 
game of religious belief is settled. That does not mean that such certainty 
can be given isolated, as it is a basic element. Rather, it is how it is related 
to the rest of certainties in such language what gives it a special role46. So, 
we have evidence similar to that of the language game of psychology. We 
take for granted those certainties on which our behaviour is based. We take 
                                                 
43 Wittgenstein, 2000, 04.02.1937. Cf. Wittgenstein, 1980, ca.1944: “The Christian 
religion is only for the one who needs infinite help, that is only for the one who suffers 
infinite distress” (compare with the entry in MS 102, 39v-41v, 08.12.1914). See, also, 
Wittgenstein, 2000, 23.02.1937: “A religious question is either a question of life or it 
is (empty) chatter. This language game –one could say- gets played only with 
questions of life. Much like the word “ouch” does not have any meaning –except as a 
scream of pain”. 
44 Cf. Rhees, 1981, 115-116. Also, Wittgenstein, 1980, 16.10.1946, or 1931: “How 
should we feel if we had never heard of Christ? Should we feel left alone in the dark? 
Do we not feel like that only in the way a child doesn’t when he knows there is 
someone in the room with him?”. 
45 Wittgenstein, 2000, 28.01.1937; underlined in the original. 
46 Cf. Hoyt, 2007,41. 
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for granted that others have inner life, what makes us have the attitude that 
they are human beings. Wittgenstein remembers that such a matter is not 
an object of experience. That is, if one day we discovered that what we 
have in front of us is an automaton and not a human being, we would not 
have made any empirical discovery. What would have happened is that our 
attitude had changed.   
 Something similar happens to our belief in God. Such belief is 
conditioning our attitude towards life, shaping a model of behaviour which 
permeates our lives. That is the reason why we can say that a belief in God 
is an attitude, something on which the rest of our conducts (and of our 
understanding of meaning in the religious domain) is based. We can never 
discover that God does not exist. Stating that (his inexistence) would be 
but showing that our attitude –and with it our whole life- has changed. This 
explains why proofs on the existence of God are of no importance for our 
convictions: 
A proof of God ought really to be something by means of which you can 
convince yourself of God’s existence. But I think that believers who 
offered such proofs wanted to analyse & make a case for their ‘belief’ 
with their intellect, although they themselves would never have arrived at 
belief by way of such proofs.47 
In view of all we have argued before, we can understand 
Wittgenstein’s criticism to the arguments on the existence of God, and how 
such criticism is important in his conception of religious belief. 
Consequently, his argumentative line denies the intellectual value of such 
proofs, but also of any attempt to appeal to reason in religious matters. Is 
not there, then, room for argument of any kind? We can clearly say no if 
proofs on God’s existence try to have probative value. That does not mean 
that we cannot postulate his existence from a reflection of logical kind 
about the world. But in such case there would not be logical entailment or 
conclusion guaranteeing the existence of a divine being.   
 
                                                 
47 Wittgenstein, 1980,1950. 
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Subject, World and Value 
(Some Hypotheses on the Influence of Schopenhauer in 
the early Wittgenstein) 
 
JULIÁN MARRADES MILLET 
 
Introduction  
It is an acknowledged fact that Wittgenstein read Schopenhauer’s Die Welt 
als Wille und Vorstellung (The World as Will and Representation.1) in his 
youth, and possibly other works by the same author (Anscombe, 1963; 
McGuiness, 1988). In general, Wittgenstein is reluctant to recognize other 
authors' influences on his thought, but in his Notebooks, 1914-1916 2 he 
makes explicit reference to Schopenhauer, and it is also a commonplace 
that his influence is present in many of the theses and ideas of the 
Tractatus Logico-philosophicus3 (Anscombe, 1959; Gardiner, 1963; Janik, 
1966; Micheletti, 1967; Engel, 1969). Wittgenstein himself recognized in 
conversations with close colleagues that, as a young man, he came to think 
that Schopenhauer had got the basics right (Von Wright, 1954; Bouwsma, 
1986). Such recognition cannot be seen to weaken in his later philosophy.  
If we keep in mind the fact that such relevant texts as the Notebooks, 
1914-16 and the Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value) were not 
published until 1961 and 1977 respectively, it becomes less surprising that 
the study of the relationships between Wittgenstein’s thought and 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy was not begun until relatively late. Studies by 
Gardiner (1963) and Janik (1966), as well as Micheletti’s monograph 
(1967), may be considered pioneering contributions. To these must be 
added the contributions of Morris Engel (1969), A. P. Griffiths (1974), 
Bryan Magee (1983), E. M. Lange (1989) and Hans-Johann Glock (1999).  
According to these and other Wittgenstein scholars, Schopenhauer’s 
influence on his thought permeates many concepts, theses and points of 
view throughout his work, in some cases Wittgenstein adopted the strict 
                                                 
1 Hereafter referred to as WWI and quoted by volumen, chapter and page. 
2 Hereafter referred to as NB and quoted by date and page of the English translation. 
3 Hereafter referred to as TLP and quoted by paragraph. 
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Schopenhauerian meaning, and in others, he revised and modified it in 
terms of his specific interests. My purpose here is to trace certain 
implications of an element of that influence providing a metaphilosophical 
key to the understanding of the true meaning of particular philosophical 
theses that Wittgenstein points out in the Notebooks and develops in the 
final part of the Tractatus.  
The point in question is the following: Wittgenstein decided to 
outline a limit to the linguistic expression of thought employing, in a 
certain way, the distinction between representations and will that 
Schopenhauer had used to reinterpret the Kantian distinction between the 
phenomenon and the thing-in-itself. In same way as Schopenhauer, 
Wittgenstein maintains that the world of science corresponds to the 
phenomenon, to the world as ‘representation’, to the world of facts; and 
equally considers that everything that has to do with the matters of the 
greatest importance and value for us – the meaning of our existence or of 
the existence of the world, the relationship between the willing subject and 
ethics, the nature of art, the possibility of an existence beyond this world, 
etc., in short, everything that has to do with that which is vaguely called 
‘the meaning of life’, resides in the will, which is outside the world. Even 
so, the possible Schopenhauerian source of the separation that Wittgenstein 
traces between fact and value, does not deny their deep discrepancies of 
content as regards conceptions of the subject, the world and will.  
Continuing the thread of this last observation, I should like to clarify 
the way that I use the word ‘influence’ to label the way that reading 
Schopenhauer could have made Wittgenstein think. I have not tried to 
isolate and identify certain elements in particular texts by Wittgenstein that 
are taken from Schopenhauer’s philosophy, in the way that an 
archaeologist discovers pieces of an earlier building in a later one. My 
approach has been guided by an entirely different image, suggested by 
Wittgenstein himself: ‘I think there is some truth in my idea that I really 
only think reproductively. I don’t believe I have ever invented a line of 
thinking. I have always taken one over from someone else. I have simply 
straightaway seized on it with enthusiasm for my work of clarification. 
That is how Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, 
Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me’ (Wittgenstein 1980, 18e-
19e). If we compare Wittgenstein’s activity of clarification with the growth 
of a plant, we can think of the foreign elements as nutrients that have fed it 
according to its own nature (which he characterizes as enthusiasm!) In this 
process of absorption, the nutrients are metabolized according to the 
Subject, World and Value 
 
73
specific needs of the plant that feeds on them. So that, if we look for their 
effects in the plant, we will only be able to find them transformed and 
adapted to the new context. The idea of ‘influence’, then, acquires the 
sense of an inspiration, rather than a loan. What I seek to suggest, when 
establishing comparisons between certain of Wittgenstein’s thoughts and 
certain philosophemes of The World as Will and Representation, is that 
Wittgenstein could find materials in Schopenhauer’s book that he 
apprehended and transformed until he changed them into his own thoughts 
that were, therefore, different from their place of origin. 
 
1.  Philosophy and the Question of Limits  
There is considerable agreement among Wittgenstein scholars that the 
Kantian bias of the Tractatus is conditioned by the Kant he discovered in 
his reading of Schopenhauer. David Pears’ opinion in this respect is telling: 
‘He [Wittgenstein] took much of the framework of the Tractatus from 
Kant through Schopenhauer, whom he had read and admired, and, though 
he modified this framework in his second period, he never destroyed it’ 
(Pears, 1971, 46). It would be proper, however, to define which aspects of 
Schopenhauerian Kantism were retained by Wittgenstein and which he 
rejected.  
Schopenhauer combines elements taken from Kant with others taken 
from Plato in his philosophy. From Kant, he takes the idea of the world as 
‘representation’, that is, as a phenomenon for us, as an object for 
understanding according to the ‘principle of reason’ (that establishes a 
priori the forms of space, time and causality as conditions of knowledge). 
The turn towards Plato takes place when also conceiving the world as a 
reality-in-itself endowed with an essence that we can know, not 
intellectually, but intuitively, even when it is not exhaustive and wholly 
satisfactory knowledge (cf. WWR, II, §41, 494). Schopenhauer distances 
himself from both when he characterizes essence as ‘will’, conceived as an 
originating and unconscious force, as an impulse to a self-assertion of 
existence that occurs in all beings, and which, in man, has the intellect as 
an instrument at its service.  
But if the metaphysical push to affirm the will as the real essence of 
the world is Platonic, the contention of that push within the limits of 
experience is, again, of Kantian inspiration. Indeed, for Schopenhauer the 
essence of the world is not transcendent, but postulated as an explanatory 
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principle of the intrinsic coherence of experience, in a broad sense of the 
term. Now, that explanation should be circumscribed by experience and 
not seek answers to questions that exceed its limits (such as, for example, 
where does universal will come from or why does it also manifest itself as 
individual will). For this reason, Schopenhauer says, ‘my philosophy… is 
immanent in the Kantian sense of the word’ (WWR, II, §50, 641).  
Thus, Schopenhauer joins Kant by reducing theoretical knowledge of 
the world to ‘representation’, to the group of phenomena subject to the 
necessary conditions of the principle of reason. And, in consequence, he 
also agrees with Kant in rejecting all transcendent metaphysics. But he 
distances himself from Kant when postulating the possibility of a higher 
type of knowledge than theoretical knowledge, namely: the intuitive 
knowledge of the reality-in-itself of the world as will. No matter how much 
Schopenhauer considers that his philosophy ‘abides by the facts of external 
and internal experience, just as they are accessible to each person’ (ibid.), 
his idea of intuitive knowledge of the will transcends the limits of 
experience in the Kantian sense of the term – that is to say, in the sense 
defined by modern natural science – and to that extent disagrees with Kant.  
We might say that Wittgenstein’s position on this point is closer to 
the real Kant than the Schopenhauerian. In the Tractatus, he establishes 
that only the propositions that represent possible states of things can be 
true or false. Possible knowledge is thus circumscribed within the scope 
defined by the conditions of the meaning of language, and this implies 
restricting it to natural science (TLP 4.11). For Wittgenstein there is no 
knowledge possible of the world other than that which conforms to the 
conditions of what Schopenhauer called ‘the world as representation’, with 
the important restriction that Wittgenstein rejects all a priori knowledge of 
the world: natural science is empirical knowledge of contingent facts. In 
consequence, the propositions of transcendent metaphysics would be just 
as nonsensical (unsinnig) for him as those that express the presumed 
intuitive knowledge of Schopenhauerian will.  
Wittgenstein defends the idea that philosophy is a priori, not because 
it deals with objects which transcend experience, but because it deals with 
the formal or structural features of experience. In this critical or reflexive 
turn, Wittgenstein joins Kant again. However, in the way that Wittgenstein 
determines this task, it is possible that Schopenhauer has exercised an 
indirect influence. The Tractatus tries to distinguish forms of discourse 
with meaning from others that lack it. This tentative effort is similar to the 
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one that Kant undertook in his Critique of Pure Reason, with a significant 
difference: Kant wished to mark the boundaries of human knowledge, 
while Wittgenstein intends, more radically, to mark the boundaries of 
meaningful discourse. Or, to put this more precisely, philosophy must fix 
the limits of thought by marking the boundaries of the linguistic expression 
of thought. This shift from knowledge to thought, from experience to 
language, could somehow be endorsed by having read Schopenhauer. 
Indeed, Schopenhauer put the emphasis on ‘representation’, rather than 
consciousness. The Schopenhauerian notion of ‘representation’ is closer to 
the symbolic or linguistic relationship between thought and reality than the 
epistemological – and according to Wittgenstein, psychologistic – 
conception of the ‘idea’ as a mental representation of the thing. In this 
sense, Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung could have contributed to the creation 
of the Wittgensteinian notion of Abbildung (Representation) (cf. TLP 
2.151, 2.22, 4.015). 
 
2.  The Metaphysical I and the World 
A central motif of the method applied by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus is 
to eradicate psychologism from the logical analysis of the language, taking 
it in a similar direction to that started by Frege in the philosophy of logic 
and mathematics. In the expression of this task, Wittgenstein used a 
conceptual instrument that some interpreters (Black, 1964; Micheletti, 
1967; Lange, 1989) consider to have been inspired by his reading of 
Schopenhauer, that is: a transcendental conception of the I that takes the 
form of the knowing subject in Schopenhauer and functions as a necessary 
condition of the world as ‘representation’, and takes the form of the 
metaphysical subject in Wittgenstein. The I of the Tractatus is located, as 
is the Schopenhauerian knowing subject at a higher level than the 
phenomenic I in Schopenhauer, and than the subject ‘as it is conceived in 
contemporary superficial psychology’ (TLP 5.5421). The notion of the 
metaphysical subject, perhaps inspired by Schopenhauer, plays a decisive 
role in Wittgenstein in the rejection of certain suppositions of metaphysics 
inherited from the modern epistemological tradition. Let us see.  
Wittgenstein affirms that the I makes its appearance in philosophy is 
not a part of the world, but ‘a limit of the world’ (TLP 5.632). Just as the 
eye makes it possible for there to be a visual field coordinated with it, but 
without being part of it and without anything in it making it possible to 
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infer that it is an eye that sees it (TLP 5.633), thus too the I delimits the 
field of the thinkable – understanding by ‘thinking’ our projection of the 
meaning of the proposition onto the world (TLP, 3.11) – and it does this 
without being part of the world and without anything making it possible to 
infer in the proposition that has been thought that it is an I who thinks it. 
The limiting statute of the Wittgensteinian metaphysical I may be 
considered to be one of the acknowledged features of Kantism in the 
Tractatus. And, in view of certain analogies, it is worth asking if it does 
not also have a relationship with the Schopenhauerian knowing subject.  
Schopenhauer uses the expression ‘knowing subject’ in two different 
senses: on the one hand, to designate the subject that knows things as 
objects conditioned by space, time and causality; and, on the other hand, to 
refer to the ‘pure subject of knowing’ (WWR, I, § 36, 179), which arises 
when the individual subject surrenders to the intuitive contemplation of the 
object, becomes lost in that contemplation and separates from his 
individuality. Then, the subject does not know things as singular 
phenomena, but as eternal objectifications of the essence of the world, that 
is, as ideas. If we make an abstraction of this strange mixture of Kantian 
and Platonic elements that Schopenhauer combines in this notion of the 
‘pure subject of knowing’, we can preserve its atemporal and non-
individual character as aspects in which it resembles the Wittgensteinian 
metaphysical I.  
The similarity also extends to another aspect: the impossibility of 
being represented. To the extent that the ‘universal condition of all 
objects’, the Schopenhauerian subject ‘is always presupposed’ (WWR, I, § 
2, 5), and we never know it. It cannot have a form of representation other 
than the one that conforms to the necessary conditions of space, time and 
causality. Since the knowing subject is outside space and time, it cannot be 
known. Neither does the Wittgensteinian metaphysical subject form part of 
the world; and, like the eye that cannot see itself, the metaphysical subject 
cannot be thought about.  
But the analogy between both notions is broken at two crucial points. 
In the first place, the metaphysical subject of the Tractatus is not a subject 
of knowledge, but a subject of thought (Denken), understanding as such, 
not some mental process – thought thus conceived is a fact that forms part 
of the world and has a psychological subject (cf. TLP 4.1121) – but rather 
the action of projecting the meaning of a propositional sign onto the world 
(cf. TLP 3.11), by means of which an internal figurative relationship is 
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established between the sign and the possible state of things that it 
describes, constituting thus the propositional sign in the proposition or 
effective representation of a state of things. Nevertheless, the distinction 
that Wittgenstein traces between thought as a mental or psychological fact, 
and thought as a constituent activity of meaning, is a distinction between 
two irreducible levels that correspond with the Schopenhauerian distinction 
between the transcendental  subject and the things in the world that it 
constitutes as objects of knowledge.  
The other point of divergence lies in the fact that the Wittgensteinian 
subject is unable to be represented in a more radical sense than the 
Schopenhauerian transcendental subject. The idea of the subject is 
postulated by the latter as the necessary foundation of knowledge, since it 
defines the a priori conditions of every representation, that is to say, of 
every object. Subject and object are conceived as correlative terms of the 
cognitive relationship, in the following sense: since all possible knowledge 
is of objects given in the forms of space, time and causality, and these 
forms are a priori, it is necessary to postulate a foundation that is external 
to the object – that is, to the world as representation – as a necessary 
condition of it. Such a foundation is the knowing subject that 
Schopenhauer characterizes as ‘the supporter of the world’ (WWR, I, § 2, 
5).  
Schopenhauer flatly affirms that the subject cannot be known, 
because it cannot be given as an object. However, when conceiving it as a 
necessary condition of knowledge, he thinks of it by reference to the 
object, and, to that extent, it can be said that in some way he objectifies it. 
There is a latent tension in the claim to determine it as an a priori 
condition of the object – which implies rejecting that it may itself be an 
object of knowledge– while, at the same time, refusing that such a 
determination is a genuine ‘representation’.  
If, from this point of view, we compare Wittgenstein’s metaphysical 
subject with the Schopenhauerian subject, what attracts one’s attention is 
that Wittgenstein no longer thinks of the subject as the correlate of 
something as an object. The absence of correlation is preserved by the 
characterization of the subject as ‘a limit of the world’. Indeed, the limit of 
a thing (let’s say, the limit of A) does not limit with A. Only something 
beyond the limit of A limits with A. This is what happens to the 
Schopenhauerian subject: as the presupposition of the world that it is, it 
falls beyond it. Wittgenstein affirms, simply that the subject ‘does not 
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belong to the world’ (TLP 5.632). Comparing the subject/world 
relationship with the eye/visual field relationship illustrates this difference 
well: the eye does not belong to the visual field, but, as a limit of it, it does 
not seem correct to assert that it lies beyond it.  
By characterizing the metaphysical subject as a limit of the world, 
Wittgenstein abandons the conception of the subject as ‘the thinking, 
presenting subject’ (TLP 5.631) of the modern epistemological tradition. 
We can find such a conception materialized both in the Cartesian ego 
cogitans, or thinking substance that has representations or ideas, and in the 
de-substantialized I that Hume describes as a ‘bundle of perceptions’. The 
transcendental interpretation of the thinking I made by Kant and by 
Schopenhauer himself undertakes the de-objectification of the thinking 
subject, since it denies the possibility of there being representations of it, 
and redirects his concept from the sphere of representation or content to the 
sphere of form or the condition of possibility of every representation. But 
in that same de-objectification, there is a residual objectification. For, at 
the same time that it is affirmed that the subject cannot be an object, there 
remains a non-objective quasi-representation of the subject as a condition 
of the object, and, to that degree, the subject is objectified as the ‘subject’. 
Wittgenstein parts company with precisely this residual objectification. His 
assertion that ‘there is no such thing’ as the subject that thinks and has 
representations (TLP 5.361), could imply that the metaphysical subject of 
the Tractatus is not a ‘subject’ in the sense of the modern epistemological 
tradition, as it cannot be conceived as a correlate of the world. 
 
3.  The Resolution of Solipsism  
Wittgenstein has the metaphysical subject play a role in the resolution of 
the problem of solipsism. If we now make an abstraction of the way 
Wittgenstein understands the proposition ‘The world is my world’, it could 
be understood in the following way: the world does not exist, only I and 
my mental states exist; the world is absorbed in my I; my I fills everything. 
This is the meaning that the metaphysical solipsist attributes to it. A 
presupposition of such an interpretation is that the terms ‘world’ and I 
designate objects (what the solipsist denies is precisely that the world 
exists as an object facing the I).  
According to Wittgenstein, solipsism is based on an error as I and 
‘world’ are not names, they do not designate objects (therefore, they cannot 
be part of facts nor, in consequence, can they be ’represented’ by 
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language). The solipsist cannot give I and ‘world’ the meaning that he 
seeks to give them, hence his proposition ‘The world is my world’ fails by 
trying to mean something that cannot be said.  
However, Wittgenstein considers that ‘what solipsism means, is quite 
correct’ (TLP 5.62), although it is expressed obscurely. What is there that 
is correct behind solipsism? No more, no less than the idea that there 
cannot be another world other than that which I see, I understand, etc.; 
because, if there were, it would be the idea of a world that is necessarily 
beyond my world and an idea to which I could not give any meaning, for 
which reason it is nonsensical. This is what is there is of truth behind the 
solipsist’s proposition ‘the world is my world’.  
Wittgenstein takes possession of this idea, but gives it a slant, not 
only different, but opposite to that given by the solipsist (opposite, because 
solipsism’s undoing as regards anti-realism, or its coincidence with 
realism, follows from Wittgenstein’s interpretation). The meaning that he 
attributes to ‘The world is my world’ is based on the idea that the I of ‘my 
world’ is not an object, it is not the psychological I of solipsism, but the 
metaphysical I that does not belong to the world, but is rather a limit of it. 
We have already pointed out the comparison that Wittgenstein makes 
between this I and the eye (cf. TLP 5.633): just as the eye cannot see itself, 
though the existence of the visual field shows the coordination of the eye 
with it, the I that is the limit of the world can neither be represented nor 
stated, but the coordination of the world with it can be shown.  
Where and how is such coordination shown between the I and the 
world, that is to say, where is it shown that ‘the world is my world’ (TLP 
5.62)? In the language. Or, more precisely, is it shown in that ‘the limits of 
my language mean the limits of my world’ (TLP 5.6). But, why is it shown 
there? Because ‘logic fills the world’ (TLP 5.61), that is, it establishes the 
limits of the possible: there cannot be another world that is illogical (a 
world we can think of outside logic), neither can there be another language 
that is illogical (a language that has meaning because, if not, it would not 
be a language, but outside logic). Now, this is like saying: there can only 
be one logical language; or it is like saying that all natural languages are a 
single language: ‘the language which I understand’ (TLP 5.62). And, for 
the same reason, there can only be one logical world: the world that can be 
expressed in this language.  
In consequence, my language is the
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private, as the solipsist thinks (private from the world, since the world does 
not exist, or only exists as the content of my consciousness, of my 
psychological I), but, on the contrary, because it is the language that 
anyone can understand; and my world is the world, because it is the only 
world that can be expressed in language. ‘Here we see that solipsism 
strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks 
to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it’ 
(TLP 5.64). 
Some comparisons should be established between Wittgenstein and 
Schopenhauer’s strategies regarding the problem of solipsism, based on the 
following considerations.  
Schopenhauer approaches the topic of solipsism from two different 
perspectives: that of representation and that of will. From an 
epistemological point of view, solipsism is ‘the last stronghold of 
scepticism’ (WWR, I, § 19, 104). The solipsist denies the reality of the 
external world on the basis that it cannot be proven that the representation 
that the subject has of the world has an objective and external cause to the 
knowing subject, and thence concludes that the world is a mere 
representation by the subject, this being the only thing that has a reality in 
itself. Schopenhauer’s objection to solipsism – an objection that he also 
extends to realism and the idealism – is that it makes the conceptual 
mistake of conceiving knowledge as a causal relationship. A causal 
relationship can only occur between objects of knowledge – the 
relationship of causality is the essential form of every object – and the 
object necessarily presupposes the subject as its first condition, which is 
why there cannot be a cause and effect relationship between them (cf. 
WWR, I, § 5). There is a radical asymmetry between the transcendental 
quality of the knowing subject and the empirical statute of the known 
object. This also holds for self-knowledge: the I is not known as a subject, 
but only as an object. For his part, Wittgenstein also brings into play a 
metaphysical notion of the I in his interpretation of the proposition ‘The 
world is my world’, in answer to solipsism.  
But elsewhere Schopenhauer also formulates (cf. WWR, I, § 19) a 
specific, perhaps more relevant, argument against solipsism, that can be 
summarized as follows: we have double knowledge of ourselves, as 
representation and as will; on this basis, the solipsist infers from the fact 
that his own I is the only object known by him as representation and as 
being in itself, the consequence that there is not any other object that, in 
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addition to being his representation, has reality in itself. But such a 
conclusion is invalid and only attests to his ‘theoretical egoism’ (WWR, I, § 
19, 104). Although Schopenhauer recognizes that this position is not 
theoretically refutable, he goes for a kind of pluralism or metaphysical 
egalitarianism, according to which the two aspects under which my I is 
given – as phenomenon and as thing-in-itself – can be extrapolated to 
every object. This is what he is saying when he proclaims ‘the identity of 
macrocosm and microcosm’ (WWR, II, §41, 486), a formula that might 
throw some light on this statement by Wittgenstein ‘Man is the microcosm: 
I am my world’ (NB 12.10.16, 84e. Cf. TLP 5.62).  
The identification of the I with the macrocosm – or, overcoming 
solipsism in a type of metaphysical realism – does not occur in 
Schopenhauer via knowledge, but through the will. The knowing subject 
comprehends itself as representation, as a phenomenon subjected to the 
conditions of space-time and causality, and, to that extent, as an individual. 
Solipsism’s vision of itself moves within the limits of the world as 
representation. That vision can only transcend itself if the subject notices 
that there is something in itself that constitutes his true being and that is not 
phenomenon: something that is ‘in itself’ that presents itself to him as will, 
not as intellect, and that it is not temporary and personal, but eternal and 
impersonal. That noumenic I which identifies itself with macrocosm 
cannot be represented, there cannot be any intuition of it because it is 
outside space and time (in this sense, Schopenhauer characterizes it as ‘the 
dark point in consciousness’ [WWR, II, §41, 491]). But it is possible to 
conceive it as essentially identical to nature in its totality.  
It is worthwhile wondering to what extent this vision of 
Schopenhauer’s underlies the following annotation by Wittgenstein: ‘This 
is the way I have travelled: Idealism singles men out from the world as 
unique, solipsism singles me alone out, and at last I see that I too belong 
with the rest of the world, and so on the one side nothing is left over, and 
on the other side, as unique, the world. In this way idealism leads to 
realism if it is strictly thought out.’ (NB 15.10.16, 85e. Cf. TLP 5.64) 
 
4.  The Will and the World  
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein denies that there is any logical connection 
between the will and the world: ‘The world is independent of my will’ 
(TLP 6.373). The meaning of this assertion becomes clearer if it is read in 
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the light of certain observations in the Notebooks of 1916, and both 
contexts are read with reference to the Schopenhauerian distinction 
between will and representation. Let us see.  
In the notes made on 4.11.16, Wittgenstein considers the possibility 
of contemplating a deliberate action (for example, my action of getting up 
from the armchair) from two perspectives: (a) as my act of will in moving 
the armchair, and (b) as my act of will in moving my body. There is, 
however, an evident asymmetry between (a) and (b): my will seems to be 
directly connected to the movement of my body, but it would be strange to 
think that the movement of the armchair directly obeys my will.  
However strange it may seem that my will should be the cause of the 
armchair’s movement, it must also seem strange that it is the cause of the 
deliberate movement of my body. Why? Because the causal relationship is 
a contingent connection, and the idea of the action of getting up itself, as a 
deliberate action, involves my perceiving such an action as compelled 
(gezwungene) by my will. Now, this supposes ‘removing’ the will from the 
world, or conceiving it as a limit – not as a part – of the world. To that end, 
Wittgenstein establishes there a distinction between the concepts of ‘will’ 
and ’desire’:  
a) ‘Desire’ is a fact that precedes action as cause precedes effect; if 
action follows desire – or accompanies the action – such an accompanying 
is ‘accidental’ (zufällig) (NB 4.11.16, 88e). It is one thing to desire, and 
another to satisfy the desire: both facts are logically independent.  
b) In contrast, ‘the act of the will is not the cause of the action but is 
the action itself’ (ib., 87e). What Wittgenstein means by this is that volition 
is not something that is connected to the action (as it is considered by 
psychology, for example), but rather the action itself perceived in a totally 
different way: for example, as something for which I feel responsible. This 
form of perception is the one I have with respect to the movement of my 
body, but not with respect to the movement of the armchair. Such a 
difference may describe thus: ‘My wish relates to the movement of the 
chair, my will to a muscular feeling.’ (ib., 88e).  
If the act of will is an act that constrictively accompanies the action, 
then the relationship between the will and the world is not internal to the 
world, but external: ‘The will is an attitude of the subject to the world.’ 
(ib., 87e), and the world is that which clashes with the will and opposes it.  
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In this double consideration of intentional behaviour by reference, 
respectively, to ‘wishing’ and to ‘willing’ as situated in irreducible spheres, 
it is possible to glimpse the Schopenhauerian distinction between 
representation and will. Schopenhauer states that the body is given in two 
entirely different ways to the subject of knowing, in the first place, ‘as 
representation, as an object among objects, liable to the laws of objects. 
But it is also given in quite a different way, namely as what is known 
immediately to everyone, and is denoted by the word will.’ (WWR, I, § 18, 
100). When we explain an action as being based on motives (for example, 
a wish), we locate the action and the wish on the plane of representation, 
that is, we consider them as objects that are related to each other causally. 
But this knowledge does not reveal the true meaning of his intentional 
behaviour to the subject that is only given when the subject perceives his 
bodily action as an immediate manifestation of the will. In such a case, ‘the 
act of will and the action of the body are not two different states 
objectively known, connected by the bond of causality; they do not stand 
in the relation of cause and effect, but are one and the same thing […] 
Resolutions of the will relating to the future are merely deliberations of 
reason about what will be willed at some time, not real acts of will. Only 
the carrying out stamps the resolve; till then, it is always a mere intention 
that can be altered; it exists only in reason, in the abstract. Only in 
reflection is willing and acting different; in reality they are one.’ (WWR, I, 
§ 18, 100-101). Wittgenstein will say: ‘Wishing is not acting. But willing 
is acting’ (NB 4.11.16, 88e). Therefore, for both Schopenhauer and 
Wittgenstein, the will is not the name of some object, it is incorrect to 
speak of the will as the cause of the behaviour of the body, and an act of 
will and a corresponding movement of the body are not two different 
processes, but the same thing considered from different aspects.  
However, there still exists a relevant divergence: according to 
Schopenhauer, we have direct, intuitive knowledge – not scientific – of the 
will in its corporal manifestation (after all, the will is the world, seen from 
another perspective); Wittgenstein, on the other hand, denies all knowledge 
of the will, since it is external to the world, and the only possible 
knowledge is that which natural science offers of the world. 
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5.  Ethics and the Willing Subject 
Wittgenstein links ethics to the discovery of a deeper dimension of the 
world than that which belongs to the sphere of representation and can be 
expressed in language. Such a condition is that ‘the world must thereby 
become quite another’ (TLP 6.43), not because it changes something inside 
the world, but because the limits of the world change and the world reveals 
itself as being completely another.  
A change of this nature also presupposes a metaphysical subject that 
is not part of the world that, as the bearer of value, is a condition of ‘the 
sense of the world’ (TLP 6.41). In the Notebooks, this subject is 
denominated ‘the willing subject’ (NB 2.8.16, 79e). It could be said that 
meaning enters the world through two different methods of projection: 
thought and the will. Both are outside the world, but, just as the 
metaphysical I that makes the meaning of language possible is an 
impersonal I, the willing subject is a personal I (‘my will’, TLP 6.373) and 
a real I: ‘The thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing 
subject exists’ (NB 5.8.16, 80e).  
It remains significant that, for Wittgenstein, the willing subject ‘is 
not an object’ (NB 7.8.16, 80e), and that he considers that the value-
bearing will is not ‘the will as a phenomenon’ (TLP 6.423). Both points 
agree with the Schopenhauerian conception of the will. The specific 
meaning that Wittgenstein gives to the will – as well as the possible 
analogies that can be established with Schopenhauer – can be traced in the 
concatenation of the following theses:  
 (a) ‘The sense of the world must lie outside of the world… In it there 
is no value’ (TLP 6.41). 
(b) The will is ‘the bearer of good and evil’ (NB 21.7.16, 76e), but is 
so as far as it ‘is not part of the world, but a boundary of the world’ (NB 
2.8.16, 79e).  
(c) Good and evil will are attitudes of the subject with regard to the 
world as a whole (cf. NB 4.11.16, 87e).  
(d) The goodness or wickedness of the world have nothing to do with 
how the world is, but with what it is; that is to say, they do not alter the 
facts of the world, but the limits of the world (TLP 6.43).  
(e) That change is shown in the resolution of life in the world: ‘The 
world and life are one’ (TLP 5.621).  
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(f) The solution to the problem of life – when it stops being 
problematic – is given for those that live, not in time, but in eternity, ‘if by 
eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then 
he lives eternally who lives in the present’ (TLP 6.4311).  
It is worth wondering about the possible Schopenhauerian matrix of 
these of Wittgenstein’s thoughts. To find an answer, the following 
observations may be useful.  
(1) Schopenhauer distinguishes two visions of the world that are 
irreducible between themselves: as representation and as will. 
Wittgenstein, for his part, distinguishes between the world as ‘the totality 
of facts’ (TLP 1.1), from which ‘we make to ourselves pictures’ (TLP 2.1), 
and the world just as ‘it is given me’ (NB 8.7.16, 74e) being the world to 
which my will gains access ‘completely from outside as into something 
that is already there’ (ibid.).  
(2) The analogy extends to two possible ways of thinking about the 
will. Schopenhauer points out that the will becomes objectified as a 
phenomenon in the body, and thus it is possible to represent it as an object 
(this is the way, for example, that psychology considers it when it explains 
acts of will as the effects of motives, that is, as objects causally connected 
to other objects). However, it is only when we feel it as the deepest essence 
of ourselves and the world, that we capture the will as a source of all value 
(which is the only consideration of interest to philosophy). Wittgenstein, 
for his part, establishes a radical distinction between the will as a 
phenomenon or part of the world – a consideration that does not interest 
philosophy, but psychology (TLP 6.423) – and the will as ‘the bearer of 
ethics’ (NB 5.8.16, 80e), which does not belong to the world. And, 
mentioning Schopenhauer explicitly, states: ‘It would be possible to say (à 
la Schopenhauer): It is not the world as Idea (Vorstellung) that is either 
good or evil; but the willing subject’ (NB 2.8.16, 79e).  
(3) Both trace a distinction between two possible attitudes of the I 
with regard to the world that we can call the objectifying attitude and the 
attitude of identification with the world. In Schopenhauer, the first of these 
responds to the ‘ordinary way of considering things’, characteristic of 
knowledge as representation, which considers ‘the where, the when, the 
why, and the whither in things’ (WWR, I, § 34, 178), tracing the 
relationships between objects in conformity with the principle of reason. 
But there is another possible attitude to the world, more elevated and less 
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common, that occurs when the subject surrenders himself to the intuition of 
objects and allows his consciousness to become filled to the brim by his 
contemplation. When this occurs, ‘we lose ourselves entirely in the 
object…, we forget our individuality, our will, and continue to exist only 
as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object’ (ibid.). In this contemplative 
attitude the subject is ‘pure’ as long as it has become empty of all 
subjective content (of individuality, of will, of his temporality) and reduced 
to a point – a simple position of consciousness – whose whole content is 
the other of the I, the world, but no longer as an object. The contemplative 
attitude dissolves the subjectivity of the I and the objectivity of the world 
to the extent that both ‘become one’ (WWR, I, § 34, 179).  
In Wittgenstein, we can find a apparently similar distinction to this. 
On the one hand, there is the attitude towards the world of science that 
formulates questions and offers answers about real or possible facts. The 
scientific attitude objectifies the world as the set of the facts that can be 
represented in language. On the other hand, in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein 
notes a different attitude that leads to being in ‘agreement’ with the world 
(NB 8.07.1916, 75e). He considers this attitude as a precondition for a 
happy life, an idea that we shall return to shortly. The thing that is 
interesting to highlight here is that it is a way of locating oneself in the 
world that Wittgenstein calls ‘the life of knowledge’ (NB 13.08.1916, 81e), 
and that it leads to seeing oneself in perfect continuity with things: ‘A 
stone, the body of a beast, the body of a man, my body, all stand on the 
same level. That is why what happens, whether it comes from a stone or 
from my body is neither good or bad’ (NB 12.10.1916, 84e).  
There are several possible points of convergence with Schopenhauer 
here: whoever adopts this attitude comes to see their own body as being 
situated inside the world, as one further object among others, and to 
consider whatever happens to him as lacking value, because good and evil 
depend on the will, which is outside the world. Moreover, seeing oneself as 
a being at the same level as other objects, the I can adopt an attitude of 
acceptance towards the world without restrictions and renounce wanting 
things to be this way or that, under the false supposition that they are good 
or bad. Such an attitude with respect to the world as a whole is what 
Wittgenstein understands by good will (cf. TLP, 6.43): that which gives 
meaning to the world as a bearer of value (cf. TLP 6.41).  
(4) It would still be necessary to establish another analogy in the way 
that each man distinguishes two different attitudes of the I with regard to 
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its own temporality. Schopenhauer affirms that, when one contemplates 
oneself through the prism of the principle of reason, ‘the individual is only 
phenomenon… for this knowledge, the individual receives his life as a gift, 
rises out of nothing, and then suffers the loss of the gift through death, and 
returns to nothing. We, however, wish to consider life philosophically, that 
is to say, according to its Ideas, and then we shall find that neither the will, 
the thing-in-itself in all phenomena, nor the subject of knowing, the 
spectator of all phenomena, is in any way affected by birth and death.’ 
(WWR, I, § 54, 275). The reason of it rests on this: whoever lives 
philosophically, recognizes that ‘the present alone is the form of all life, 
and is its also life’s sure possession which can never be torn from it. […] 
The present alone is that which always exists and stands firm and 
immovable (WWR, I, § 54, 278-279).  
These very ideas resonate in the Wittgensteinian conception of the 
happy life as eternal or atemporal life, and of this as life in the present: 
‘Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy. For life in 
the present there is no death.’ (NB 8.7.16, 74e-75e) 
 
6.  The Happy Life, Sin and Salvation  
 Wittgenstein says that only good or evil will can change the limits of the 
world. ‘The world must thereby become quite another’ (TLP 6.43). Of 
course, this complete conversion does not consist in transforming the 
world by means of the production of new facts. A change like this would 
only take place within the world – and would therefore not change it 
completely; but, moreover, this idea lacks meaning, because there is no 
logical connection between the will and the world that guarantees that what 
we want to happen will happen, therefore, if it did in fact happen, we 
would not be able to attribute it to our will (cf. TLP 6.374). To put it 
another way, the will cannot have effects within the world, since it is does 
not form part of it; it can only change it from outside, that is to say, as a 
whole.  
The question, then, is not to do with changing the world, but of 
changing world. And this change can only happen in a change of the will 
that leads the I to want the world, to accept the facts in their entirety. Good 
will is that which wants what actually is. It is the bearer of happiness that 
lies in accepting the world, or of unhappiness that lies in not accepting it. 
But the will is the bearer of happiness or unhappiness, not as if a cause – 
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not like an action or an effort – but as a change in the ’I’. At this point 
Wittgenstein meets with Schopenhauer. ‘For a blissful condition of man, it 
would not be by any means sufficient for him to be transferred to a “better 
world”; on the contrary, it would also be necessary for a fundamental 
change to occur in man himself… To be transferred to another world and 
to change one’s entire nature are at bottom one and the same thing… 
Accordingly, here is to be found the point of contact between 
transcendental philosophy and ethics.’ (WWR, II, §41, 492).  
The complete change of world that Wittgenstein associates with good 
will may be illustrated by way of this observation in the Notebooks: ‘It is 
generally assumed that it is evil to want someone else to be unfortunate. 
Can this be correct? Can it be worse than to want him to be fortunate?’ 
(NB 29.7.16, 78e). Just as the correct understanding of logic depends on a 
way of looking at it, so Wittgenstein seems to link the correct way of living 
with a way of wanting it to proceed to a way of seeing the world as a 
whole, and breaks away from the creation of desires that are internal to the 
world since they are subject to accidental circumstances. It could also be 
expressed this way: happiness derives from an inert will that wills, but 
does not wish. ‘And yet in a certain sense it seems that not wanting is the 
only good’ (NB 29.7.16, 77e).  
The Wittgensteinian ideal of a happy life has little to do with the old 
ethics that considered virtue a necessary condition of a happy life. Nor 
does it agree with the ordinary conception of happiness as the continuous 
satisfaction of our desires. What both visions have in common is what 
Schopenhauer called an optimistic vision of ethics, according to which 
happiness depends on working: he who works well is not guilty and is 
therefore happy. In contrast, Schopenhauer thought that there was a more 
original sin than the one that leads to evil acts: the guilt of being, of 
existing. ‘Original sin is really our only true sin’ (WWR, II, §48, 604). But 
that guilt is not erased by work, for to work as we should, we would have 
to be as we are not. What we need is to become something totally different 
and even opposite to what we are, ‘we need a complete transformation of 
our nature and disposition’ (ibid.), a salvation that produces a rebirth in us. 
Now, since the sin is to exist, and the principle of existence is the will to 
live – ‘the will wills life absolutely and for all time’ (WWR, II, §45, 568), 
salvation must come from detaching our will from life, from a negation of 
the will to live.  
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That negation has its roots in the comprehension of the ‘inborn error’ 
(WWR, II, §49, 634), according to which the destiny of human life is 
happiness: original, because it is consubstantial with our being, since our 
essence is nothing but the will to live; but finally it is an error because the 
whole of human existence clearly shows that our destiny is unhappiness. 
The spring of Schopenhauerian ethics is to rescue us from that error, to 
suppress the illusion of happiness that binds our will to life. But this 
renunciation of existence is not achieved by means of work, but by the 
acceptance of pain and misery, by contemplating them under a new light. 
An example will clarify the meaning of this: the optimist who believes in 
happiness as the destiny of the virtue that he puts into practice feels the 
suffering that accompanies life as an injustice, and tries to compensate for 
that injustice by venting his pain on others by means of violence or 
cunning. This kind of behaviour is a typical phenomenon of the will to 
live. In contrast, he who thinks of the misery and suffering that life has 
dealt him as the authentic destiny of human life, can renounce happiness 
and find comfort in that resignation. Such detachment from existence can 
be expressed in multiple ways (in asceticism, in the abandoning of any 
inheritance, in the search for adversity, in the renunciation of any chance 
privilege…) and has nothing to do with an effort of the will.  
Without a question, it would be excessive to state that the happy life 
that Wittgenstein aspires to passes through metaphysical pessimism and 
the negation of the will to live in Schopenhauer’s sense. But, at all events, 
it does pass through a renunciation of happiness conceived as the 
satisfaction of the desires via an acceptance of the personal destiny that life 
has laid out, and an attitude of resigned asceticism that would have to be 
indifferent to success or failure in ordinary life. Ethics, good, the truly 
valuable, do not seem to be marked by anything that has to do with the will 
conceived as an agent that intervenes in the march of the world. The happy 
life is characterized, rather, by an attitude of the I that can bear the misery 
of the world and can contemplate its joys as gifts of fortune that can be 
renounced (cf. NB 13.8.16). It is an open question whether in this 
Wittgenstein is indebted to Schopenhauer; he probably also learned it from 
others. But it is difficult to deny the existence of a certain family air 
between certain basic options and the deepest values that support their 
respective conceptions of ethics. 
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The Ethical Dimension of the Tractatus 
 
CHON TEJEDOR 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, I propose to explore a new understanding of the ethical 
dimension of the Tractatus. There is no doubt that Wittgenstein regarded 
his book as having an important ethical purpose. In a 1919 letter to Ludwig 
Ficker, Wittgenstein writes: 
[…] the point of the book is an ethical one. I once wanted to include in the 
preface a sentence that is now actually not there, but that I will write to 
you now since it might be a key for you: I wanted to write that my book 
consists of two parts: of the one that is present here and of everything I 
have not written. Precisely this second part is the important one. For the 
ethical is delimited as it were from the inside by my book; and I am 
convinced that strictly speaking it can ONLY be delimited in this way. In 
short I think: everything of which many nowadays are blethering, I have 
defined in my book by being silent about it […]. I would recommend you 
to read the preface and the conclusion since they express the point most 
directly.  
The letter to Ficker suggests both that the main purpose of the 
Tractatus is an ethical one and that this purpose can only be fulfilled by 
being silent about ethics. The notion of silence in ethics emerges once 
more in the main text of the Tractatus: 
So it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.  
Propositions can express nothing that is higher. (TLP 6.42) 
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. 
(TLP 6.421) 
The view that silence is essential in some areas is also present in the 
final remark of the Tractatus (TLP 7 – which Wittgenstein may well have 
regarded as the ‘conclusion’ he mentions in the letter to Ficker) and in the 
version of the Preface that was finally published: 
What we cannot speak of, we must pass over in silence. (TLP 7) 
What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about 
we must pass over in silence. (TLP Preface)  
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The claim that ethics cannot be put into words gives rise to an 
obvious tension – one that lies at the very heart of the Tractatus. For, if 
ethics cannot be put into words, if there can be no ‘propositions of ethics’, 
how can a book – something that is, on the face of it, made up of words – 
have an ethical dimension? Part of the aim of this paper is to defend a new 
approach to this fundamental question of Tractarian scholarship.  
 My approach offers an alternative to what I call the Schopenhauerian 
reading of the Tractatus. The Schopenhauerian reading I will be 
considering here hinges on two main assumptions: firstly, that the 
Tractatus posits a transcendental subject as a condition both of 
representation and of ethics; and secondly, that morality involves a 
transcendental choice between two attitudes towards the world (a morally 
good attitude that makes for a happy life and a morally bad one that makes 
for an unhappy one). In this paper, I argue against this Schopenhauerian 
reading and present a different way of approaching the ethical dimension 
of the Tractatus. The paper consists of three parts. In part I, I give a brief 
account of the Schopenhauerian reading, as it is presented by Martin 
Stokhof. In part II, I present the problems with this reading. Finally, in part 
III, I introduce an alternative understanding of the ethical purpose of the 
Tractatus. 
 
1.  The Schophenhauerian reading 
The Schopenhauerian reading suggests that Wittgenstein posits, in the 
Tractatus, a transcendental subject as a condition of both representation 
and ethics. This view is motivated in great part by the fact that the 
Notebooks discuss such a transcendental subject (the ‘willing subject’ as 
Wittgenstein calls it) and at several key points go as far as endorsing it. 
The Schopenhauerian reading adds that the willing subject of the 
Notebooks is the same as the metaphysical subject of TLP 5.641: 
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my 
world’. 
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the 
human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical 
subject, the limit of the world – not a part of it. (TLP 5.641) 
 The idea is therefore that TLP 5.641 embraces the notion of a willing 
subject understood as a transcendental condition of representation and 
ethics. In this section, I will give a brief overview of the Schopenhauerian 
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reading of the Tractatus. Although I will touch upon the issue of 
representation at a couple of points, I will for the most part remain focused 
on the ethical aspects of the Schopenhauerian reading.  
 According to Stokhof, both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein posit a 
transcendental subject understood as the condition of representation and 
ethics. Schopenhauer calls it the ‘noumenal will’; in the Notebooks, 
Wittgenstein calls it the ‘willing subject’. Both authors distinguish this 
notion of transcendental subject from the notion of phenomenal or 
empirical self: the self that has wishes and desires. According to this 
reading, both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein advocate the view that 
happiness and willing involve the abandonment of one’s empirical desires 
and wishes: the abandonment of our empirical will.    
 In this view, the main difference between Wittgenstein’s views and 
Schopenhauer’s relates to their accounts of the phenomenal or empirical 
world. Schopenhauer views the phenomenal world in strictly deterministic 
terms; in contrast, Wittgenstein regards the empirical world as 
fundamentally contingent. For Wittgenstein, the empirical world is the 
totality of facts and there is no a priori necessity as to which facts should 
obtain. Indeed, in his view, there is no necessity outside logic, and thus no 
necessary connections between facts other than those arising from logical, 
internal relations (for instance, the relations of entailment between certain 
propositions). Interestingly, Schopenhauer’s strictly deterministic view of 
the world and Wittgenstein’s view that the world is fundamentally 
contingent coincide in rendering the notions of human freedom and moral 
responsibility similarly problematic. Furthermore, according to Stokhof, 
both authors adopt a similar strategy in the face of this difficulty: the 
strategy that consists in locating freedom of choice and moral 
responsibility at the limits of, rather than within, the phenomenal or 
empirical world. For Wittgenstein, although the empirical will is incapable 
of genuine freedom and responsibility, the willing subject is capable of 
these. Although I have no control (no choice) over which facts obtain in 
the world, I do have a choice as to which attitude to adopt towards these 
facts. Specifically, it is open to me to adopt an attitude of acceptance 
towards reality, or one of rejection. The attitude of acceptance is the 
ethically correct one – it is that which makes for a ‘happy life’. The attitude 
of resistance, in contrast, makes for an ‘unhappy life’.  
According to the Schopenhauerian reading of Wittgenstein’s 
position, adopting an attitude of acceptance (i.e. leading a happy life) 
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involves the denial or abandonment of one’s empirical wishes and desires. 
Wishing necessarily involves suffering, since there is no necessity as to its 
fulfillment. There are no necessary connections between our wishes and 
the facts that would fulfill them – that is, wishing for certain facts do not 
necessarily bring them about. There are not even necessary connections 
between our wishes and our actions: it is possible for me to wish to 
perform a certain action and fail to perform it. The wishing impulse is the 
impulse to control the facts that make up reality – but such a control is 
illusory. The wishing impulse is thus the source of all suffering and the 
happy life must involve the abandonment of this impulse.  
 Whilst the fundamental contingency of the world means that we can 
exert no control over which facts obtain, there remains room for choice: I 
can choose to adopt an attitude of acceptance towards the facts or one of 
rejection. According to the Schopenhauerian reading of the Tractatus, 
accepting that the world is beyond our control and that we can exert no 
influence over it involves abandoning our desires and wishes. This choice 
between abandoning one’s desires so as to harmonize with the world and 
embracing our desires in a vain attempt at controlling the world is central 
to Wittgenstein’s ethical thinking.  
 
2.  Problems with the Schopenhauerian reading 
There are, in my view, three major problems with the Schopenhauerian 
reading. The first problem stems from its reliance on the view that 
Wittgenstein retains, in the Tractatus, the notion of a transcendental 
subject as a condition of representation and ethics; the second arises from 
Wittgenstein’s insistence on the need for silence in ethics; the third 
concerns the way in which the Schopenhauerian reading portrays 
Wittgenstein’s notion of being in agreement with the world. In this part, I 
will consider each of these in turn. 
 
(i)  The notion of a transcendental subject 
As I mentioned earlier, the Schopenhauerian reading is predicated on the 
assumption that Wittgenstein retains, in the Tractatus, the notion of willing 
subject from the Notebooks –that is, the notion of a transcendental subject 
understood as a condition of both representation and ethics. In my view, 
this assumption is incorrect.  
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In the Notebooks, Wittgenstein discusses three notions of the subject: 
the ‘thinking subject’ (mentioned explicitly in e.g. NB 4.8.16 and NB 
5.8.16), the ‘willing subject’ (e.g. NB 2.8.16 and NB 5.8.16), and the 
‘metaphysical subject’ (NB 4.8.16 and NB 2.9.16).  In NB 5.8.16, 
Wittgenstein draws a contrast between the notion of ‘thinking subject’ and 
that of ‘willing subject’. The notion of thinking subject is that of an object-
like, thinking (or – more generally – representing) subject. This notion is 
rejected by Wittgenstein in the Notebooks, as well as in the Prototractatus 
and the Tractatus. In contrast, the notion of willing subject does appear to 
be endorsed in at least some sections of the Notebooks. Consider notably 
NB 5.8.16, where Wittgenstein writes:  
The thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists.  
If the will did not exit, neither would there be that centre of the world, 
which we call the I, and which is the bearer of ethics.  
What is good and evil is essentially the I, not the world.  
The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious. (NB 5.8.16) 
NB 5.8.16 therefore appears to endorse the notion of a transcendental 
subject, of the type discussed by the Schopenhauerian reading. We know, 
however, that Wittgenstein’s thoughts on these issues were in flux when he 
was writing the Notebooks: not all of the views from the Notebooks survive 
into the Tractatus. The question before us is therefore: does Wittgenstein’s 
endorsement of the subject as transcendental condition of representation 
and ethics survive into the Tractatus? I suggest that it does not. For the 
Notebooks’ discussion of the subject, the I, the will, etc. ends with two 
entries that provide strong evidence against such continuity. These are the 
entries dated 9.11.16 and 19.11.16: 
Is belief a kind of experience? 
Is thought a kind of experience? 
All experience is world and does not need the subject. 
The act of the will is not an experience. (NB  9.11.16)  
What kind of reason is there for the assumption of a willing subject?  
Is not my world adequate for individuation? (NB  19.11.16)  
 These are the last entries of the Notebooks to discuss the notion of 
the subject; in this respect, it is fair to regard them as concluding the 
Notebooks’ discussion of this question. Since experience is a form of 
  Doubt, Ethics and Religion 98 
thought, of mental representation for Wittgenstein, NB 9.11.16 must be 
read as suggesting that mental representation does not require a 
transcendental (that is a willing, non-object-like) subject. In the next entry 
(NB 19.11.16), Wittgenstein moves to an even stronger view: he argues 
that there is, in fact, no reason whatsoever to posit such a subject. These 
are the last entries from the Notebooks to mention the transcendental 
subject: Wittgenstein never returns to this notion in the Notebooks. This, in 
my view, is highly significant. It is as if, having played with the 
Schopenhauerian idea of a transcendental subject, Wittgenstein finally 
comes to the conviction that this notion must be rejected. There is indeed 
no further mention of the expression ‘willing subject’ in the Prototractatus 
or the Tractatus. 
 There is, in addition, biographical evidence to support the view that 
Wittgenstein had a change of heart concerning his views on ethics and the 
transcendental subject in the run up to writing the Tractatus. 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts about the willing subject developed most rapidly 
during the weeks he spent with Paul Engelmann, whom he met in Olmütz 
in October 1916. Ray Monk writes:  
Engelmann was the closest friend Wittgenstein had had since leaving 
England. The friendship owed much to the fact that the two met each 
other at a time when both were experiencing a religious awakening which 
they each interpreted and analysed in a similar way. 
Monk also quotes the following passage by Engelmann: 
In me, Wittgenstein unexpectedly found a person, who […] suffered 
acutely under the discrepancy between the world as it is and as it ought to 
be according to his lights, but who tended also to seek the source of that 
discrepancy within, rather than outside himself. [… This] enabled me to 
understand, from within as it were, [Wittgenstein’s] utterances that 
mystified everyone else. 
 The strongly Schopenhauerian remarks from the Notebooks end 
abruptly in late November 1916, with the two entries I mentioned above 
(NB 9.11.16 and NB 19.11.16). Shortly thereafter, Wittgenstein leaves for 
Vienna for Christmas and then returns to the front. By the time Engelmann 
and Wittgenstein meet again in December 1917, it is clear to Engelmann 
that Wittgenstein has had a change of heart. In January 1918, Engelmann 
writes a letter in which he expresses his concern over Wittgenstein’s 
spiritual condition. Referring to their recent meeting he writes: 
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It seemed to me as if you – in contrast to the time you spent in Olmütz, 
where I had not thought so – had no faith. 
To this, Wittgenstein replies: 
If you tell me I have no faith, you are perfectly right, only I did not have it 
before either. It is plain, isn’t it, that when a man wants, as it were, to 
invent a machine for becoming decent, such a man has no faith. But what 
am I to do? I am clear about one thing: I am far too bad to be able to 
theorize about myself; in fact, I shall either remain a swine or else I shall 
improve, and that’s that! Only let’s cut out the transcendental twaddle 
when the whole thing is as plain as a sock on the jaw. [My italics in the 
last instance] 
 Wittgenstein’s reply to Engelmann is in many ways puzzling and I 
shall be returning to it at the end of this paper. At the same time, however, 
it does indicate a clear change of heart on Wittgenstein’s part. In my view, 
it shows that, by the winter of 1917 –1918, when Wittgenstein was writing 
the remarks that would come to form the Prototractatus, he had given up 
on the ‘transcendental twaddle’: he had abandoned the Schopenhauerian 
notion of a transcendental subject as condition of representation and ethics. 
If he did seriously espouse this notion earlier in the Notebooks – as he 
appears to have done before November 1916 – he had abandoned it by the 
time he was writing the Prototractatus and the Tractatus. This is why there 
is no mention of a willing subject in these works. 
 
(ii)  Silence and ethics 
We are now in a position to consider my second objection to the 
Schopenhauerian reading, the one that arises from Wittgenstein’s 
insistence on the need for silence in ethics. For a defender of the 
Schopenhauerian reading might protest at this stage that the notion of 
willing subject is retained in the Prototractatus or the Tractatus: that it is 
simply retained under a different label, namely that of ‘metaphysical 
subject’. After all, the metaphysical subject is mentioned in both the 
Prototractatus and Tractatus. Indeed, both PTLP 5.33552 and TLP 5.641 
appear actively to endorse this notion, as we noted earlier. This reply from 
the Schopenhauerian camp does not ultimately hold water however. For, 
first of all, it is highly unclear that the expressions ‘willing subject’ and 
‘metaphysical subject’ are intended to be interchangeable. Both 
expressions feature in the Notebooks – but, crucially, they are never used in 
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the same entries. And there is nothing in the entries that do mention them 
(i.e. that do so separately) to suggest that these expressions are regarded by 
Wittgenstein as equivalent in the Notebooks. In other words, there is 
nothing in the Notebooks to suggest that the ‘metaphysical subject’ is the 
same as the ‘willing subject’ for Wittgenstein.  
 But there is a second, more fundamental problem with arguing that 
the metaphysical subject of TLP 5.641 is the willing subject of the 
Notebooks. For TLP 5.641 starts off by noting that ‘there really is sense in 
which philosophy can [“must” in NB 11.8.16] talk about’ the metaphysical 
subject. The entry as a whole reads: 
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in 
a non-psychological way. 
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my 
world’. 
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the 
human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical 
subject, the limit of the world – not a part of it. (TLP 5.641) 
 If the metaphysical subject were the willing subject of the 
Notebooks, TLP 5.641 would thus be advancing both that the willing, non-
object-like subject is a transcendental condition of the world (a limit in this 
sense) and that the willing subject can be talked about. This suggestion is 
deeply problematic, however. For any attempt to talk about a non-object-
like condition of the world would surely, in Wittgenstein’s view, constitute 
an attempt to say what cannot be said. As such, it would result in nonsense. 
If so, it is highly unclear why Wittgenstein should encourage philosophers 
to continue talking about it.  
 In my view, the metaphysical subject of TLP 5.641 is not the 
transcendental, willing subject of the Notebooks. When Wittgenstein 
suggests that the metaphysical subject is the limit of the world in PTLP 
5.33552 and TLP 5.641, he does not mean that it is a transcendental 
condition of the world. That would suggest that he was engaging in the 
kind of ‘transcendental twaddle’ he condemns in his letter to Engelmann. 
There is indeed a different way to interpret ‘metaphysical subject’: we can 
interpret it as standing for all possible thought, for the totality of possible 
thoughts. In my view, the metaphysical subject is the limit of the world 
simply in that it encompasses all possible thought – one cannot go beyond 
all possible thought: that is the limit. Since every thought can be expressed 
by means of propositions, there is indeed a real sense in which 
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philosophers can (perhaps even must) talk about the metaphysical subject. 
This is a view I have defended elsewhere, as part of my discussion of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on solipsism.  
 
(iii) The notion of a transcendental choice 
The third major problem with the Schopenhauerian reading, as it is 
presented by Stokhof, concerns its characterisation of Wittgenstein’s 
notion of agreement with the world. In Stokhof’s reading, when one 
becomes clear as to the fundamental contingency of reality, one is 
presented with a choice: the choice between adopting an attitude of 
acceptance of or one of resistance to the facts; the choice between adopting 
the attitude of attempting to pursue those facts that would satisfy my 
desires or the attitude of abandoning my desires. In my view, the 
importance attributed to choice here is misplaced. What is more, it results 
from placing undue emphasis on the notion of a transcendental, willing 
subject. For the notion of transcendental, willing subject encourages us to 
think that certain facts are closer to us (in the sense of being more under 
our control) than others. Indeed, the view that I can choose to abandon my 
desires implies that I can control –at least to some degree– certain mental 
facts (namely my desires). As soon the notion of transcendental willing 
subject is abandoned, however, as soon as it becomes clear that I am an 
merely an empirical self, exactly on a par with other contingent facts, this 
notion of choice loses its grip. Without the notion of transcendental 
subject, the idea that I might choose to abandon my desires is undermined. 
After all, both I (as empirical self) and my desires are facts for 
Wittgenstein; and, outside logic, the relations between facts are only 
contingent. I, as empirical self, cannot necessitate the abandonment (that is 
the non-obtaining) of any facts –not even if the facts in question are my 
own desires. 
 In the Schopenhauerian reading, there is an ethical point to the 
Tractatus in that the book teaches us that reality is contingent and then 
presents us with a choice. The choice is between an intrinsically good 
attitude towards the world (the attitude of good willing, which involves the 
abandonment of desires and results in happiness) and an intrinsically bad 
one (bad willing which insists on holding on to desire and results in 
unhappiness. According to this reading, the Tractatus recommends that we 
choose the former. In my view, this misrepresents Wittgenstein’s 
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understanding of the ethical dimension of his book. In part III, I present an 
alternative understanding of the ethical purpose of the Tractatus.   
 
3.  Ethics without a Transcendental Subject 
Wittgenstein’s approach to ethics is intimately connected to his view that 
there is no necessity outside logic. The view that there is no necessity 
outside logic entails that no facts obtain necessarily and that there are no 
relations of causal necessity between facts.  
 Wittgenstein explains in the Preface that the Tractatus aims at the 
clarification of thought and language. The process of clarification in which 
we engage when we read the Tractatus culminates in the realisation that 
we are factive, empirical selves on a par with other facts in the world and 
that there is no necessity outside logic. I would suggest that this realisation 
has, in and of itself, a fundamental ethical dimension for Wittgenstein: for 
to recognise the essential contingency of reality and of ourselves as facts is 
to undergo a profound ethical transformation. 
 In order to see this, it is worth turning our attention briefly to 
Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture on Ethics’. Although Wittgenstein only gave this 
lecture in 1929, the evidence suggests that his ethical views had not 
changed since he wrote the Tractatus.  
In the ‘Lecture on Ethics’, Wittgenstein draws an important 
distinction between the notions of relative and absolute value.  
Every judgment of relative value is a mere statement of facts and can 
therefore be put in such a form that it loses all the appearance of a 
judgment of value: Instead of saying “This is the right way to 
Granchester,” I could equally well have said, “This is the right way you 
have to go if you want to get to Granchester in the shortest time”. 
(‘Lecture on Ethics’)  
 Relative value emerges when we adopt an instrumental attitude 
towards reality: it emerges when we come to regard facts as means to be 
used in order to achieve our particular ends. Absolute value, in contrast, 
emerges when we consider facts in and of themselves, as opposed to from 
the point of view of how we may use them to fulfill our ends. In effect, 
absolute value emerges when we become fully clear as to the essential 
contingency of facts. In the ‘Lecture on Ethics’, Wittgenstein explains that 
he associates the notion of absolute value with the experience of 
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‘[wondering] at the existence of the world’, that is, with the experience that 
makes him inclined: 
to use such phrases as ‘how extraordinary that anything should exist’ or 
‘how extraordinary that the world should exist.’ (‘Lecture on Ethics’) 
 The contrast between relative and absolute value in the ‘Lecture on 
Ethics’ helps to throw light on the Tractatus’ approach to valuing. From 
the point of view of the Tractatus, the idea that it is possible to use facts as 
means to satisfy our ends involves the illusory belief that we can exert 
genuine control over reality. This instrumental attitude to reality results 
from a lack of clarity as to its essentially contingent status: it arises from 
the misguided sense that we can (necessarily) cause the world to be 
different. The sense that we exert genuine influence over reality vanishes, 
however, as soon as we come to ‘see the world aright’ (TLP 6.54): it 
vanishes when the process of clarification in which the Tractatus engages 
us culminates with the realisation that all facts are fundamentally 
contingent. This realisation is the realisation that our desires and our 
(empirical) minds are exactly on a par with all other facts. The idea that 
mental facts are on a par with other facts also emerges in the ‘Lecture on 
Ethics’. 
Now perhaps some of you will agree to that and be reminded of Hamlet’s 
words: “Nothing is either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.” But this 
again could lead to a misunderstanding. What Hamlet says seems to imply 
that good and bad, though not qualities of the world outside us, are 
attributes to our states of mind. But what I mean is that a state of mind, so 
far as we mean by that a fact which we can describe, is in no ethical sense 
good or bad. (‘Lecture on Ethics’) 
 For Wittgenstein it is a source of profound wonder that any possible 
state should obtain as a fact. This sense of wonder arises in connection to 
all facts: physical facts (the rocks, plants, animals, human physical bodies 
we encounter in reality) but also mental facts. Mental facts include desires, 
beliefs, wishes, and, more broadly, minds. This is important, because it 
marks a crucial difference between Wittgenstein’s ethics and 
Schopenhauer’s. In Wittgenstein’s view, the process of conceptual 
clarification of the Tractatus culminates in the realisation that desires are 
mental facts and that all facts are fundamentally contingent.  Becoming 
clear about this is coming to view our desires (along with all other facts) 
with a profound sense of wonder. That I should have any desires – that 
these mental facts should obtain at all –is quite extraordinary. As soon as 
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one starts to view one’s desires in this way, one comes to value them 
absolutely, as a precious and fragile gift.   
 This, of course, differs in an important way from Schopenhauer’s 
view on desire. As we saw earlier, Schopenhauer believes that we can and 
should choose the attitude of abandoning our desires. He suggests that, 
although I cannot freely choose what desires I have, I can choose to let go 
of those desires I do have. Imagine that I have a desire for warmth. 
Although I cannot choose to have a desire for coldness instead, I can let go 
of my desire for warmth: I can choose to abandon my desire for warmth. 
To this limited extent, freedom is possible within Schopenhauer’s view: I 
am free to choose to let go of those desires I do have. Letting go of my 
desires is the ethically correct choice, for Schopenhauer: my life will be a 
good, happy life if I make this choice.  
 Wittgenstein’s position is different. To begin with, there is in his 
view no suggestion that we are faced with an ethical choice. He allows that 
there are two possible attitudes towards the world, but he does not suggest 
that we choose (let alone freely choose) between them. Instead, 
Wittgenstein’s suggestion is that our attitude towards the world goes hand 
in hand with the conception of the world we happen to have. I do not freely 
choose between valuing things relatively or valuing them absolutely, just 
as I do not freely choose between the confused and the enlightened 
conceptions of the world. There is no choice to be made between the two 
attitudes: it is not as if I can choose between two attitudes that are equally 
available to me at any one point. Instead I find that, at any given point in 
time, I either conceive the world clearly and value it absolutely (in which 
case I am not conceptually confused and do not value the world relatively) 
or I value facts in a relative manner as part of a confused conception of the 
world (in which case I do not, at that time, have a clear conception of the 
world and do not value facts absolutely). This is why Wittgenstein says, in 
his letter to Engelmann: ‘I shall either remain a swine or else I shall 
improve, and that’s that!’. 
 Wittgenstein’s view therefore differs from Schopenhauer’s with 
respect to the issue of choice: for Schopenhauer, there is a free choice to be 
made, albeit a limited one; for Wittgenstein, there simply isn’t. 
Wittgenstein’s view also differs from Schopenhauer’s in another important 
respect: they differ in their treatment of desire. Both philosophers agree 
that we cannot change our desires: I cannot choose to have a desire for 
coldness rather than a desire for warmth. However, they differ in their 
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treatments of the desires we do have. Schopenhauer recommends that we 
strive to abandon or let go of the desires we do have: I should, in the above 
example, try to let go of my desire for warmth. For Wittgenstein, in 
contrast, my desire for warmth is part of the fundamentally contingent 
reality (of the world as totality of facts). As such, it can be a source of 
profound wonder: it is to be valued, in and of itself, in an absolute manner. 
Instead of attempting to let go of the desires I do have, I should simply 
value them for the fundamentally fragile gifts they are. Valuing them in 
this way involves, of course, recognising that attempting to fulfill them 
may prove to be an inherently pointless Endeavour. 
 Before we draw this discussion to a close, it is worth sounding a note 
of caution. For Wittgenstein’s position could be understood as an invitation 
to cease all action, to stop striving towards any goals, or to stop trying to 
improve oneself. If I am not genuinely in control of anything, what is the 
point in my attempting to act or in my trying to improve myself? This is by 
no means Wittgenstein’s position, however. Indeed, we should note that 
this suggestion (the suggestion that one should cease trying to act or cease 
trying to improve oneself) relies on the mistaken assumption that I am, in 
fact, in control of at least some aspects of my life: I am sufficiently in 
control to make the decision to cease to act or to cease to strive! 
Wittgenstein sees this as a misapprehension. I may, at any given time, have 
the desire to stop acting or have the desire to stop improving myself, but 
there is absolutely no guarantee that these desires will be satisfied: I may 
have these desires and yet continue to act and continue trying to improve 
myself. 
 For Wittgenstein, the key really is in our recognising the 
fundamental contingency of all facts presented before us: whether these 
facts are desires to continue improving ourselves or desires to give up, 
whether they are actions or inactions. Wittgenstein’s experiences during 
World War I, whilst he was developing the Tractatus, show that trying to 
improve himself, trying to become a better (that is, a clearer, more 
authentic) person – is central to him, and would remain so for the rest of 
his life. In Wittgenstein’s view there is no inconsistency between accepting 
the desire to improve oneself (the desire for whatever might bring this 
improvement) and the recognition that this desire may never be granted. 
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Conclusion 
For Wittgenstein, the point of the Tractatus is an ethical one. The reason 
for this is not that his book succeeds in conveying a putatively unsayable, 
yet substantive, Schopenhauerian view, such as the one described by 
Stokhof. Instead, the point of the Tractatus is an ethical one because the 
book engages us in a process of conceptual clarification which, if 
successful, culminates in our valuing all facts (including our own desires) 
in an absolute manner. In this respect, it is likely that when Wittgenstein 
speaks of a ‘machine for becoming decent’ in his letter to Engelmann, he is 
really referring to the Tractarian system. The mention of a machine is 
potentially misleading here, however. For the idea is not that reading the 
Tractatus will cause (in a way that implies causal necessity) an ethical 
transformation in us. The idea is, rather, that the book may succeed in its 
task of helping us gain conceptual clarity. When the Tractatus does 
succeed in this task it effects a profound ethical transformation in us. For 
being conceptually clear is valuing all facts in an absolute manner. 
 Wittgenstein allows that there are two attitudes towards the world: 
the conceptually confused attitude of valuing individual facts in a relative 
manner and the conceptually clear attitude of valuing all facts absolutely. 
He does not, however, suggest that we can or do, at any point, choose 
between these two attitudes. Instead the suggestion is simply that, when we 
are conceptually clear we value the world absolutely; and when we are 
conceptually confused we value it relatively –that is, we place no genuine 
value on it at all.   
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The early Wittgenstein, Tolstoy’s Kurze 
Darlegung des Evangelium and Nietzsche’s 
Der Antichrist 
 
JOAN B. LLINARES CHOVER 
 
To understand the religious background to Wittgenstein’s work and the 
man himself, it is helpful to bear in mind the Catholic education his mother 
gave him from infancy, and to take note of at least some of the authors who 
influenced him in this area from adolescence and youth, for example, 
Angelus Silesius, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, William James, and the two 
greatest Russian writers of the nineteenth century, Tolstoy and 
Dostoyevsky. It may also be appropriate to add Nietzsche to this list, as we 
shall try to explain.  
The curious feature here is that the singular vision that Nietzsche, 
author of Also sprach Zarathustra, had of Christianity would have been 
impossible in his final lucid stage (we refer to the works of 1887-1889 that 
he published or left ready for printing, and which were largely brought 
together in one volume, published with deficiencies and manipulations in 
1904) without his meticulous and annotated earlier reading of certain of 
Dostoyevsky’s novels and a long essay by Tolstoy, Ma Religion that had 
been published in 1885. Nietzsche read Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky in 
French, rather than German translations, because he considered them as 
exceptional interlocutors in the environment of the best culture of his time, 
being that created in Parisian circles. Tolstoy’s work (on the hundredth 
anniversary of the Russian novelist and thinker’s death) will help us, 
therefore, to specify aspects of the philosophy of religion both in the 
mature Nietzsche and the young Wittgenstein, particularly in Der 
Antichrist and the so-called Geheime Tagebücher, respectively.    
As is well-known, this ‘secret’ section of the Tagebücher is written 
in code, on the opposite pages of three books of notes that cover the period 
from August 1914 to August 1916. Known as the Notebooks 1914-1916, 
they were written at the front during the First World War and during the 
gestation of what were to become the Tractatus.  
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However, we should like to point out some important omissions. We 
shall not be looking at the traces, noticeable in the Wittgenstein of those 
years, of his passionate reading of what is surely the best of Tolstoy’s 
legacy – his literature. There are documents from the time that show that 
he both knew and greatly valued not only Tolstoy’s posthumous story 
Hadji Murat (1912) but also his Volkserzählungen (his Russian Folk 
Legends). Nor is it trivial that we shall ignore his readings of Dostoyevsky, 
especially Verbrechen und Strafe (as ‘Crime and Punishment’ has finally 
been translated – it was previously known as Schuld und Sühne) and Die 
Brüder Karamasow as we believe that they provide clues that make it 
much easier to understand what is meant by being ‘born-again’, as well as 
for defining and discussing what is meant in Wittgenstein by ‘religion’ or 
‘being religious’ and even the ‘mystical’. What we present here is, 
therefore, a minuscule part of a complex relationship.   
The basis of our considerations is to be found in these two 
annotations of the Geheime Tagebücher, corresponding to the parts written 
on 2.9.1914 and 8.12.1914 respectively and which read: “Gestern fing ich 
an, in Tolstois / Erläuterungen zu den Evangelien zu lesen.  /  Ein 
herrliches Werk.” Y: “Nietzsche Band 8 gekauft / und darin gelesen.1 
 
1.  A Misleading Title   
We will begin by clarifying a textual problem: Wittgenstein gives the name 
of Tolstoy’s book as “Erläuterungen zu den Evangelien” (for example, on 
2.9.1914 and 8.9.1914), though in the annotation of the 11.10.1914 he 
gives its title as “Darlegungen des Evangeliums”. To complicate matters 
further, it is known that, in a letter to L. von Ficker, Wittgenstein refers to 
this work as “Kurze Erläuterungen des Evangeliums”2. Three different 
ways, therefore, of giving the title of a specific book that he acquired at the 
time. Yet which specific work was he referring to?   
In 1891, the Berlin publishers Hugo Steinitz published F. W. Ernst’s 
translation of the Russian work Krátkoye izlozhenie Yevánguelia by L. 
Tolstoy under the title Kurze Auslegung des Evangelium. In 1892, 
however, the publisher Philipp Reclam of Leipzig published a new 
translation, with a foreword by the new translator, Paul Lauterbach, a 
Tolstoy expert who was interested in the changes in the Russian text upon 
                                                 
1 The original text quotes Wittgenstein, 1991. Hereafter referred to as GT. 
2 Cf. Valdés Villanueva, 2006, 324, note 3. 
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which the great novelist continued to work, but he published it under a 
slightly different title: Kurze Darlegung des Evangelium. Therefore, in 
1914, there were at least two different editions of Tolstoy’s book in 
German and they were certainly not based on exactly identical original 
manuscripts in Russian, as can be deduced by comparing several 
noticeably different passages in these translations – not simply because of 
choices of terminology that do not coincide, or the obvious stylistic 
differences in the personal way the two translators write – on occasions 
there are entire pages that do not appear in one, which demonstrates that 
the manuscript that served as a source was another, one less explicit and 
developed. At that time, Tolstoy was working unceasingly on what he 
considered to be the heart of his message, the authentic gospel. Indeed, the 
mature Tolstoy invested a great deal of energy and writing on explaining 
his religion from 1878 until his death, that is, more than thirty years of 
intense efforts spent on research, as well as teaching and popularization, as 
we shall now see.   
Professor Valdés suggests that it is ‘reasonable to suppose that the 
edition that Wittgenstein bought in Tarnów was the Reclam one’, but does 
not give any reasons for his supposition3.  W. Baum, the editor of the GT, 
is of the same opinion because in note 15 of his edition4, explaining what 
Wittgenstein wrote on 2.9.1914, he says: ‘The work by Tolstoy that 
Wittgenstein refers to is a translation into German of a text by Tolstoy, 
entitled Kurze Darlegung des Evangeliums. Wittgenstein had acquired the 
booklet (a double volume of Reclam’s well-known ‘Universal-Bibliothek’) 
by chance some days earlier.’5 
Our confusion when reading these notes is double, because it is 
currently possible to consult that German translation of Tolstoy’s KDE on 
the Internet thanks to a copy held by the University of California, and upon 
examination, it can be seen, on the one hand, that Baum does not quote the 
title exactly (at the end of ‘Evangelium(s)’ he has as extra S) and, on the 
other, that the Spanish editors, who seem to be interested in the traces of 
the work in Wittgenstein, have chosen to translate a section of a German 
translation that, according to their own indications, is not the one used by 
                                                 
3 See the note quoted op. cit. ibid. 
4 Op. cit. p. 49. 
5 This will be quoted as KDE. Page numbers in this German translation will be shown 
with the prior abbreviation s. and ss. 
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the young Wittgenstein6, as if the specific version of a text that one reads 
were unimportant. Many Wittgenstein commentators are even more 
audacious, because they neither base their work on the German translations 
nor do they go back to the Russian original of KDE, they merely mention a 
recent English reissue, The Gospel in Brief, a way of proceeding that 
would alarm any philologist, and with good reason, but as is well-known, 
the care applied to religious and literary questions is not the same as that 
used with scientific and mathematical texts, as corresponds to our 
civilisation’s prevailing values.  
For this reason, we believe that the only rigorous way to approach 
the question requires both taking note of what Wittgenstein’s wrote in his 
GT and the German translation of Tolstoy’s work just as he read it. 
Although, in his note, Baum does not justify his decision in favour of the 
Reclam edition either, we suppose that it may be justified by the existence 
of copies Wittgenstein acquired and gave to his friends, as it is known that 
he did, and that are perhaps filed with other elements of his legacy, or by 
the study of the quotations that he wrote in his GT, comparing both texts 
and confirming their identity, as anyone can verify. 
 
2.  Tolstoy’s Religious Works  
In the ‘Vorwort’ (KDE s. 5) Tolstoy explains that the brief version of the 
gospel that he offers us is ‘ein Auszug aus einem grösserem Werke, das im 
Manuskripte vorliegt, in Russland aber nicht erscheinen darf.’ The work 
could not appear in his own country because of censorship, obviously, 
since in czarist Russia questions that affected the Orthodox Church as the 
official church were under strict government control. There was a kind of a 
ministry dedicated to such tasks and police control was implacable. There 
was neither freedom of the press nor in publications of a religious nature, 
far less if they presented a version of biblical texts that departed from the 
canonical version. In his novel Resurrection Tolstoy himself, who was 
eventually excommunicated by the Orthodox hierarchy in 1901, portrayed 
the outrages and injustices in the treatment of evangelical ‘sects’ and their 
                                                 
6 Cf. the translator’s introduction, op. cit. p. 22 and the ‘Conclusion’, ibid. p. 309. 
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wailing presence in Russian jails!.  So, what “grosses Werk” did KDE 
summarize?    
At the beginning of 1880s, the magnum opus that Tolstoy was 
focusing his enormous capacity for work on was, as he indicated himself, 
divided “aus 4 Teilen”, the first, of a personal nature and the one that, in 
our opinion, refers to materials that would go towards the book that we 
know today as A Confession; the second, a “Darlegung der christlichen 
Lehre nach den Auslegungen der Kirche… nebst den Beweisen für die 
Falschheit dieser Auslegungen,” in our opinion, referring to materials that 
would go towards the book known today as Critique of Dogmatic 
Theology; the third, an “Untersuchung der christlichen Lehre … allein 
nach dem, was von Christi Lehere auf uns gekommen ist” and a 
“Übersetzung der vier Evangelien und einer Verschmelzung derselben in 
eines”, the fourth forms a “Darlegung des wirtlichen Sinnes der 
christlichen Lehre, der Gründe um derentwillen sie enstellt worden ist und 
der Folgen, die ihre Predigt haben muss”, an exposition that can largely be 
found in the book today known in Spanish as Cuál es mi fe, in English as 
What I Believe, and in French as Ma religion. Given this, it is obvious that 
“diese “Kurze Darlegum des Evangelium” nun ist ein Auszug aus jenem 
dritten Teile” (KDE s. 5), that is, the work that we know today as The Four 
Gospels Harmonized and Translated.   
Thus, it is advisable to bear in mind that Tolstoy’s obsessive 
dedication to religious problems led him to write numerous pages, in 
particular the following texts: (1) an autobiography, significantly entitled A 
Confession, written between 1879 and 1882, published in Russian in 
Geneva in 1884, with the relevant subtitle, ‘Foreword to an unpublished 
work’. With Tolstoy’s successive research from 1878 onwards, as the years 
passed, this ‘unpublished work’ continued to grow and took shape, as we 
have partially indicated, in the following books: (2) A critical essay, 
written between 1879 and 1881, entitled Critique of Dogmatic Theology, 
(3) a work with a critical edition in Greek, Russian translation and 
comments, entitled The Four Gospels Harmonized and Translated, 
published in its original version in Geneva in 1890, from whose 
                                                 
! Cf. our presentation to the Congreso de filosofía de la Societat de Filosofia del País 
Valencià, entitled “Antropologia Filosòfica i Literatura: La religió en la novella de L. 
Tostói “Resurrecció” (1899)”,(Philosophical Anthropology and Literature: Religion in 
Tolstoy’s novella ‘Resurrection’) awaiting on-line publication. 
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manuscripts, almost all dating from 1881-1882, The Gospel in Brief, as it is 
known in English, was derived – a compendium previously prepared by 
one of Tolstoy’s disciples, V. I. Alekseyev. This was revised, enlarged and 
prefaced by the author and was the one that, in German translation, 
accompanied Wittgenstein during the First World War, the KDE.  And (4) 
the essay What I Believe which had been finished in January 1884 and was 
published in Russian in Geneva that same year. Tolstoy completed his 
reflections on a crucial problem, non-violence, with (5) the essay The 
Kingdom of God is Within You (1890-1893). We have not enumerated the 
articles on religious themes from these decades that are, certainly, very 
pertinent for the nuances that they provide, such as Religion and Morality 
(1893), or Church and State (1882), for example, or the Pensées de Tostoï, 
published in Paris in 1898 (with its equivalent in German Über Gott und 
Christentum (On God and Christianity)8, and in English, Thoughts and 
Aphorisms), nor the letters, nor the writer’s diaries during those years, nor 
yet his various essays and other works of literary creation that are also 
directly related with that problem; we refer, for example, to What is Art? 
(1897) – read by Wittgenstein – to What is to Be Done? of 1884-1886, and 
to Resurrection (1899), respectively, referring only to texts that synthesize 
what was explained in shorter works and in Tolstoy’s dedication to 
narratives and popular theatre, which were very productive at that time.  
With respect to the five long works on religion that we have listed, it 
may be pertinent to add that these had a gestation period of several years, 
from 1877-1878, when Tolstoy anxiously finished writing Anna Karenina.  
At the time, he was nearly fifty years of age, and since they could not be 
published in Russia without severe cuts imposed by the censors, they first 
appeared unabridged in other countries. By then, he was a very famous 
author and the number of his disciples grew year on year, many having to 
go into exile for possessing forbidden copies of these works and thereby 
contributing to their diffusion. Tolstoy’s international prestige was already 
immense. It was multiplied by the threatening political situation that turned 
him into a privileged focus of attention, and he was visited by journalists 
from all over the world. However, this facet has almost entirely 
disappeared for us now, his literary legacy, largely from the period prior to 
his ‘conversion’, being what has lasted. In fact nowadays, Tolstoy’s 
                                                 
8 Texts translated by M. Syrkin and published in Berlin by Steinitz in 1901, 
successfully used for understanding the relationships between Tolstoy and 
Wittgenstein, for example, by Ilse Somavilla in her illuminating article “Spuren 
Tolstois in Wittgensteins Tagebüchern von 1914-1916”. 
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religious essays are very scarce in European bookshops, although there are 
indications of a certain revival. Yet it is reasonable to suppose that the 
Wittgenstein of 1914, like the young Gandhi, or B. Schaw, R. Rolland, S. 
Zweig … and many of the Zionists of the time would also have a 
conception of Tolstoy where those sapiential characteristics would stand 
out strongly, recognizing him above all as a great independent religious 
thinker, which led to his being excommunicated by the Orthodox church as 
if he were a dangerous heretic and, consequently, his extraordinary civil 
burial. In 1910, as Vargas Llosa put it, ‘years previously (Tolstoy) had 
ceased to be merely one of the greatest novelists of all times, and had 
become a prophet, a mystic, an inventor of religions, a patriarch of morals, 
a theoretician of education and an imaginative ideologist who proposed 
pacifism, manual and agricultural labour, asceticism and a primitive, sui 
generis anarchist Christianity as a remedy for humanity’s wrongs … The 
things he said reverberated the world over and on at least four of the five 
continents there arose, during his own lifetime, agrarian communities of 
young Tolstoyans … who abandoned the cities, renounced the pursuit of 
money and went to be morally regenerated, sharing everything and 
working the earth with their hands.’9 
In fact, there are striking elective affinities between Tolstoy and 
Wittgenstein or, if you prefer, there is a certain relationship or family 
likeness, and it is customary to mention evident parallels between the two 
men. Both were descendants of very wealthy families, yet preached 
austerity, detachment and asceticism with their own lives, giving away 
their considerable personal inheritances. Despite their ‘aristocracy’, they 
valued work, above all manual labour, as indispensable. Tolstoy, while 
physically strong, was not very nimble-fingered and Wittgenstein was an 
engineer with flair. They both loved music, solitude and nature. Both had 
experience of war and had demonstrated their spirit and courage. They 
were both affected by serious crises that led them to the brink of suicide, 
and confronted with death, both experienced a kind of ‘religious 
conversion’ though distanced from churches or confessional sects, 
institutions and hierarchies. They were both deeply concerned with 
teaching and spent several years of their lives as teachers, even writing 
teaching manuals in the form of dictionaries or spelling primers. They both 
distrusted the academic environment and official teaching, and because of 
their inquisitive dispositions, their frank intelligence and their assorted 
                                                 
9 Vargas Llosa, 2010, 29.  
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interests, they did not experience the schism between the so-called ‘two 
cultures’. Both men often kept a personal diary, confessing deeply personal 
matters, setting down in writing their sensual and spiritual problems. 
Though having very different experiences and influences, both are 
characterized by a vision that counterpoints love and sexuality, perhaps to 
an unhealthy extent. They were both strongly influenced by the work of 
Schopenhauer; neither had much liking for Shakespeare; and so on. We 
believe that it is not outrageous to imagine that, had he lived a couple of 
decades earlier, Wittgenstein, who tried to live as a worker in the USSR, 
might have wished to live out his fantasy existence as a manual worker 
within a group of sincere Tolstoyans who, congruently, had chosen to live 
somewhere that was silent, isolated, and of a beautiful, rural nature. 
 
3.  From Existential Crises to the Writing of the Abbreviated 
Gospel  
Let us now recall the context in which KDE was written and its 
development. The principal years spent on writing Anna Karenina, from 
1873 to 1875, were marked by painful bereavement in his own home. 
Tolstoy lost three children and two aunts whom he loved very much – one 
of them had been like a mother to this hypersensitive orphan. In this 
context, in a letter dated March 1876, he tells his cousin Alexandrina that 
he has met a certain count who is a strong believer: ‘He cannot be 
contradicted because he doesn’t try to prove anything. He simply says what 
he believes and, when listening to him, one feels that he is happier than 
those who do not believe, above all one feels that a faith such as his cannot 
be obtained by an effort of mind, but rather must be received as a 
miraculous gift. That is what I want!’10 
One night in 1876, having finished Anna Karenina, he was seized by 
an access of terror: he thought that he was dead, locked in his coffin. He 
transferred this traumatic shock to his work: in the eighth and last part of 
Anna Karenina, Tolstoy narrates his crisis via his fictional alter ego, the 
character of Levin, the name being a diminutive of his own11.  Life seemed 
to him even more terrible than death, weighed down by insoluble 
                                                 
10 Quoted by H. Troyat, 1965, 198-199. 
11 Cf. chapters VIII-XIX of the last part of Anna Karenina. I think it helpful to point 
out that during the trip they made to Iceland in 1912, D. Pinsent ‘compared his friend 
Wittgenstein with Beethoven and with Levin, the character from Tolstoy’s novel, 
Anna Karenina’, as mentioned by  Baum, 1988,  64 
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problems: where did life come from, what did it mean, why have we been 
given life? His minutely reviewed scientific convictions did not provide 
him with any solutions. He read Plato and Spinoza, Kant and Schelling, 
Hegel and Schopenhauer. ‘At one time, reading Schopenhauer, he put in 
place of his will the word love, and for a couple of days this new 
philosophy charmed him, till he removed a little away from it. But then, 
when he turned from life itself to glance at it again, it fell away too.’12 He 
then began to read theological works, verified the opposing positions of 
Catholic and Orthodox theologians, and these constructions also crumbled. 
Life became a torment, a bitter, intolerable joke, caused by the cruel irony 
of a wicked genius… ‘And Levin, a happy father and husband, in perfect 
health, was several times so near suicide that he hid the cord that he might 
not be tempted to hang himself, and was afraid to go out with his gun for 
fear of shooting himself.’13 
In A Confession, Tolstoy narrates those years of crisis succinctly and 
without intermediaries, until he finds a way out14.  The backbone of his 
autobiography is the search for the meaning of life, that being the central 
question. We think that Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914-1916, written at 
the front, invites a rereading of this dramatic confessional tale in its most 
genuinely philosophical and religious dimensions. The presence of death is 
a decisive experience in both authors’ return to religion, which is why they 
both understand it so radically, as a true power of salvation, capable of 
transforming life, not as the result of a metaphysical argument. 
The Critique of Dogmatic Theology is a frontal attack on 
ecclesiastical teachings.  As a self-confessed follower of Rousseau, 
claiming to be a good son of the Enlightenment and thus necessarily 
employing understanding and reason, Tolstoy rejects whatever he believes 
goes beyond them. This includes, for example, the dogma of the Trinity, or 
that Jesus is the second person of a God who is three and one, born of the 
Virgin Mary conceived by the Holy Spirit, or that he rose again on the 
third day, as well as everything related to angels and demons, the creation 
of the world in six days, the myth of Paradise, Adam and Eve and the 
snake, or the doctrine of salvation and eternal damnation, and so on. For 
Tolstoy, all of these are vulgar legends, mere superstitions. He does not 
                                                 
12 Quoting the work in Spanish translation, L. Tolstói, 1986, 962-963. 
13 Op. cit. p. 964. In chapter IV of A Confession, Tolstoy admits that he too had 
suffered exactly the same anguish and fear. 
14 Tolstoy, 2008. 
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think that it is necessary to pray to have faith, as if human beings were 
unaware of the precarious and ephemeral situation in which we live, like 
those who are shipwrecked and in great peril, always at the mercy of death 
that visits us whenever it wants. In religion, the fundamental question for 
Tolstoy is to know what the human being should do, how he should live. 
The gospel is, finally, the proclamation of a rule of life that can be reduced 
to five commandments that refer to the five temptations that are to be 
defeated (not to get angry, not to commit adultery, not to swear, not to 
fight evil with evil, not to treat anyone as an enemy), those commandments 
come down to a central rule: ‘to love God and your neighbour as yourself’, 
which is the equivalent of this fundamental precept: ‘to treat others as you 
wish them to treat you’. For Tolstoy, this is the novelty of Jesus’ teaching, 
just as he explained it in the Sermon on the Mount, in clear contrast with 
traditional Jewish doctrines, that is, the law of Moses and later 
ecclesiastical doctrines, perverted in the interests of the State by the service 
of the three supposedly Christian churches. 
In his essays, Tolstoy tries to be clear and intelligible for any reader, 
so he does not worry if he repeats himself and chooses to employ very 
flexible existential metaphors (the oriental fable of the dragon and the well; 
the immense forest that has neither paths nor exits; the boat in stormy 
waters; the ship with neither captain nor compass, bound for nowhere, and 
so on, like the prophetic dreams of some Kaspar Hauser), as well as very 
effective – though perhaps excessively Manichean – structural oppositions 
with clear and firm contrasts between black and white, as well as right and 
wrong, life and death, light and darkness, the vital situation after 
recognizing the evangelical doctrine (‘now’) and existence without that 
faith and without the morals that derive from it (‘then’), that is to say, the 
antithesis between Jesus’ law and the law of the world, the genuine Gospel 
and the church, the true and rational life as opposed to the false and absurd 
life, the opposition between faith and scientific reason, the heart and the 
intellect, the individual and the mob, the boy and the adult, the voice of 
one’s own conscience and public opinion or ‘what they will say’, between 
sense and nonsense, the spirit and the flesh, eternity and time, and even 
between men and women, sickness and health, good sense and lunacy, 
town and country, agriculture and industry, war and peace, and so on.  
Tolstoy bluntly generalizes and universalizes, with the result that 
everything that we know about the author of Ecclesiastes, Socrates, 
Buddha, Confucius or Mohammed comes down to one and the same vital 
wisdom, because deep down all the sages agree and say the same thing – 
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that is, what Jesus expressed with the greatest clarity and well-defined 
practical consequences. This wisdom, which to Tolstoy’s mind had 
become forgotten and perverted and therefore needed to be proclaimed 
again, is that which he expresses in his indefatigable writing, translating, 
commenting and compiling the gospels in his own personal way. 
 
4.  Tolstoy’s Kurze Darlegung des Evangelium in Wittgenstein’s 
Geheime Tagebücher   
Let us now return to the previous thread and those Secret Diaries: 
Wittgenstein bought Tolstoy’s Kurze Darlegung des Evangelium at the end 
of August of 1914 and, as he notes on the 2nd of September, had begun 
reading it from the first of the month.    
On the second, he acknowledges some disappointment, because 
although he considers it “ein herrliches Werk”, he adds shortly afterwards 
that “es ist mir aber / noch nicht das, was ich davon er- / wartete.”. 
Nonetheless, one day after that, on the 3rd, he notes that “in Tolstoi gelesen 
/ mit grossen Gewin”. It is striking that he does not say that he has read the 
‘Gospel’, or the ‘abbreviated Gospel’, but rather that he has read ‘Tolstoy’, 
as if the writer’s voice and his personal message should matter greatly to 
him, rather than an Evangelist’s version of the person and teachings of 
Jesus, or the persistent question of who the historical Jesus was, the 
problem of the sources, primitive Christianity, and so forth.    
Five days later, on 8.9.1914, he writes: “Jeden Tag viel / gearbeitet 
und viel ins Tolstois Erläuterungen / zu den Evangelien gelesen!”.  And 
again we wish to stress that he does not simply note that he is reading the 
Gospels, but ‘Tolstoy’s comments on the Gospels’. It is the clear emphasis 
on Tolstoy’s authorship that is again surprising: that mediating presence 
stands out, with his personal points of view and existential commitment, 
and not simply his work of translating the words of Jesus of Nazareth and 
aligning the four Evangelists. It seems, therefore, that what interests 
Wittgenstein most is Tolstoy’s perspective of the New Testament, the 
hermeneutic work that he subjects it to, his particular religious message as 
a path to personal health. In fact, one month later, on 11.10.1914, he 
writes: ‘Trage die “Darlegungen des Evangeliums” von Tolstoi immer mit 
mir / herum, wie einen Talisman’. It is not necessary to underline the 
magical-religious character that he attributes to this book here, as if it were 
an amulet connected with astrology and everything in the cosmos, an 
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object charged with forces that protected him against being hunted from 
outside, such as the bullets of enemy rifles, or from within himself, such as 
the temptations that besiege the soul and the body and desire its strength. 
Wittgenstein always carries it with him, as a basic necessity, a proven 
remedy, until it became one of his distinguishing characteristics and he 
would give it to his best friends.   
Let us start another section and specify what Tolstoy, according to 
what he says himself in the “Vorwort”, does in this book. He synthesizes 
the four Gospels according to Jesus’ original doctrine, and endorses the 
truthfulness of his interpretation with a double argument: on the one hand, 
the unity, clarity, simplicity and entirety of the teaching thus presented, 
that is, its economy and coherence, and, on the other, its alignment with the 
internal feelings of everyone seeking the truth (EA p. 34). In this way, it 
lapses into a type of arrogant ‘begging the question’ that serves to 
legitimize his work by the presumed superior purity of his intentions and, 
at the same time, dismiss the ecclesiastics as well as the historians and 
freethinkers of the nineteenth century, such as D. F. Strauss or E. Renan, 
who tackled the scientific-positivist study of the Gospels and who continue 
to fail to understand them because their interests are awry and they seek 
their own advantage. Jesus’ teaching is summarized in twelve points that 
are the equivalent of the content of the Lord’s Prayer, just as Tolstoy 
translates and interprets it.   
The deep mark the book made on the young Wittgenstein’s diaries 
can be observed particularly in certain themes that are repeated in both 
texts, as it were leit-motivs that connect them and give them structure. Here 
is a possible list: the antithesis of the spirit and the flesh, the soul and the 
body; the consideration of the temptations of sensuality, depression, fear 
and sin; freedom as an experience of the spirit; the meditations on the 
question of time, the present and eternity; the vindication of work, both 
manual and spiritual, as a path to salvation: “Die Gnade der Arbeit!!”, as 
Wittgenstein will say (2.11.1914); the conception of the true life, a life that 
is happy and reasonable, rational and blessed; the experience of death as a 
moment of truth and a radical affirmation of life and its meaning; the 
discovery of ‘the only thing that is necessary’; the acceptance of divine will 
as a liberation from crises and doubts; isolation and solitude as existential 
conditions and as preludes to religious experience; religion as light and 
clarity, as peace, as happiness and fullness of meaning; genuine faith as 
praxis and a way of life that is pleasing to God; the need to fulfill the 
difficult commandment of never resisting evil and not confronting people’s 
The early Wittgenstein, Tolstoy’s Kurze Darlegung des Evangelium  
and Nietzsche’s Der Antichrist 
 
121
wickedness; and so on. Following the Tolstoyan gospel and the most 
personal part of Wittgenstein’s diaries along each of these central themes 
provides valuable nuances for outlining their respective visions of religion, 
and which should then be complemented by what each states in other, later 
texts.  
Here and now, we will only note one question, of celebrated 
Augustinian derivation, that of time, an experience that also marked them 
both. Wittgenstein’s reading of KDE resonates in this note which he made 
on 12.10.1914: “Über die nächste / Zukunft völlig im ungewissen! / Kurz, 
es giebt Zeiten, wo ich nicht / bloss in der Gegenwart und nur dem / Geiste 
leben kann. Die guten / Stunden des Lebens soll man als Gnade / dankbar 
genissen und sonst gegen das / Leben gleichgültig sein.” We can see the 
Tolstoyan roots of this conception (which, as is known, could also be 
argued from Schopenhauerian texts). We can already find these six theses 
in the “Vorwort of KDE, the last of the twelve that summarize the central 
meaning of the teaching of the Gospels according to Tolstoy’s 
hermeneutics: 
7. Das zeitliche, fleischliche Leben ist die Speise des wahren Lebens, der 
Baustoff für das vernünftige Leben.  
8. Und darum liegt das wahre Leben ausserhalb der Zeit allein im 
Gegenwärtigen. 
9. Der Trug des Lebens ist der Zeit, in Vergangenheit und Zukunft 
verbirgt den Menschen das wahre Leben, das in del Gegenwart. 
10. Und darum muss der Mensch dahin streben, den Trug des zeitlichen, 
des Vergangenheits- und Zukunfts-lebens zu zerstören.. 
11. Das wahre Leben liegt nicht allein ausserhalbt der Zeit, als ein Leben 
im Gegenwärtigen, sondern ist auch ein Leben ausserhalb der 
Persönlichkeit, als ein allen Menschen gemeinsames Leben. 
12. Und darum vereint sich, wer im gegenwärtigen, allen Menschen 
gemeinsamen Leben lebt, mit dem Vater, dem Ursprunge und Grunde des 
Lebens (ss. 6-7, pp. 29-30). 
These theses are detailed in chapter VIII of KAE entitled “Das Leben 
ist keines in der Zeit” (s. 126 and ss.), and we would refer the reader to 
check them in the text. We think that they decisively marked 
Wittgenstein’s way of experiencing ‘religion’ at the front. We must now 
tackle the second part of our objective in this article.   
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5.  Nietzsche’s ‘Der Antichrist’, Tolstoy’s Christianity, and the 
Young Wittgenstein   
The entry made on 8.12.1914 of the GT may be found surprising: in the 
recognized context of war where Wittgenstein found himself, meditating 
on the logical-philosophical problems of what would become the Tractatus 
and suffering from a foot wound, one suddenly reads: “Nietzsche Band 8 
gekauft / und darin gelesen. Bin stark / berührt von seiner Feindschaft // 
gegend das Christentum.” As the editor W. Baum explains in the 
corresponding note15, the eighth volume of the Works of Nietzsche was 
published in Leipzig in 1904 and contained the following texts: 1. Der Fall 
Wagner. 2. Götzen-Dämmerung. 3. Nietzsche contra Wagner. 4. 
Umwertung aller Werte: Ertes Buch: Der Antichrist.  5. Gedichte (the 
Dionysos-Dithyramben). And he specifically adds: ‘What most interested 
Wittgenstein in this volume was undoubtedly Der Antichrist’. It may be 
opportune to add that this edition – where in a non-disinterested way it is 
incorrectly supposed that the Nietzschean legacy included more books of 
The Revaluation of All Values, thereby preparing the fraud of The Will to 
Power – is very dissimilar from the one that can be read today in G. Colli 
and M. Montinari’s critical edition. The adjective ‘idiotic’ applied to Jesus 
(with obvious roots in Dostoyevsky) does not appear in it, nor, for 
example, does the text end with that terrible page entitled ‘Gesetz wider 
das Christentum’, which had he seen it, would have shocked young 
Wittgenstein even more.  
His reading of this text, which must have interested him enormously, 
has a strong relationship with Tolstoy’s work because, as specialists well 
know, he was one of the authors who most strongly influenced the 
preparation and writing of Der Antichrist16, specifically by his essay Ma 
Religion, which Nietzsche read in 1887-1888 in the French translation 
published in Paris in 1885 by Librairie Fischbacher, as noted above. He 
made numerous notes while reading it, sometimes copying out passages in 
full. Such notes, more than forty in number, can be consulted in the Colli-
Montinari edition of the complete works of Nietzsche1!.  Both Tolstoy and 
                                                 
15 Baum, 1983, 109. 
16 Hereafter referred to as AC. 
1! In the footnotes that, with the valuable assistance of A. Morillas, we have prepared 
for our Spanish translation of the posthumous fragments of the philosopher's mature 
years, we have indicated the numbers of the page or pages from the mentioned French 
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Nietzsche carried out their interpretations of the Old and New Testaments 
consulting the studies of philologists and historians who were extremely 
famous at the time, such as D. F. Strauss and E. Renan, whom both 
comment on and criticize, though they do so based on quite different 
suppositions and considerations. Nietzsche remained an expert professor of 
classic philology par excellence, committed to a peculiar version of 
psychology that had an intimate relationship with his philosophical project 
based on the complex ontology sketched out in the concept of Wille zur 
Macht. 
Perhaps it would not be inappropriate to point out some aspects of 
AC where, to our reading at least, the influence of Tolstoy is particularly 
clear in Nietzsche and in his concept of ‘Christianity’. By this term both 
authors understand two things: what Jesus of Nazareth lived and preached; 
this personal experience, according to both Tolstoy and Nietzsche, 
deserves special attention and should be distinguished – with the greatest 
care – from something that is very different but, unfortunately, is usually 
also called ‘Christianity’, what Paul and others preached as the purported 
message of Jesus and which the various Christian Churches have continued 
to modify, particularly since Constantine and the new circumstances of 
Christianity, which were the product of its relationships with the 
established powers and its return to Jewish conceptions, partly to adapt to 
the mood of the public to whom they addressed themselves. 
Both Tolstoy’s powerful criticisms of dogmatic theology and the 
mature Nietzsche’s ferocious attack on this ecclesiastical and priestly 
Christianity focus on the second meaning of this term, not the first. This 
distinction is unfortunately absent from various commentators on 
Wittgenstein’s work who only distinguish the negative part of AC. In this, 
they are it faithful to the letter of what he noted in his diary, but they miss 
the opportunity to highlight the remarkable parallelisms between the text 
and the Tolstoyan vision of evangelical Christianity.18  
Here are some features of the image that Nietzsche offers of Jesus in 
the aphorisms of AC, an image, as we have mentioned, marked strongly by 
what he read in Tolstoy, but also, let us not forget, Dostoyevsky. Nietzsche 
had not only read some of Dostoyevsky’s books, for example, The House 
                                                                                                                                                        
translation to which each refer. Cf. Nietzsche, 2008,. Cf. particularly fragments 11 
[236-282] of a notebook of November 1887 – March 1888, pp. 427-437. 
18 Cf. for example, Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1994, 126. 
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of the Dead (Souvenirs de la maison des morts) and The Possessed (Les 
possédés), but among other things he also knew, through various articles 
and an excellent book by E. M. M. de la Vogüé, Le roman russe, what 
Dostoeivski had written both in Crime and Punishment and in a strange 
novel with suggestions about the figure of Jesus, entitled The Idiot. We 
think it worthwhile to highlight Dostoyevsky’s Christological 
hermeneutics and summarize the Tolstoyan interpretation of Christianity, 
as well as the great influence both authors had on Nietzsche’s AC, because 
it may help to clarify Wittgenstein’s reading of both KDE and AC.   
In aphorism 27 of this text, the political dimension of the Jesus of 
Nazareth type is presented as if he were a kind of young Dostoyevsky, or 
convinced Tolstoyan, who would be condemned to hard labour in Siberia 
in the nineteenth century for having subversive ideas: 
Dieser heilige Anarchist, der das niedere Volk, die Ausgestossnen und 
“Sünder”, die Tschandala innerhalb des Judentums zum Widerspruch 
gegen die herrschende Ordnung aufrief - mit einer Sprache, falls den 
Evangelien zu trauen wäre, die auch heute noch nach Sibirien führen 
würde, war ein politischer Verbrecher, soweit eben politische Verbrecher 
in einer absurd-unpolitischen Gemeinschaft möglich waren.19 
However, as aphorism 29 explains, Nietzsche is particularly 
interested in Jesus’ psychological type, because he considers Renan’s 
interpretation (Jesus as hero and as genius) to be superficial and mistaken; 
the Dostoyevskian version (the idiot, that is, Prince Myshkin as the 
Christological figure) and the Tolstoyan (the non-resistance to evil as the 
central commandment of the Sermon on the Mount; the true evangelical 
message announcing that the kingdom of God is within you) seem to him 
far more correct and, without mentioning these authors, explicitly assumes 
their teachings with unmistakable details, literally transcribed from his 
knowledge of The Idiot and Ma Religion: 
Herr Renan, dieser Hanswurst in psychologicis, hat die 
zwei ungehörigsten Begriffe zu seiner Erklärung des Typus Jesus 
hinzugebracht, die es hierfür geben kann: den Begriff Genie und den 
Begriff Held (“héros”). Aber wenn irgend etwas unevangelisch ist, so ist 
es der Begriff Held. Gerade der Gegensatz zu allem Ringen, zu allem 
Sich-In-Kampf-fühlen ist hier Instinkt geworden: die Unfähigkeit zum 
Widerstand wird hier Moral (“widerstehe nicht dem Bösen!” das tiefste 
Wort der Evangelien, ihr Schlüssel in gewissem Sinne), die Seligkeit im 
                                                 
19 Nietzsche, 1980, s.198. 
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Frieden, in der Sanftmut, in Nicht-feind-sein-können. Was heisst “frohe 
Botschaft”? Das wahre Leben, das ewige Leben ist gefunden, - es wird 
nicht verheißen, es ist da, es ist in euch: als Leben in der Liebe, in der 
Liebe ohne Abzug und Ausschluß, ohne Distanz. Jeder ist das Kind 
Gottes - Jesus nimmt durchaus nichts für sich allein in Anspruch -, als 
Kind Gottes ist jeder mit jedem gleich ... Aus Jesus einen Helden machen! 
- Und was für ein Missverständnis ist gar das Wort “Genie”! Unser ganzer 
Begriff, unser Cultur-Begriff “Geist” hat in der Welt, in der Jesus lebt, gar 
keinen Sinn. Mit der Strenge des Physiologen gesprochen, wäre hier ein 
ganz andres Wort eher noch am Platz: das Wort Idiot.20 
The good news announced by Jesus corresponds to a physiological 
habit that Nietzsche diagnoses by means of characteristics that he seems to 
have taken, one by one, from the Tolstoyan interpretation of the Gospel: 
Man übersetze sich einen solchen physiologischen habitus in seine letzte 
Logik - als Instinkt-Hass gegen jede Realität, als Flucht in’s 
“Unfassliche”, ins “Unbegreifliche”, als Widerwille gegen jede Formel, 
jeden Zeit- und Raumbegriff, gegen Alles, was fest, Sitte, Institution, 
Kirche ist, als Zu-Hause-sein in einer Welt, an die keine Art Realität mehr 
rührt, einer bloss noch “inneren” Welt, einer “wahren” Welt, einer 
“ewigen” Welt... “Das Reich Gottes ist in euch”...21  
This aversion to every formula and all conditioning within the 
coordinates of space and time, this internal, true and eternal world, refer to 
the concept of ‘spirit’ that Tolstoy presents in its KDE and which reappears 
so often in Wittgenstein’s Tagebücher.   
In aphorism 31, Nietzsche finally admits the enormous debt that he 
owes to the two great Russian writers, to Dostoyevsky, obviously, but also, 
though implicitly, to Tolstoy’s particular version of the Final Judgement, 
which is in no sense at all either post-historic or celestial: 
Jene seltsame und kranke Welt, in die uns die Evangelien einführen - eine 
Welt, wie aus einem russischen Romane, in der sich Auswurf der 
Gesellschaft, Nervenleiden und “kindliches” Idiotentum ein Stelldichein 
zu geben scheinen - muss unter allen Umständen den 
Typus vergröbert haben... Man hätte zu bedauern, daß nicht ein 
Dostoiewsky in der Nähe dieses interessantesten décadent gelebt hat, ich 
meine, jemand, der gerade den ergreifenden Reiz einer solchen Mischung 
von Sublimem, Krankem und Kindlichem zu empfinden wußte… 
                                                 
20 Op. cit. ss. 199-200. 
21 Op. cit. s. 200. 
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Einstweilen klafft ein Widerspruch zwischen dem Berg-, See- und 
Wiesen-Prediger, dessen Erscheinung wie ein Buddha auf einem sehr 
wenig indischen Boden anmutet, und jenem Fanatiker des Angriffs, dem 
Theologen- und Priester-Todfeind, den Renans Bosheit als “le grand 
maître en ironie” verherrlicht hat… Als die erste Gemeinde einen 
richtenden, hadernden, zürnenden, bösartig spitzfindigen Theologen nötig 
hatte, gegen Theologen, schuf sie sich ihren “Gott” nach ihrem 
Bedürfnisse: wie sie ihm auch jene völlig unevangelischen Begriffe, die 
sie jetzt nicht entbehren konnte, “Wiederkunft”, “jüngstes Gericht”, jede 
Art zeitlicher Erwartung und Verheißung, ohne Zögern in den Mund 
gab.22 
Tolstoy’s presence in the text of AC is rarely more obvious than in 
aphorims 32 and 33. Traditional theology’s conceptions of ‘sin’, ‘reward’ 
and ‘punishment’ fall apart here, and innovative theses that will also mark 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion are defended. These are: the 
fundamental importance of the way of life (Wandel), of praxis as the only 
truthful and congruent manifestation of genuine religious belief, and 
silence as the pertinent road for such experience, and they are radically 
different from those enunciated and described by our civilization’s 
scientific-technical language, replete with legal formulas, orders and verbal 
credos. In any event, language serves to present signs, analogies, 
metaphors, complementary ways of seeing and suggesting aspects of what 
may be perceived, as if from the standpoints of eternity and blessedness. 
Genuine Christian faith is not the result of a rational proof, the exercise of 
dialectics, of syllogisms and argument, nor is it affected by alternative 
reasoning. It has taken root at another level, in the deep feelings of the 
heart, that of the living life: 
Die “gute Botschaft” ist eben, dass es keine Gegensätze mehr gibt; das 
Himmelreich gehört den Kindern; der Glaube, der hier laut wird, ist kein 
erkämpfter Glaube… Dieser Glaube formuliert sich auch nicht, - er lebt, 
er wehrt sich gegen Formeln… Man könnte, mit einiger Toleranz im 
Ausdruck, Jesus einen “freien Geist” nennen - er macht sich aus allem 
Festen nichts: das Wort tödtet, alles, was fest ist, tödtet. Der Begriff, 
die Erfahrung ”Leben”, wie er sie allein kennt, widerstrebt bei ihm jeder 
Art Wort, Formel, Gesetz, Glaube, Dogma. Er redet bloss vom Innersten: 
“Leben” oder “Wahrheit” oder “Licht” ist sein Wort für das Innerste, - 
alles übrige, die ganze Realität, die ganze Natur, die Sprache selbst, hat 
für ihn bloss den Wert eines Zeichens, eines Gleichnisses… 
                                                 
22 Op. cit. 202-203. 
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Das Verneinen ist eben das ihm ganz Unmögliche -. Insgleichen fehlt die 
Dialektik, es fehlt die Vorstellung davon, dass ein Glaube, eine 
“Wahrheit” durch Gründe bewiesen werden könnte (- seine Beweise sind 
innere “Lichter”, innere Lustgefühle und Selbstbejahungen, lauter 
“Beweise der Kraft” -). Eine solche Lehre kann auch nicht 
widersprechen… 
In der ganzen Psychologie des “Evangeliums” fehlt der Begriff Schuld 
und Strafe; insgleichen der Begriff Lohn. Die “Sünde”, jedwedes Distanz-
Verhältnis zwischen Gott und Mensch ist abgeschafft, - eben das ist die 
“frohe Botschaft”. Die Seligkeit wird nicht verheissen, sie wird nicht an 
Bedingungen geknüpft: sie ist die einzige Realität – der Rest ist Zeichen, 
um von ihr zu reden...  
Die Folge eines solchen Zustandes  projiziert sich in eine neue Praktik, 
die eigentlich evangelische Praktik. Nicht ein “Glaube” unterscheidet den 
Christen: der Christ handelt, er unterscheidet sich durch ein 
andres Handeln… Das Leben des Erlösers war nichts andres 
als diese Praktik, - sein Tod war auch nichts andres... Er hatte keine 
Formeln, keinen Ritus für den Verkehr mit Gott mehr nötig, - nicht einmal 
das Gebet… er weiss, wie es allein die Praktik des Lebens ist, mit der 
man sich “göttlich”, “selig”, “evangelisch”, jederzeit ein “Kind Gottes” 
fühlt. Nicht “Busse”, nicht ”Gebet um Vergebung” sind Wege zu Gott: 
die evangelische Praktik allein führt zu Gott, sie eben ist ”Gott”!... Der 
tiefe Instinkt dafür, wie man leben müsse, um sich “im Himmel” zu 
fühlen, um sich “ewig” zu fühlen, während man sich bei jedem andern 
Verhalten durchaus nicht ”im Himmel” fühlt: dies allein ist die 
psychologische Realität der “Erlösung”. - Ein neuer Wandel, nicht ein 
neuer Glaube...23 
The religion of the ‘Good News’ is to be found in a state of the heart 
that is outside time and space, and hence is not affected by so-called 
natural death. It is an experience of completeness that overcomes terrors 
and fears, hopes and disappointments, and maintains a praxis that by itself 
guarantees its peace and bliss: 
Der Begriff “des Menschen Sohn” ist nicht eine konkrete Person, die in 
die Geschichte gehört, irgend etwas Einzelnes, Einmaliges, sondern eine 
“ewige” Tatsächlichkeit, ein von dem Zeitbegriff erlöstes psychologisches 
Symbol... Das “Himmelreich” ist ein Zustand des Herzens, - nicht etwas, 
das “über die Erde” oder “nach dem Tode” kommt. Der ganze Begriff des 
natürlichen Todes fehlt im Evangelium: der Tod ist keine Brücke, kein 
                                                 
23 Op. cit. 203-206. 
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Übergang, er fehlt, weil einer ganz andern, bloss scheinbaren, bloss zu 
Zeichen nützlichen Welt zugehörig. Die “Todesstunde” 
ist kein christlicher Begriff, - die “Stunde”, die Zeit, das physische Leben 
und seine Krisen sind gar nicht vorhanden für den Lehrer der “frohen 
Botschaft”... Das “Reich Gottes” ist nichts, das man erwartet; es hat kein 
Gestern und kein Übermorgen, es kommt nicht in “tausend Jahren”, - es 
ist eine Erfahrung an einem Herzen; es ist überall da, es ist nirgends da... 
(...) 
Dieser “frohe Botschafter” starb wie er lebte... Die Praktik ist es, welche 
er der Menschheit hinterließ: sein Verhalten vor den Richtern, vor den 
Häschern, vor den Anklägern und aller Art Verleumdung und Hohn, - sein 
Verhalten am Kreuz. Er widersteht nicht, er verteidigt nicht sein 
Recht…24  
Evangelical praxis, precisely as Tolstoy and Nietzsche present it, that 
of the genuine Christian, implies another way of acting: not offering 
resistance, not differentiating between native and foreign, not getting angry 
with anybody, not despising anybody, not going to court nor swearing, not 
moving away from the person with whom an intimate coexistence has 
begun, in brief, loving thy neighbour, living in the light, being already in 
paradise, as Jesus told the good thief. As a result it immediately becomes 
obvious that ecclesiastical doctrine and its conception of Christianity are an 
absolute misrepresentation of this ‘Good News’, a miserable degradation 
of its singularity: 
man hat aus dem Gegensatz zum Evangelium die Kirche aufgebaut... 
Dass die Menschheit vor dem Gegensatz dessen auf den Knien liegt, 
was der Ursprung, der Sinn, das Recht des Evangeliums war, dass sie 
im Begriff “Kirche” gerade das heilig gesprochen hat, was der “frohe 
Botschafter” als unter sich, als hinter sich empfand - man sucht 
vergebens nach einer größeren Form welthistorischer Ironie.25 
For this reason, Nietzsche personalizes and, if possible, underlines 
the false transvaluation carried out by Pauline and ecclesiastical 
Christianity to an even greater degree than Tolstoy, though, as will be 
shown below, this does not mean that he scorns Jesus’ message and the 
way of life from which it arises. However, based on these texts, the 
vertiginous, implacable, bloodcurdling degree of accusation and the 
harshness of his criticism in AC also turns out to be understandable: 
                                                 
24 Aphorisms 34 y 35, op. cit. ss. 206-207. 
25 Aphorism 36, op. cit. p. 208. 
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ich erzähle die echte Geschichte des Christentums. - Das Wort schon 
“Christentum” ist ein Mißverständnis -, im Grunde gab es nur Einen 
Christen, und der starb am Kreuz. Das “Evangelium” starb am Kreuz. 
Was von diesem Augenblick an “Evangelium” heisst, war bereits der 
Gegensatz dessen, was er gelebt: eine “schlimme Botschaft”, 
ein Dysangelium. Es ist falsch bis zum Unsinn, wenn man in einem 
“Glauben”, etwa im Glauben an die Erlösung durch Christus das 
Abzeichen des Christen sieht: bloss die christliche Praktik, ein Leben so 
wie der, der am Kreuze starb, es lebte, ist christlich... Heute noch ist 
ein solches Leben möglich, für gewisse Menschen sogar notwendig: das 
echte, das ursprüngliche Christentum wird zu allen Zeiten möglich 
sein... Nicht ein Glauben, sondern ein Tun, ein Vieles-nicht-tun vor allem, 
ein andres Sein...26  
Given this, one can understand that Wittgenstein should be shocked 
by Nietzsche’s fiery and drastic ‘anti-Christian’ transvaluation in AC. In a 
way, he already knew the positive and affirmative part of this book through 
his readings of Tolstoy’s KDE, which strongly emphasized the ‘Fluch auf 
das Christentum’ (curse on Christianity), the overwhelming series of 
aphorisms that like an incendiary pamphlet, attack Pauline theology, the 
priestly reading, the insertion of ecclesiastical power into the history of the 
West, its decadentism, its nihilism, its deplorable degradation of humanity. 
These are the words with which, on 8.12.1914, Wittgenstein, as a young 
soldier summarized his startled reading of the texts in the eighth volume of 
Nietzsche’s works: 
Bin stark / berührt von seiner Feindschaft // gegen das Christentum. / 
Denn auch in seinen Schriften ist etwas / Wahrheit enthalten. Gewiss, / 
das Christentum ist / der einzige sichere / Weg zum Glück. Aber wie, / 
wenn einer dies Glück / verschmähte? ! Könnte / es nicht besser sein 
unglück- / lich, im hoffnungslosen / Kampf gegen die äussere / Welt zu 
Grunde zu gehen? / Aber ein solches Leben / ist sinnlos. Aber warum / 
nicht sin sinnloses Leben / führen? Ist es unwürdig? / Wie verträgt es sich 
mit dem / streng solipsistischen / Standpunkt? Was muss ich / aber tun, 
das[s] mein Leben // mir nicht verloren geht? / Ich muss mir seiner immer 
/ -des Geistes immer- bewusst sein. 
Nevertheless, R. Monk has lucidly written that, based on these 
words, ‘we can see how close Wittgenstein was, in spite of his faith, to 
                                                 
26 Aphorism 39, op. cit. p. 211. 
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accepting Nietzsche’s point of view.’27 Hence, he does not discuss the 
question of whether Christian doctrine is true, but rather, and in syntony 
with Nietzsche’s psychological position, whether it offers help to confront 
existence, to find meaning in a world that otherwise could be found absurd 
and unbearable – in brief, if it offers a way to live, a praxis that cures the 
pains of a ‘sick soul’, as William James said and as Vicente Sanfélix has 
explained. In AC, there are indeed passages ‘that convinced Wittgenstein 
that there was a certain truth in the work of Nietzsche’28. This, for 
example: 
Bewusstseins-Zustände, irgend ein Glauben, ein Für-wahr-halten zum 
Beispiel – jeder Psycholog weiss das – sind ja vollkommen gleichgültig 
und fünften Ranges gegen den Werth der Instinkte: strenger geredet, der 
ganze Begrif gesitiger Ursächlichkeit ist falsch. 29 
As Monk indicated, the idea that the essence of religion resides in the 
feelings (or, as Nietzsche says, in the instincts) and in praxes rather than in 
beliefs would become a recurrent topic in Wittgenstein. During the First 
World War, Christianity was for him “der einzige sichere Weg zum Glück”, 
though not because it promised him a blessed life in heaven, but because 
the figure of Jesus, just as Tolstoy and Nietzsche had taught him to 
interpret Him, provided an example, an attitude to follow that made life’s 
suffering, anguish in the face of the death, bearable. 
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Wittgenstein’s Religious Character 
 
ISABEL CABRERA1 
 
Wittgenstein’s religious thought begins with the promise of a valuable 
enigma that appears in certain aphorisms at the end of the Tractatus: the 
mystical is a threshold of value and sense that takes us beyond this 
uncaring reality. If we think about the context in which this thought came 
about – Wittgenstein sunk in the First World War and his life in danger –  
we realize the vital importance that these ideas had for Wittgenstein, even 
though their nature was cryptic and their number few. Yet however intense 
it may have been, Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the inexpressible was veiled 
and insufficiently strong with the result that the subject was ignored by his 
early readers. It was moreover considered by some, including Russell 
himself, the uncomfortable side of the brilliant Austrian engineer. 
However, Wittgenstein does not slacken in his attempt to communicate 
something on the subject and, in Cambridge in about 1930, delivered his 
famous Lecture on Ethics in public, where he insists on his distinction 
between saying and showing, and alludes to experiences that would seem 
to be religious (such as ‘feeling absolutely safe’ or ‘feeling guilty’ – in the 
eyes of God) or aesthetic-religious (such as ‘perceiving the world as a 
miracle’), and which for him are at the centre of ethics. What he said in his 
lecture squares with the spirit of the Tractatus: ethics, aesthetics and 
religion drink from the same source, they are all transcendental: they refer 
to values, not to facts, and consequently neither explains nor describes 
objects or events in the world, but instead shows ways of seeing the world, 
and therefore affects its value and meaning. Or as Wittgenstein would say a 
good deal later: even when religious belief is indifferent to historical facts, 
it permeates human life in a profound way and has a strength that scientific 
truths never attain.  
Throughout his life, Wittgenstein maintains a certain fidelity to his 
initial position. I would even say that his thought on religious questions 
barely changed – strange in such a dynamic thinker. The emphasis on 
seeing the mystical, the ethical and the aesthetic as things that are 
                                                 
1 I´m very grateful to Vicente Sanfelix and Joan Llinares for his comments on an early 
version of this paper, and to Philip Daniels who translate this paper from Spanish. 
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transcendent, ‘beyond the world’, disappears, but the accent on not 
considering his propositions descriptive persists; his terms become part of 
normative and expressive language games, and do not attempt to 
communicate information about facts. They rather express and evoke 
attitudes and feelings, or accompany and stimulate certain practices. With 
this minimal conception of religious language, in the following decade, 
Wittgenstein would sporadically apply himself to criticizing, on the one 
hand, those who conceive of religion as a pre-scientific thought, and on the 
other, those who interpret religious language as referring to supposed facts 
that occurred millennia ago, or that are to occur after one’s death. Even 
when their intention was to defend the religious tradition to which they 
belonged, they only induce self-deception: they present religion as if it 
were rational discourse or sought to be so, as if it were a theory about what 
has happened and what will happen. These criticisms are to be found in his 
Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough; and in the classes on religious belief 
that he gave in Cambridge in 1938. In the first part of this paper, I describe 
and briefly discuss some of the broad ideas that guided Wittgenstein’s 
thought on religious language, particularly on what seem to be the virtues 
and the limits of its critical nucleus.  
If religious language is a reflection of experiences and practices, then 
we will not really be able to understand the meaning of the terms that a 
believer uses unless we take into account the context of their use: the 
activities that the believer relates this thought to, and the images that they 
evoke in the believer; understanding the meaning leads us to submerge 
ourselves in the believer’s form of life. The second part of this paper is an 
exercise that seeks to apply Wittgenstein’s theory regarding religious 
language to his own case, in order to understand the characteristics that 
give rise to his particular religious character: to identify the emotions that it 
inspires in him, and in general the behaviour that it induces in him. This 
will have to be reconstructed from the little that he says in his early texts, 
what he wrote in the personal diaries that were published after his death, 
and from what we know about his life.  
  
1. Religious Language  
‘How do I know that two people mean the same when each says he 
believes in God?’(...) Practice gives the words their meaning. (CV, p. 85.)  
At the end of the Tractatus, the mystical is pronounced inexpressible. 
The structure of figurative language forces any proposition that claims to 
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be true to represent facts, and consequently, propositions that claim to 
express values are condemned to nonsense, they do not represent the only 
thing that they would be able to represent: the states of things. In his 
Lecture on Ethics, Wittgenstein says that language can make an empirical 
– and consequently legitimate – use of terms like ‘good’ or ‘valuable’, but 
always in a relative sense. Something is good, e.g., for one’s health, or 
something is valuable to obtain a certain end, e.g. to build a house, but we 
cannot assign a meaning to that which is proclaimed good or valuable ‘in 
itself’, because then we are no longer referring to any quality of the object 
that can be discovered empirically; for this reason, Wittgenstein thinks, in 
this early period, that ethics, aesthetics and religion struggle against the 
boundaries of language to express absolute values, and systematically fail 
in their intent: they cannot say what they seek to express; at most, they can 
show what only few will be able to comprehend.  
Years later, Wittgenstein stops thinking in terms of the boundaries 
of language and recognizes that language has functions over and above 
describing facts and transmitting information, language also serves to 
organise, command, play, invoke, promise, intimidate, etc.; and he no 
longer finds these functions marginal, nor derived from language’s 
central, descriptive function. When speaking, we do various things, so, to 
analyze meaning one must take account of the usage as well as the 
practices with which such a usage is associated. Moreover, as regards 
religious language, Wittgenstein thinks that it should not be thought of as 
language that communicates knowledge in the traditional sense. Many 
religious beliefs would seem to be articulating events that have occurred 
(such as the creation of the world in 6 days, the life of Jesus, the 
resurrection of Lazarus), or that will occur (such as the Final Judgement), 
but in spite of their appearance, Wittgenstein neither accepts that they 
deal with historical beliefs, nor that they tell stories, nor seek to compete 
with current science to provide explanations. Its function is to express 
attitudes, to motivating practices, to reflect vital commitments. Anyone 
who interprets religion as a theory is making a serious error, because seen 
through scientific eyes, religion is an erroneous and even an irrational 
conception. Yet exactly because as an error “religion would be a too big 
an error”, we must not accept Frazer’s interpretation. For Wittgenstein, it 
is in this that Frazer’s great insensitivity lies.  
The believer uses religious terms not with the intention of referring 
to certain objects, but rather as part of his ceremonial practices, therefore 
to discover the meaning of these terms, it will be necessary to examine 
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the context of their use and relate them with a certain form of life. 
However, Frazer believes that archaic religion (which he calls magic) is a 
false belief that will collapse under its own weight when scientific 
conception imposes itself and Wittgenstein would say that he does not 
notice, that no opinion is the basis of a religious symbol. And error only 
corresponds to opinion (Cf. CRD, p.15); before being rejected as false, 
religion must be considered a theory (cf. Ibid, p.9), and it is not. We 
might then wonder why archaic societies have rituals if they do not seek 
to control anything thereby. Perhaps, Wittgenstein thinks, they have that 
inclination, we might even say that ‘the human being is a ceremonial 
animal’ (Ibid, p. 21); but the most correct thing would simply be to point 
out that this happens, that ‘such is life’. What is an error is to think –  as 
Frazer does –  that archaic man does not distinguish his religious practices 
from his technological and scientific tasks, however rudimentary they 
may be.  
Another error that we can detect, knowing that religion is neither an 
explanatory theory nor seeks to be one, is the one made by a person who 
seeks historical support for religions; in the case of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition – the only religion that Wittgenstein really speaks about, and the 
only one that really interests him – we might think of those who believe 
that Jesus’ existence can be demonstrated, or that there are archaeological 
traces of certain miracles; but this –  even when it can be carried out in a 
rigorous and serious way –  would not in fact contribute to the strength of 
religious belief, rather, Wittgenstein thinks, it has the opposite effect: it 
confuses religion with superstition, and cultivates self-deception (Cf. LCR 
pp. 134–136). The idea is not to make religion seem rational, anyone who 
seeks that has not understood its meaning, the true believer accepts 
religion as it is: irrational, ‘pure madness’. The same criticism would be 
valid for those who seek to give rational arguments for believing in God: 
theology, in the most traditional sense, rests entirely on this basic 
confusion. No theoretical test could convince us of the existence of God, 
it is life that can lead us to faith in God:  
Life can educate one to a belief in God. And experiences too are what 
bring this about; but I don’t mean visions and other forms of sense 
experience which show us the ‘existence of this being’ but e.g. sufferings 
of various sorts. These neither show us God in the way a sense impression 
shows us an object, nor do they give rise to conjectures about Him. 
Experiences, thoughts – life can force this concept on us. So perhaps it is 
similar to the concept of ‘object’. (CV, p. 87)  
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For all the above reasons, in religion, the term ‘belief’ does not mean 
the same as it does in other contexts: when people refer to themselves as 
Christian, it would seem that they are saying that they accept certain 
presumed truths, such as the existence of God or of the soul, the life and 
resurrection of Jesus, or the coming of the Final Judgement, and it is 
pertinent to ask, as in other cases, about the reasons for these beliefs; but 
their religious beliefs really reflect more than the acceptance of certain 
supposed truths, their adhesion to ‘a frame of reference, and the cultivation 
of certain practices and images that guide their lives. More than 
propositional beliefs, ‘beliefs that’, religious beliefs are a trust, born of 
pain and the search for meaning, or from admiration with regard to 
existence or thought, or simply a product of our ceremonial instinct. 
Whatever their origin may be, they do not arise as certain cold wisdom, but 
as uncertain passion. The religious believer lives as if these beliefs were 
true but, unless an ignorant person, knows that their strength does not come 
from their rational foundations, but from their vital importance. For this 
reason, Wittgenstein wrote in 1937, the word ‘believe’ has caused ‘terrible 
damage’ to religion because if considered as belief, faith represents a 
challenge to reason. ‘But if instead of “belief in Christ” you would say: 
“love of Christ”, the paradox vanishes”. (MT, p. 247)  
This idea of seeing religious language as a non-descriptive language 
has a very long history. From very early times, it was said that God was an 
ineffable mystery, and many religious texts prefer to take a roundabout 
way of describing the indescribable: the Scriptures themselves speak via 
metaphors and parables, and very soon negative theology appears saying 
not what God is, but only what He is not; moreover images and even 
paradoxes are plentiful in the mystical Judeo-Christian tradition. It is also 
worth mentioning that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in his 
book Das Heilige, Rudolf Otto offers a similar interpretation of religious 
language to Wittgenstein’s: terms are used analogically in religion, God is 
spoken of as a father, or heaven as a place but, in fact, what is desired is to 
evoke attitudes and emotions that correspond with religious experience. In 
this sense, the terms are associated with images, we associate God with a 
father or with destiny, or with a judge, and thereby we say how we live, 
what images guide our life. Otto’s examples are taken from religious texts 
of all periods and the whole of the first part of his book explores these 
‘irrational’ aspects of religion. Although there was apparently no contact 
between Otto and Wittgenstein, it is no accident that both turn, whether 
explicitly or not, to authors for whom religion has an irreducible irrational 
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component, and for whom religious beliefs are not always propositional 
beliefs. Neither William James, Tolstoy, nor Kierkegaard conceive of 
religion as an explanatory theory with respect to anything, for them faith is 
intrinsically united with the believer's emotional life and practice, and they 
respect the unavoidable nucleus of mystery, even madness, that there is in 
religion. As we shall see in the following part of this text, these were 
decisive influences for Wittgenstein’s religious thought.  
In summary, the thesis with respect to religious language would seem 
to be divided into two parts, on the one hand it is stated that religious 
language is not figurative, it does not describe facts (past, present or future) 
and, on the other hand, it is stated that its meaning refers to practices and 
attitudes. With respect to the former, we might ask ourselves whether it is 
correct to think that religious language never seeks to be descriptive. It 
seems clear that a large proportion (if not the overwhelming majority) of 
believers do believe that religion speaks of real events (past, present or 
future). Religious people usually think that upon their deaths their souls 
will leave their bodies, that God created the world, and that there is a 
heaven and a hell. This interpretation is usual, not only in what is popularly 
denoted ‘the third world’, where it might be thought that ignorance 
abounds, but it is also usual in ‘the first world’, where in 2009 
Evolutionism competed with Creationism as if they were rival scientific 
theories and a Head of State claimed to be in contact with God, who 
apparently told him whom to bomb. In another sense, Wittgenstein is very 
probably right and believers of this type guide their lives according to their 
religious values, and express feelings through their religious beliefs, the 
problem is that they also believe that their religious beliefs refer to realities 
that somehow can be demonstrated or be rationally argued. Thus, 
Wittgenstein accuses the majority of religious believers of being 
superstitious, which in the strict sense is not drastic (there are those who 
would accuse them all of being superstitious), but this transforms his 
criticism into a sort of normative proposal regarding the use and 
understanding of religious language, as this would tell us how we should in 
fact use it and interpret it, not how it is in fact used and interpreted.  
On the other hand, I concur with his intuition that religious language 
– on certain chosen occasions, I am afraid – does not seek to refer to facts 
but rather to express a practical and vital dimension. Nonetheless, the fact 
that one cannot gain access to this unless one understands the form of life 
with which it is associated has given rise to the idea that Wittgenstein is 
supporting a sort of religious relativism. Only those who have certain 
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attitudes and share a certain form of life can really understand the meaning 
of the beliefs and the religious terms. There is no way then of judging the 
relevance, correctness or ‘truth’ of such beliefs from the outside. I think 
that there is a way for Wittgenstein to defend himself from this criticism, 
and it is by pleading that, in the end, it is the same practice (and, in general, 
form of life) that makes it possible not only to understand - but also to 
value – the relevance of a certain religion; I believe that D. Z. Phillips is 
right when he states that it is necessary to turn practice into a critical 
mirror. I realise that this discussion requires much finer argument that what 
I am offering here, but my interest is different, it is to apply this idea that 
religious language refers to the believer’s emotional life and practice, to 
understanding the type of religiousness that Wittgenstein himself 
professed. To this I now turn.  
  
2. Wittgenstein’s religiousness  
Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has 
happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of 
something that is that actually takes place in human life. (CV, p 28)  
In his early texts, Wittgenstein speaks of an experience that he 
considers valuable: thinking that life makes sense, feeling protected, 
absolutely safe, seeing the world as a miracle. These characteristics offer a 
strongly positive religious experience: faith as trust. Yet we also know that 
his religious character has another side, a painful side, and which we know 
of mainly through his letters and personal diaries. This facet is dominated 
by guilt, the feeling of impurity and an authentic struggle against both his 
sexuality and against his vanity. There are moreover important changes 
from some texts to others. In his public texts (and even in the selection of 
aphorisms included in the Notebooks 1914–1916 published by the 
executors), the language Wittgenstein uses to refer to ethical-religious 
matters is impersonal, he uses ‘the mystical’ or God as the equivalent of 
the meaning of the world or, sometimes, even destiny, while in his 
personal diaries his religious language is more intimate and more similar to 
that of the believer who prays, and often he does not speak of God but with 
God: he constantly and explicitly invokes Him to ask for strength when 
faced by the fear of death when a soldier, and decades later, he beseeches 
Him more infrequently and timidly, asking for strength to overcome his 
vanity, his resistance to surrender. This is what he wrote in 1946: 
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I cannot kneel to pray because it’s as though my knees were stiff. I am 
afraid of dissolution (of my own dissolution) should I become soft. (CV 
1946) 
Additionally, in his public texts he seems to allude to a lay 
religiousness, so to speak, a religiousness that is not committed to any 
religion in particular, nor linked with traditional religious symbols, 
whereas his personal texts display a constant reference to Christianity and 
some of its symbols. Thus, and in spite of the emphasis in his published 
texts of seeming neutral towards religious traditions, there can be no doubt 
that Wittgenstein thinks about religion from a Christian standpoint.  
To approach the complexity of Wittgenstein’s religiousness, we can 
use three of the characteristics that he mentions in his early texts as a 
thread, and which, to my mind, represent the central elements of his 
position:  
a) Trust in there being ultimate values and meaning,  
b) astonishment before life, thought, beauty, and  
c) the question of guilt and salvation.  
Let us look at these in order.  
In the Notebooks 1914–1916, Wittgenstein’s first well-known texts, 
and from which the material of Tractatus was distilled, there is a long, 
written note dated June 11, 1916 which reads:  
What do I know about God and the purpose of life?  
I know that this world exists.  
That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field.  
That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning.  
That this meaning does not lie in it but outside it.  
That life is the world.  
That my will penetrates the world.  
That my will is good or evil.  
Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of 
the world.  
The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.  
And connect with this the comparison of God to a father.  
To pray is to think about the meaning of life.  
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I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will: I am completely 
powerless.  
I can only make myself independent of the world – and so in a certain 
sense master it – by renouncing any influence on happenings.  
And later, on July the 8th of the same year, he writes:  
To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning 
of life.  
To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the 
end of the matter.  
To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning.  
The world is given me, i.e., my will enters into the world completely from 
outside as into something that is already there.  
(As for what my will is, I don’t know yet.)  
That is why we have the feeling of being dependent on an alien will.  
However this may be, maybe, at any rate, we are in a certain sense 
dependent, and what we are dependent on we can call God.  
A little before the first series of aphorisms (May the 27th) and shortly 
after the last (July the 24th and 29th), Wittgenstein reports in what are 
known as his Secret Notebooks that ‘they are being shot at’ and that he is 
very afraid of dying. It is very probable that at this stage of the war, 
religious belief was born in him again or at least was intensified.2 At this 
time, we know that he had already read William James’ The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, which, according to what he said to Russell and later 
to Drury, helped him to be a better person and struggle against 
melancholy.3 In any case, it was very probably William James who 
sensitized Wittgenstein to the emotional content of religious language, and 
also helped him to identify his own tensions.4 Moreover, we also know 
                                                 
2 Wittgenstein was educated as a Catholic and lost his faith during puberty, apparently 
after conversations with one of his sisters. One of his friends said that Wittgenstein 
told him one day that his faith had been reborn in him after seeing a play where the 
main character, who was in a desperate situation, admitted to feeling ‘absolutely safe’. 
As we will see below, this is related to this first characteristic. 
3 The letter to Russell is dated June 25, 1912. Years later, circa 1930, Drury 
commented that Wittgenstein had told him that William James’ book had helped him a 
great deal to conquer sorge, in the Goethian sense. (Cf. R. Rhees, pp. 181-182). 
4 For more details on this relationship, see Vicente Sanfélix’s paper included in the 
bibliography. 
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that, when he was soldier, he read Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief and said some 
time later that this book saved his life. He probably also read other essays 
by Tolstoy, or knew more of his religious thought through William James’ 
book, in any event, the influence that both authors exercise on his religious 
thought is obvious, particularly Tolstoy, who writes in the Introduction to 
his The Gospel in Brief: 
I consider Christianity to be neither a pure revelation nor a phase of 
history, but I consider it as the only doctrine that gives a meaning to life.’ 
(Tolstoy, GB, p. 22) 
Belief in God, then, means to believe that life has meaning. It has 
nothing to do with the most common belief of thinking of God as He who 
created the world or decreed certain laws for humans. Religious faith 
seems to be a ‘yes’ to life, a trust in its meaning and value. But for Tolstoy 
this acceptance brings with it certain responsibilities. If it is accepted that 
life has meaning, and this meaning has been revealed in the Gospels, then 
the life of the believer will be linked to the morals that derive from them. 
And both Wittgenstein and Tolstoy think that one of the peculiarities of 
this Gospel-based moral is its emphasis on purity, in distancing oneself 
from carnal pleasures, and in particular keeping oneself safe from 
sexuality. But I should like to take a small detour to better understand the 
relationship between the two authors and, to do so, I shall dedicate some 
pages to briefly sketch Tolstoy’s religious thought.  
From the time he was born, Tolstoy enjoyed social prestige and, 
during his youth, shared the values of his time: elegance, the desire for 
power, courage and honour. Later, he spent some time in the Caucasus, he 
went to war and travelled in Europe. At this time, Tolstoy witnessed two 
events that marked the beginning of the transformation that he would 
suffer throughout his life: the first was a public execution that he witnessed 
in a Paris square, the other was his brother’s premature death, who 
moreover died in despair. We also know that Tolstoy granted freedom to 
his serfs years before this was officially enacted, and that he founded a 
school where he put his educational ideas into practice: to teach without 
paternalism, teaching only what curiosity provoked. He got married at the 
age of 34 and during his life had 13 children of whom only eight survived. 
In his first fifteen years of marriage, he published his best novels: The 
Cossacks, War and Peace and Anna Karenina. Subsequently, he suffered a 
profound crisis starting from, as he says in A Confession, the consciousness 
of death, and he became a solitary being, a writer of religious essays and 
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moral tales. Tolstoy distanced himself from his family, and ended his days 
in the winter of 1910.  
In A Confession, written two decades before his death, Tolstoy says 
that in spite of having had a quite satisfactory life, without knowing why, 
he fell into a sort of melancholy, where everything that happened seemed 
of no importance, human life under the great shade of death was a useless 
sigh. He lost interest in his work, ‘watching life in the mirror of art’ no 
longer afforded him pleasure (Tolstoy: C, p 33) and he became obsessed 
by the question of the meaning of his life. Before this abyss, religious faith 
offers an answer, but an answer that forces us to deny reason and accept a 
certain dose of irrationality. There is no rational answer to the problem of 
the meaning of life, to answer this question, it is necessary to accept 
something that is indemonstrable: the existence of God. Tolstoy writes in 
his Confession: 
... faith is a knowledge of the meaning of human life, the consequence of 
which is that man does not kill himself, but lives. Faith is the force of 
life.’ (Tolstoy: C, p. 54.) 
Now, if this faith is the force of life, then it does not consist of 
theological explanations that calm our anxieties; religion should not lead us 
to believe but rather lead us to act. For Tolstoy, the idea that faith is non-
rational does not imply that having faith is to accept a set of irrational 
beliefs, it rather implies that we must adopt a certain attitude and a 
minimum theology that supports it: faith in the existence of the God of the 
Gospels, of the God of Love (agape) spoken of therein. Beyond the 
acceptance of this existence (which is indemonstrable), the rest of the 
answer to the meaning of life is a practical answer, it consists in living in a 
certain way: practising the love that the Jesus of the Gospels taught. And 
with the purpose of emphasizing this doctrine and explaining it without 
risking falling into pre-enlightenment thought, Tolstoy offers his own 
version of the Gospels. In it, Tolstoy criticizes the ecclesiastical institution 
for exalting suffering and seeking to explain the meaning of this life 
through a later life, when according to him, the original Gospel doctrine 
seeks to put an end to suffering through the practice of certain virtues. 
According to Tolstoy, the first evangelical commandment states, ‘God 
wants neither sacrifice nor prayer, but peace, concord and love among you’ 
(Tolstoy, GB, p. 74). The original doctrine seeks to favour the life of the 
spirit as the true life that nonetheless ‘must be lived in the present’. And 
the third chapter of his version of the Gospel says: ‘The kingdom of God is 
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not in time, or in place, of any kind, [...] it is within you.’ (Ibid, p. 62) This 
true life is not an external one but, on the contrary, it moves us from 
within, because for Tolstoy the God that Jesus preaches lies in our deepest 
being: God is man’s intimate spirit, or as Paul summarizes Jesus: “God is 
the life within man.” Neither is there any necessity to accept that Jesus is 
God made flesh, nor that another life exists. Detached from these dogmas, 
the Gospels contain a moral and social doctrine that leads us to build a 
better and more just society, or as his version of the Gospel says, a “temple 
of God; that is, the hearts of men when they  love each other” (Tolstoy, 
GB, p. 174). As individual beings, we will necessarily die, and we die 
forever, but our life is not the same if we use to leave something to others, 
in serving others and thereby making a contribution to solidarity and 
justice reigning in the community of mankind. In this way, we will be 
fertile spirits and only thus will we be able to identify with the God that is 
within ourselves.  
For Tolstoy, moreover, the test of this wisdom is none other than the 
attitude to death. For that reason, true faith is not that of the wealthy 
official or that of the bourgeois lady, but that of the people. The muzhik 
accepts privations without protest, though knowing that he will die; but the 
muzhik, unlike the nobleman, dies in peace, neither debating nor resisting 
death, because death is for him a natural and daily fact. This peace with 
which he faces death is a demonstration that his life has had meaning, and 
has had it because it has been an evangelical life, a life of service to others. 
The great nobleman, on the other hand, resists death because he feels that 
he has still not done that which is most important and, indeed, he has not: 
he has lived for himself, loving only himself, without committing himself 
to others beyond his own convenience. Tolstoy does not take refuge in the 
belief in a future life, but rather thinks that it is in this world where the God 
of agape must appear. The Gospels offer an attitude and a way of life that 
can give meaning to this naked existence and help us to accept our own 
death. We are part of a natural world and we live in community with 
others. Faith consists in accepting oneself as part of this natural world and 
guiding one’s life to the service of others, cultivating virtues, such as 
compassion, gratitude, forgiveness, and solidarity. For Tolstoy, the truth of 
Christianity is concentrated in this doctrine, and is illustrated in the life of 
the Russian peasant or poacher, who grows up in the country and cultivates 
or hunts, who sees the trees grow from saplings and occasionally cuts them 
down to, among other things, carve them into the cross for a tomb. This 
day-to-day awareness allows the muzhik to feel that he is part of a cycle 
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where death is a natural fact. His daily life, moreover, is always in function 
of service to others, continuous service at a daily level, with no need for 
great feats. Thus, for Tolstoy, what the Jesus of the Gospels has 
bequeathed us is not his death but his life, his emphasis on a life of service 
and surrender to others, a life that cultivates the spirit, disdaining the flesh, 
worldly wealth and, in general, the material world, being the only way to 
give meaning to human existence and thereby, conquering anguish in the 
face of death.  
But, in what sense does the Gospel doctrine that Tolstoy proposes 
require religious faith? Could not somebody possibly give a central value 
to solidarity, humility, compassion or justice, without therefore believing 
in God? Tolstoy would seem to think in this respect that the Gospel 
doctrine cannot only be a moral doctrine; the search for these values is not 
motivated by either moral or utilitarian reasoning, but is rather motivated 
by consciousness of God within the human being. Thus, the Gospel answer 
precisely requires God as the motive that infuses in each individual the 
strength to establish and promote values such as humility, generosity, 
solidarity, justice, compassion, forgiveness and gratitude, service to others, 
etc., beyond utilitarian reasoning. And it is via the practice of these virtues, 
the virtues that summarize Gospel agape, that man manifests God and 
exists more fully outside time, in the eternal present. This is, for Tolstoy, 
the essence of Christianity.   
But let us return to Wittgenstein. Given the context in which the 
thoughts of the Notebooks mentioned above arise (the First World War and 
being in the line of fire), it may be conjectured that Wittgenstein appeals to 
God as a sort of last hope faced by total absurdity; only God provides the 
possibility that his life (and possible death) have any meaning because only 
God would be able to integrate such events in a harmonious and organic 
whole.5 Thus ‘feeling completely safe’ (come what may) can seen as a 
consequence of this trust that the world and life are a whole with meaning, 
both ideas are related and inspire images in Wittgenstein such as that of 
‘being in hands of God’ ‘accepting his will’, or the idea of seeing God as a 
father. But seeing life as providential, as if everything happened by God’s 
Will, does not save us from moral commitments, we must make an effort 
to accept this providence, by not offering vain resistance, and struggling to 
                                                 
5 To understand the relationship between ‘meaning of life’ and ‘integration in the 
whole’, I know of no better texts than the papers by Luis Villoro included in the 
bibliography. 
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adjust our life to ‘the general form of life’. We know that Wittgenstein 
professes a sort of stoicism where destiny is another name  for  God,   
trying  to  change  it  is  useless,  for that,  his  ideal – according to what he 
says himself – ‘is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the 
passions, without meddling with them.’ (CV, p. 2).  
In other words, we trust that the world has meaning and that leads us 
to imagine that there is a way of integrating events – many of them painful 
and terrible – in a harmonious way. We have no idea how many of the 
things that we have been witness to during our lives could acquire 
meaning, but we trust that they do. But why trust that life has meaning, or 
what is the same thing in this context, that God exists? It seems to me that 
Wittgenstein trusts this for basically two reasons: the first is that he 
believes he glimpses it, what partly convinces him is a certain experience 
that he identifies as the manifestation of this meaning; and the second is 
the peculiar attraction that he feels for the Christian doctrine of salvation. 
Christianity offers him the redemption that he so strongly believes he 
needs. The former leads us to astonishment as a ‘correct perspective’ for 
capturing meaning, and the latter connects with the idea of guilt and 
redemption.  
The second feature of Wittgensteinian religiousness that we have 
highlighted is astonishment at the existence of the world, mentioned in his 
conference on Ethics (Cf. CE, 38). We are astonished that the world exists, 
that it is there in a gratuitous and inexplicable way. Two aphorisms in the 
Tractatus point to this:  
It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it is. (T 6.44) 
To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole – a 
limited whole.  
Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical. (T 6.45)  
It is a matter of seeing the world (and therefore life) as a miracle 
(CE, 41-42), a sort of ‘sacred gesture’ (CV, 284, 1946), as a hierophany, to 
use Mircea Eliade’s term. This experience, that Wittgenstein considers 
central, is behind the gratitude for life, or the image of life as a gift, ideas 
that his texts sometimes transmit. Wittgenstein cultivates this 
astonishment, that for him includes no ingenuousness, but is rather a sort of 
primordial reaction that we need to live with profundity, but we forget 
because we spend our lives asleep. Moreover, Wittgenstein was a man who 
was very sensitive to beauty, educated and refined in the artistic 
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expressions of his time, and this second feature of his religiousness seeks 
to recover this more properly aesthetic dimension in his attitude: the 
yearning and cultivation of a perspective, a point of view that, on occasion, 
identifies with the artist’s viewpoint, since ‘the work of art forces us to 
adopt the correct perspective’ (CV, p.4). In this way, beauty sometimes 
functions as a bridge towards religious feelings and images. But in addition 
to art,  
... it seems to me too that there is a way of capturing the world sub specie 
aeterni other than through the work of the artist. Thought has such a way 
– so I believe – it is as though it flies above the world and leaves it as it is 
– observing it from above, in flight. (CV, p. 5)  
Wittgenstein’s reverential admiration extends to other things that are 
imbued with this hierophanic character: one can be astonished by the most 
ordinary things, by that which you see every day, when you see it in a 
certain way from the correct perspective, then that something becomes 
unique and magical. But what most astonishes Wittgenstein is thought and, 
in particular, he is astonished by his own thoughts, to which he often 
attributes a light that ‘comes from above’ (CV, 330, 1947). Wittgenstein 
feels that he is the depository of a thought that is beyond him, and to 
express it accurately and faithfully is, probably, what he feels to be his 
personal contribution to life, that whole with meaning, and therefore, as a 
way of celebrating and being grateful for the gift, the miracle of his life:  
The joy in my thoughts (philosophical thoughts) is joy in my own strange 
life. Is that the joy of life? (MT, p. 117).  
The story is told that when he returned from the First World War, he 
heard of the death of his friend David Pinsent and contemplated suicide. 
His uncle found him at the railway station, extremely upset, holding a text 
that was very close to what would become the Tractatus. In the end, he did 
not commit suicide; his desire to publish it probably saved his life, and this 
was surely not the last time that his philosophical work gave meaning to 
his life. Because if his philosophical work – which he liked to define as: ‘to 
distinguish’, ‘to dissolve problems’, ‘to detect confusion’, ‘to take the fly 
out of the bottle’ – acquires the capacity to give meaning to his life, it is 
because it is wrapped in religiousness, and, it seems to me, that it is in this 
sense that one would have to understand what he said to Drury: ‘I am not a 
religious man, but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious 
point of view.’ (Drury p. 79)  
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To recapitulate: it seems clear that there is a relationship between the 
first two aspects of Wittgensteinian religiousness, on the one hand, 
religious faith as trust in the meaning of life allows us to see the 
gratuitousness of things as the object of reverential astonishment, and not, 
as it would be for some atheistic existentialists, as the obviousness of the 
absurdity of existence. Furthermore, the astonishment is not a consequence 
of the belief in the meaning of the world, it is rather a way of recognizing 
this meaning, of seeing what we are shown when we manage to adopt the 
correct perspective. In Tolstoy, on the other hand, this exaltation does not 
exist; he separates the aesthetic from the religious dimension and on the 
few occasions when there is religious exaltation (such as in Chapter XXII 
of The Cossacks, where Olenin has a sort of religious experience), this is 
bound to love, to generosity and contact with others.  
Finally, I should like to pause at the third feature of what we have 
called the negative characteristic of Wittgensteinian religiousness and 
which consists of a sort of tragic dimension. In this respect, what Malcolm 
relates is significant: Wittgenstein feels no attraction for the idea of God as 
a creator, yet on the other hand, he does feel it faced by the image of the 
Final Judgement. According to what I have explained so far, linking God 
with the meaning of life, makes religion not a doctrine but a way of life, it 
leads to morals. But this is where the difference begins, for Tolstoy they 
are social morals, morals based on community values, while for 
Wittgenstein they would seem instead to lead to morals of a much more 
personal nature. Wittgenstein avoids human contact, he has few friends, he 
constantly seeks to be isolated and he does not seem to have much belief in 
human solidarity, nor to have a community vision such as that which might 
arise from Tolstoy’s thinking. His friend Fania Pascal says that 
Wittgenstein fantasized about the Russia that he knew, not from his own 
experience, but from the texts of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, so we may 
suppose that his fantasies of community work and his idealization of the 
Russian worker have some relation with Tolstoy’s admiration for the 
muzhik. It is also probable that Tolstoy influenced his decision to bequeath 
his inheritance to his family, and his desire to become a rural teacher, 
perhaps to apply the educational ideas of his admired Tolstoy. 
Nevertheless – and perhaps exactly because of his inability to fulfil these 
community ideals – Wittgenstein feels that he is excluded from this 
Tolstoyan project of collective salvation.  
This relates to Wittgenstein’s idea that the human being is lost and 
abandoned in this world: alone, wounded, lacking, and yearning for help, 
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comfort and salvation. The religion of meaning and astonishment are 
insufficient to cover this shortfall, since it arises from the yearning of the 
individual to be an active part of life, of this ‘whole with meaning’; and it 
is because Man acts and seeks, that he errs and is lost. The perspective of 
meaning and astonishment can suddenly vanish, and then, once again, we 
are alone and disoriented. Moreover it is Christianity that offers 
Wittgenstein the road to redemption that he believes he desperately needs. 
And it is for this reason that almost all his comments on biblical texts refer 
to questions related to redemption and punishment: the Final Judgement, 
Jesus’ resurrection as a test of his character as a redeemer, or comments on 
the Pauline doctrine of Predestination (which he completely fails to 
understand). One of the most significant aphorisms in this respect is the 
following:  
What inclines even me to believe in Christ’s Resurrection? It is as though 
I play with the thought. – If he did not rise from the dead, then he 
decomposed in the grave like any other man. He is dead and decomposed. 
In that case he is a teacher like any other and can no longer help; and once 
more we are orphaned and alone. So we have to content ourselves with 
wisdom and speculation. We are in a sort of hell where we can do nothing 
but dream, roofed in, as it were, and cut off from heaven. But if I am to be 
REALLY saved, – what I need is certainty – not wisdom, dreams or 
speculation – and this certainty is faith. And faith is faith in what is 
needed by my heart, my soul, not my speculative intelligence. For it is my 
soul with its passions, as it were with its flesh and blood, that has to be 
saved, not my abstract mind. Perhaps we can say: Only love can believe 
the Resurrection. (CV, p. 33)  
It seems to me that this brings Wittgenstein closer to Kierkegaard 
than Tolstoy. Although he agrees with Tolstoy in thinking that religion 
leads to moral commitment, it is Kierkegaard who connects him to this 
more tragic dimension of religion. Although at times his rhetoric and 
reiterative style exasperated him, Wittgenstein admired and read 
Kierkegaard and there can be no doubt that there is a certain empathy with 
him. But, as with Tolstoy, let us make a very brief detour to better 
understand the relationship between them.  
For Kierkegaard, it is consciousness of sin that brings man closer to 
religious faith because Christianity is above all a religion of salvation. His 
idea of the ‘gentleman of faith’ who trusts God above all and in spite of all, 
and who is capable of embracing the absurdity, and of standing alone when 
confronted by the world in order to avoid betraying his faith, and his idea 
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that we can refer our weakness and our sins only to God, are important 
references for this aspect of Wittgenstein’s religiousness. He too lives his 
faith as a passion and as a requirement that the majority of the time he feels 
unable to fulfil. In general, his struggle takes place on two fronts: he rejects 
his sexuality because it seems to him that it makes him dirty, sometimes 
even finding it repugnant. Christianity’s insistence on purity tortures him, 
he feels weak and constantly wrestles against his sexuality: ‘I flee from the 
dirty basement of my pleasure and displeasure’ (MP, p. 95). Another 
temptation that comes to him frequently, and where he loses, is his own 
vanity: “I soil everything with my vanity” (MP, p. 93). At one moment, he 
confesses to Drury that wounded vanity is the source of the greatest evil. 
Wittgenstein endures contact with most people, he has little patience and 
tolerance with many human characteristics, e.g. stupidity, vulgarity, 
arrogance, and he continually complains about the people around him. We 
know that he frequently sought isolation and that, for the most part, he 
found it in the Norwegian fjords where he wrote a good part of his work. 
But this sort of misanthropy, that was sometimes released against close 
friends (the few that still visited him or wrote to him), left a great deal of 
guilt in its wake, which is why he tortured himself and felt miserable: his 
lack of affection was obvious to him, his inability to feel and express love. 
He lived in some way above others, perhaps he could not avoid it, but 
when he realized this, he once again felt distant, very distant, from the 
Christian moral paradigm, ‘only religion would have the power to destroy 
vanity and penetrate all the nooks and crannies’ (CV, p. 48).6  
Wittgenstein is then in a struggle against himself, he does not feel 
worthy of the salvation and the redemption that the Christian religion 
                                                 
6 Other similar elements include his dreams (of a Kafkaesque type), mentioned in his 
diaries. In one of them, voices scream something like, ‘The debt must yet be paid’ at 
him (MT, p.101), and in the other, he sees himself sitting in a sort of electric chair, 
‘like a criminal’ (MT, .137). A second element is that we know that at one time he felt 
the need to confess a certain things that he was ashamed of. He then distributed a letter 
or made a verbal confession to some of his friends, and told them – according to Fania 
Pascal –  that he has concealed the fact that he is of predominantly Jewish descent and 
that he lied when faced by a girl, a student of his, who accused him of mistreatment. 
For Wittgenstein, confessing to something amounts somehow to getting rid of it, 
gaining the possibility of making a fresh start, and is furthermore an act of humility, 
since a vain man cannot admit his weaknesses. 
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offers, and this makes him feel guilty and miserable and, consequently, the 
more in need of it; he wants to be worthy, he needs to be so, because – like 
Kierkegaard –  he feels the immense need to be redeemed and saved (to a 
large extent from himself). Only religion can give him the strength to get 
up, to work, to try to transform his life into a part of that ‘whole with 
meaning’ that always threatens to disappear. Because, as we said above, 
the perspective can be lost and then the world is there again, but no longer 
as a “hierophany”, as a sacred gesture, but as an empty, barren place where 
‘everything is dead’ (MT, p. 207).  
Finally, the first and last features of his religiousness are intimately 
related: the meaning of life is translated into the Christian doctrine of sin 
and redemption, and consequently, life only has meaning and value to the 
degree that it conforms to this ‘system of references’; with the result that 
his own weakness, his inability to fulfil this model of purity and humility 
becomes, for Wittgenstein, a new source of guilt and suffering. Christianity 
offers him a redemption of which he does not feel worthy. But when he 
seeks to move away from these demands, the trust in meaning disappears.  
Wittgenstein oscillates and his religiousness moves like a pendulum 
between belief and submission, distance and resistance. He sometimes 
thinks that it is ‘his depravities’ that prevent him from achieving faith (Cf. 
MP, p.159), but although his religiousness grows and shrinks, he never 
manages to  break free from frame of reference that Christianity provides 
him with:  
I may well reject the Christian solution of the problem of life (salvation, 
resurrection, judgment, heaven, hell) but this does not solve the problem 
of my life, for I am not good & not happy. I am not saved. And thus can I 
know what I would envision as the only acceptable image of a world 
order if I lived differently, lived completely differently. I can’t judge that. 
After all, another life shifts completely different images into the 
foreground, necessitates completely different images (MP, p. 169). 
In many moments of his life, Wittgenstein felt doubts about the 
Christian ‘system of references’, and although his disposition towards the 
blind submission of which Kierkegaard speaks diminished as the years 
went by, he never renounced a certain cultivation of his religiousness, he 
never stopped to take refuge and reproach himself – even though 
occasionally – with its images, and it is exactly for this reason that his 
religiousness shades his life and his writings in a fundamental way.  
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“...to begin at the beginning” 
The Grammar of Doubt in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty 
 
LUIGI PERISSINOTTO 
 
1. On Certainty: a work by Wittgenstein? 
Wittgenstein’s remarks published in 1969 with the title Über Gewißheit / 
On Certainty1 have, ever since their appearance, attracted the attention of 
numerous scholars for at least the following three reasons: 
 1. Even though they are handwritten notations, never revised or 
polished by their author, they seem to have “a gratifying thematic unity 
and coherence” (Glock 2004: 64) that other groups of remarks do not have, 
to the point that, in some scholars’ opinion, they are entitled to be 
considered a “work” by Wittgenstein.2 
 2. The objective and the critical reference of these remarks seems 
clearly recognizable; many of them in fact make reference to and discuss in 
detail what George E. Moore maintained in some of his essays, in 
particular in A Defence of Common Sense (1925; republished in 1959) and 
                                                 
1 See Wittgenstein 1974; hereafter cited with the abbreviation OC followed by the 
section number. 
2 For an attempt to answer the question “What is a work by Wittgenstein?” see Schulte 
2006, who seems to think that On Certainty can be numbered among Wittgenstein’s 
“works” even if it satisfies only one of the three criteria he lists. For Schulte, in fact, 
“[t]o find out whether a certain manuscript or typescript is to count as a ‘work’ by 
Wittgenstein one should try to establish whether (a) the author himself thought that the 
text in question formed a more or less organic whole displaying a satisfactory relation 
between form and content; (b) whether we as readers can detect a line of argument 
with theses, supporting reasons, objections, examples, etc.; (c) whether the text has 
undergone a certain amount of stylistic polishing and rearranging of individuals 
remarks showing that there has been some improvement in the direction of enhanced 
readability and intelligibility” (Schulte 2006: 402). With respect to these three criteria, 
the presumably most puzzling case is precisely On Certainty: “In this case, criteria (a) 
and (c) are clearly not satisfied at all. Criterion (b), however, which requires us as 
readers to be able to find a line of argument, an interesting ensemble of questions, 
objections and replies may lead us to think very highly of this book (Schulte 2006: 
403-404). 
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in Proof of an External World (1939; republished in 1959).3 For many 
scholars, the reference to specific texts, to a specific philosopher and to an 
identifiable ensemble of philosophical problems has seemed to make it 
easier and less elusive to grasp the meaning and the implications of many 
of these remarks. 
 3. In these remarks it seems that Wittgenstein takes the measure of 
some clearly identifiable philosophical orientations: scepticism, relativism, 
foundationalism, naturalism. This may be why many philosophers, 
perusing the remarks of On Certainty, do not experience the sense of 
bewilderment they do, for example, in confronting the Philosophical 
Investigations. And this is also why many have not hesitated to apply to 
these remarks some of the most classical labels of philosophy, asking, from 
one time to the next (and, obviously, responding in different and often 
contradictory ways), whether the Wittgenstein of On Certainty was a 
foundationalist or an anti-foundationalist; a sceptic or an anti-sceptic; a 
relativist or an absolutist; a naturalist or an anti-naturalist. It would almost 
seem that in the case of On Certainty many interpreters found less 
impelling or decisive the classical metaphilosophical questions4 on the 
relationship between Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy and his 
philosophical practice. 
 So, as we have seen, On Certainty has been interpreted in different 
ways and located in various positions in the context of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy. As regards its location, suffice it to recall how, recently, one 
scholar has gone so far as to coin the expression “the third Wittgenstein” 
(Moyal-Sharrock 2004) with the fundamental aim of drawing attention to 
                                                 
3 This is not to say that Moore is the sole point of reference of On Certainty; as has 
recently been emphasized (Kienzler 2006), another (and wrongfully underestimated) 
point of reference is represented by John Henry Newman and, in particular, his Essay 
in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Newman 1890). In On Certainty Newman is 
mentioned only once, in parentheses, in §1: “If you do know that here is a hand [the 
English translation has “one hand,” but Kienzler 2006: 117 note 1, proposes the 
translation “a hand,” because the first translation “gives the wrong suggestion that 
Wittgenstein is thinking about numbers here”], we’ll grant you all the rest. / (When 
one says that such and such proposition can’t be proved, of course that does not mean 
that it can’t be derived from other propositions; any proposition can be derived from 
other  ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself.) (On this a curious 
remark by H. Newman.).” 
4 According to Wright, for example, “it’s fair to say that a real integration of 
Wittgenstein’s official conception of philosophy with his own practice is something 
which has so far eluded even the best commentary” (Wright 2001: 439). 
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Wittgenstein’s work of the last years of his life, but above all to On 
Certainty, considered in this sphere to be “Wittgenstein’s third 
masterpiece” (Moyal-Sharrock 2004: 10, note 3); “a philosophical 
masterpiece comparable to the Tractatus and to the Investigations” (Stroll 
2002: 125). Obviously, not everyone agrees on the idea of a “third” 
Wittgenstein (see, for example, Hutto 2004) or on the importance 
attributed to On Certainty in the first place, maintaining that the spirit and 
the theme of the remarks in that work are not so significantly different 
from those that can be found, for example, in the Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics (Wittgenstein 1986)5 or in the remarks 
published with the title “Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness” 
(Wittgenstein 1993).6 
                                                 
5 “For Wittgenstein […] there is nothing genuinely propositional about his so-called 
hinge propositions, save their outward appearance. They are propositions in name 
only; even calling them such is a misnomer. They do not function as ordinary 
propositions at all, and hence ought properly to be classified as non-propositional; 
once it is exposed that they operate like grammatical rules, it becomes clear that they 
neither rationally fund other pieces of knowledge nor can be discovered by means of 
ratiocination. This is made clear by a host of remarks concerning rules even in his 
earlier work Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, which neatly foreshadow 
those presented in On Certainty” (Hutto 2004: 29). I remind the reader that the 
writings published with the title Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics date 
from the period between September 1937 and April 1944, with the sole exception of 
Appendix I to Part I that dates from 1933-1934; the remarks collected in On Certainty, 
by contrast, date from the last year and a half of Wittgenstein’s life; the last 7 are dated 
27 April (1951); Wittgenstein died on April 29th. 
6 “[…] many of the leading themes in On Certainty were already anticipated in 
material Wittgenstein had written in 1937, shortly after he had assembled the first 188 
sections of the Investigations (‘Cause and Effect’)” (Stern 1996: 447). It is for this 
reason that the remarks of On Certainty ought not be read—as, instead, they generally 
have—”as a set of suggestive but inconclusive first drafts, or as a response to 
discussions of skepticism and G. E. Moore with Norman Malcolm” (Stern 1994: 447). 
Van Gennip 2003 reaches very similar conclusions: “Wittgenstein’s concern with 
epistemological concepts is not limited to MSS 172, 174, 175, 176 [the manuscripts 
that constitute the sources of On Certainty]: other manuscripts of the same period 
contain notes on related issues. Moreover, there are several earlier manuscripts that 
contain reflection on the same topics” (131). As we have glimpsed, there are also 
substantial disagreements on the role played by Moore in On Certainty. For some 
scholars Moore, for Wittgenstein, was little more than a pretext; for others, such as 
Malcolm 1977, he was a genuine interlocutor. The same considerations hold for the 
role played by the discussions about Moore with Norman Malcolm (see, in this regard, 
Malcolm 1984: 70-74). 
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 Also as regards the work’s internal division into parts there are 
significant differences of opinion. Williams 2004, for example, 
distinguishes the first 64 remarks! in On Certainty, influenced above all by 
Moore’s 1939 essay (Proof of an External World) and whose predominant 
theme or problem is, allegedly, “Cartesian scepticism, the problem of our 
knowledge of the external world” (260), from the successive remarks, 
which are more influenced by Moore’s other and earlier essay, A Defence 
of Common Sense. In this case Wittgenstein would seem to be “primarily 
concerned with Agrippan scepticism, the kind of scepticism that grows out 
of reflection on what threatens to be an infinite regress of justification” 
(260). For his part, Stroll 1994 (but see also Stroll 2007) maintains that in 
the course of On Certainty Wittgenstein’s position changes and progresses: 
the certainty that he had initially thought of “in propositional terms” (Stroll 
1994: 7) is later, at least from remark 204 on, increasingly conceived in 
nonpropositional terms.8 
 The—also radical—differences of opinion increase when we 
examine the full-fledged interpretations of On Certainty. Moyal-
Sharrock/Brenner 2007, for example, individuate four basic interpretative 
orientations that they term, respectively, “the framework reading,” “the 
transcendental reading,” “the epistemic reading,” and “the therapeutic 
reading” (7-14). But in the domain of each reading the differences and 
contrapositions multiply. If for Stroll 1994 in On Certainty Wittgenstein 
was a foundationalist even if of a most particular kind, and certainly “not 
of a traditional sort” (141), for Williams 2007 thinking to number 
Wittgenstein among the foundationalists is judged to be, to say the least, “a 
bad idea” (49). If for Boghossian 2006 the Wittgenstein of On Certainty 
was an epistemic relativist, for Coliva 2010 he was indeed an anti-
foundationalist, but, pace Boghossian, by no means an epistemic relativist 
(21). If for Perissinotto 2002 it is misleading to speak, a propos of On 
Certainty, of a naturalistic tendency, by contrast both Strawson 1985 and 
                                                 
! Even if Williams speaks of the first 64 remarks, we must recall that also remark 65 
belongs to the same MS 172  from which remarks 1-64 are drawn; by contrast, the 
successive group of remarks (66-192) derive from MS 174. For a detailed description 
of the sources of On Certainty and of the editorial choices that led to its formation, see 
van Gennip 2003. 
8 Broadly speaking, Stroll 1994 maintains that “the main burden of his book [On 
Certainty] is to give a characterization of certainty that radically dissociates it from 
knowing, that makes it ‘something animal as it were’ (OC: §359)” (7). 
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Wolgast 1994 speak, even if in different senses, of the naturalism of this 
work. 
 
2. Kant: “a scandal to philosophy” 
As we know, Moore begins his 1939 essay Proof of an External World by 
quoting9 a famous note to the preface of the second edition of the Critique 
of Pure Reason in which Kant observes that 
it still remains a scandal to philosophy [ein Skandal der Philosophie] and 
to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us10 (from 
which we derive the whole material of knowledge, even for our inner 
sense) must be accepted merely on faith [bloß auf Glauben], and that if 
anyone thinks it good [einfällt] to doubt [bezweifeln] their existence, we 
are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof [genugtuenden 
Beweis]” (Kant 1787/2003: B xl, note). 
 The passage merits an analytic comment.11 In any event, the concept 
to which I wish to draw your attention here is that of faith [Glaube]. What 
is to be understood by the terms “Glaube” and “Glauben” Kant will explain 
in the second major section of the Critique, the “Transcendental Doctrine 
of Method,” where he differentiates and illustrates in detail (Kant 
1787/2003: A 820-831; B 848-859) the three different degrees of that 
which he calls “[t]he holding of a thing to be true [[d]as Fürwahrhalten]”: 
“opining [Meinen], believing [Glauben], and knowing [Wissen]”: 
                                                 
9 Moore 1959: 127. In this section of my essay I adopt the classic 1929 Kemp Smith 
translation of the Critique of Pure Reason because this is the translation followed, and 
quoted, by Moore. A more recent translation gives—more literally—”a scandal of 
philosophy” rather than “a scandal to philosophy.” 
10 Moore maintains that “the existence of the things outside of us” renders better than 
the Kemp Smith translation (“the existence of things outside us”) the German “das 
Dasein der Dinge ausser uns” (Moore 1959: 127). 
11 This passage was taken up and ironically overturned by Heidegger in Being and 
Time (Heidegger 1927/1962: I, 6, §43a, p. 249): “The ‘scandal of philosophy’ is not 
that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted 
again and again. […] It is not that the proofs are inadequate, but that the kind of Being 
of the entity [Dasein] which does the proving and makes requests for proofs has not 
been made definite enough.”  Strawson 1985: 24 compares the Kantian and the 
Heideggerian passages, including in his comparison a quote from On Certainty (§471: 
“It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the 
beginning. And not try to go further back”), wishing in this way to suggest an alliance 
between Heidegger and Wittgenstein in the criticism of Kant. 
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Opining is such holding of a judgment as is consciously insufficient, not 
only objectively, but also subjectively. If our holding of the judgment be 
only subjectively sufficient, and is at the same time taken as being 
objectively insufficient, we have what is termed believing. Lastly, when 
the holding of a thing to be true is sufficient both subjectively and 
objectively, it is knowledge. The subjective sufficiency is termed 
conviction [Überzeugung] (for myself), the objective sufficiency is 
termed certainty [Gewißheit] (for everyone). 
 Kant does not have a great deal to say about opining. He limits 
himself to specifying, first, that “if […] I have nothing but opinion, it is 
all merely a play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth” 
and, second, that there are domains, such as that of pure mathematics, 
from which all opinion is excluded: “it is absurd to have an opinion in 
pure mathematics; either we must know, or we must abstain from all acts 
of judgment.” He has considerably more to say about believing and about 
the threefold distinction between pragmatic, doctrinal, and moral belief. 
 As far as pragmatic belief is concerned, Kant tells us that this is a 
“contingent belief, which yet forms the ground for the actual employment 
of means to certain actions.” The example Kant gives us is very clear. Let 
us imagine a physician who “must do something for a patient in danger, 
but does not know the nature of his illness.” Like all good doctors, “[h]e 
observes the symptoms, and if he can find no more likely alternative, 
judges it to be a case of phthisis.” The point is that “even in his own 
estimation his belief is contingent only; another observer might perhaps 
come to a sounder conclusion.” Nevertheless, our doctor must take action 
if he wants his patient to recover, and since he sees no alternatives to his 
diagnosis, he has to trust in the belief (which, as we have seen, is 
contingent “even in his own estimation”) that this is a case of phthisis 
and, therefore, that he must apply all those means (medications, changes 
of environment, etc.) that, he believes, are suitable for curing this disease. 
It is obvious that pragmatic belief understood in this way is different from 
simple opinion—for example, from the opinion of someone who is not a 
doctor who nevertheless hazards a diagnosis: our doctor observes (as a 
doctor, i.e., as an expert) the symptoms and judges (as a doctor) that there 
are no more probable alternatives. But his is still a contingent belief, 
“theoretically insufficient,” because he cannot rule out the possibility that 
“another observer might perhaps come to a sounder conclusion.” Nothing 
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is necessary here: neither the end pursued12 nor the belief that the patient 
has phthisis nor the belief that the means employed are the most adequate. 
Nevertheless, “from a practical point of view”—i.e., with respect to the 
need to act—we can call “belief,” and not simply opinion, this our 
holding what is “theoretically insufficient” to be true. Indeed, it is not 
easy to distinguish between a simple persuasion and a firm faith; for Kant, 
the wager13 can be a good “touchstone” for distinguishing the one from 
the other: when one is confronted with a particularly demanding wager, 
that which appeared to be a firm faith can prove to be a simple 
persuasion.14 This shows, among other things, that “pragmatic belief 
always exists in some specific degree, which, according to differences in 
the interests at stake, may be large or may be small.” 
 Kant, then, goes on to distinguish between pragmatic belief and that 
which he calls “doctrinal belief,”15 namely, a holding to be true which is 
not practical but, rather, “purely theoretical” (i.e., not immediately 
conditioned by the need to act). The two examples of doctrinal belief 
Kant gives us are very different, in terms of content and importance: the 
belief that other worlds are inhabited, and the belief that God exists.16 
Neither one is a simple opinion; in both cases, in fact, “I am saying much 
too little if I proceed to declare that I hold it merely as an opinion.” I do 
not opine, but rather I hold a firm faith (“on the correctness of which I 
should be prepared to run great risks”) that also other worlds are 
                                                 
12 In this domain—the practical domain of skills—the ends pursued are not “absolutely 
necessary,” but rather “optional and contingent.” 
13 There is a passage of Wittgenstein’s in the Lectures on Religious Belief 
(Wittgenstein 1966: 57-58) that brings to mind Kant’s considerations on the wager. 
Here Wittgenstein refers to Christianity and wonders what relation it has with the 
evidence that Jesus has risen. We are faced with at least two alternatives: either we 
consider such evidence on the same plane as historical pieces of evidence, but then we 
have to conclude that Christians are “unreasonable,” because on such weak evidence 
(from the historical standpoint) “[t]hey base [wager?] enormous things”; or else we 
have to conclude that they “treat this evidence in a different way” from how a historian 
normally treats a piece of historical evidence (for example, Napoleon’s defeat at 
Waterloo). In his lectures, Wittgenstein explores the second alternative. 
14 Kant calls “persuasion” [Überredung] “the holding of it to be true,” which “has its 
ground only in the special character of the subject.” 
15 For the purposes of this essay we can omit the consideration of the third type of 
belief, namely, moral belief. 
16 To these two examples of doctrinal belief Kant adds the “doctrinal belief in the 
future life of the human soul.” 
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inhabited; just as I do not opine, but “I firmly believe in God.”1! Indeed, 
as Kant often reminds us, from the speculative viewpoint we are not able 
to account for our belief in God.18 Nevertheless, we can postulate the 
existence of God, i.e., of “a wise Author of the world [...], as a condition 
of what is indeed a contingent, but still not unimportant purpose, namely, 
to have guidance in the investigation of nature.”19 In cases such as these, 
then, “while opining is doubtless too weak a term to be applicable, the 
term knowing is too strong.” 
 Now, the first part of the passage just quoted definitely holds in the 
case—with which we began—of the existence of the things outside us. It 
would unquestionably be a “scandal to philosophy” if, with regard to a 
case such as this, we could exhibit solely and simply an opinion, “without 
the least relation to truth.” What, indeed, could be more scandalous for 
philosophy than not having “the least relation to truth”? But—and this is 
the point that interests us here— the scandal would be at least equally 
great if we were to admit that the belief in the existence of the things 
outside us is only a doctrinal belief, as subjectively firm as one could 
wish, but nonetheless objectively ungrounded. In our case, then, knowing 
can never be “too strong” a term. 
 On this point Kant is clear and explicit. In the section of the 
“Transcendental Doctrine of Method” that we are considering, at a certain 
point he remarks that also the doctrinal belief that is firmest for us “is 
somewhat lacking in stability”; in fact, “we often lose hold of it, owing to 
                                                 
1! In the aforementioned Lectures on Religious Belief Wittgenstein observes, with 
reference to a belief in a Last Judgment: “[…] one would be reluctant to say: ‘These 
people rigorously hold the opinion (or view) that there is a Last Judgment.’ ‘Opinion’ 
sounds queer. It is for this reason that different words are used: ‘dogma,’ ‘faith.’ / We 
don’t talk about hypothesis, or about high probability. Nor about knowing” 
(Wittgenstein, 1966, 57). 
18 This is why, for Kant, doctrinal belief cannot be called “hypothesis” either: “Were I 
even to go the length of describing the merely theoretical holding of the belief as an 
hypothesis which I am justified in assuming, I should thereby be pledging myself to 
have a more adequate concept of the character of a cause of the world and of the 
character of another world than I am really in a position to supply.” 
19 It is in this sense that, in analogy with pragmatic belief, here we can speak of 
“belief”: “But in many cases, when we are dealing with an object about which nothing 
can be done by us, and in regard to which our judgment is therefore purely theoretical, 
we can conceive and picture to ourselves an attitude for which we regard ourselves as 
having sufficient grounds, while yet there is no existing means of arriving at certainty 
in the matter.” 
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the speculative difficulties which we encounter, although in the end we 
always inevitably return to it.” Obviously, that “we always inevitably 
return to it” cannot mean that we have resolved all—and once and for 
all—those speculative difficulties; if that were the case, belief would 
finally have been replaced by knowledge. The oscillation is, in this sense, 
constitutive of doctrinal belief. But in the case of the existence of the 
things outside us it is precisely this oscillating instability (which stems 
from our incapacity to pit “any satisfactory proof” against the doubts on 
the existence of the things outside us) that gives rise to scandal. In short, 
in this case not only opinion but also belief is “too weak” a term. This 
means that, at least in the case of the existence of the things outside us, 
we cannot be satisfied with (subjective) conviction but, rather, we must 
philosophically demand (objective) certainty. Indeed, there are cases—
and that of the existence of God is one of them—in which “the expression 
of belief is, from the objective point of view, an expression of modesty, 
and yet at the same time, from a subjective point of view, an expression of 
the firmness of our confidence.” For Kant, nevertheless, modesty is not 
always a philosophical virtue—and most certainly not when it masks the 
incapacity to give a satisfactory proof, precisely where such a proof is, as 
it were, philosophically due.20 An excess of modesty can in fact be the 
equivalent of the triumph of the sceptic who—with his doubts—wishes, 
precisely, to induce us to admit that there is never knowledge, but only 
and always opinion and belief. 
 
3. Moore: “the first and most important problem of philosophy” 
That modesty is not always a philosophical virtue is a point on which 
Moore agrees with Kant, and on which—he contends—philosophers (or 
most of them, at least) have always agreed. In Some Main Problems of 
Philosophy, for example, after stating his view that “the first and most 
important problem of philosophy is: To give a general description of the 
whole Universe” (Moore 1953: 1-2),21 he remarks that philosophers have 
                                                 
20 Here Kant speaks from the viewpoint of he who has been able to give a satisfactory 
proof—indeed, a “rigorous proof” (Kant 1787/2003: B xl, note)—of the existence of 
the things outside us. In giving this proof he also demonstrated that it had to be given. 
In this regard, see also Moore, 1959, 127-128. 
21 Moore describes in greater detail “the most important and interesting thing which 
philosophers have tried to do […]: To give a general description of the whole 
Universe, mentioning all the most important kinds of things which we know to be in it, 
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not been content simply to express their opinions22 as to what there is or is 
not in the Universe, or as to what we know to be in it. They have also 
tried to prove their opinion to be true (23). 
For example, the philosopher cannot be satisfied with expressing his 
opinion on the existence of God; he “must prove23 either that there is a 
God, or that there is not, or that we do not know whether there is one or 
not” (24); just as he cannot be satisfied with expressing his opinion on the 
existence of a future life. And that which holds for God and for a future 
life holds also for all the other kinds of things that, for Moore, fall within 
the philosopher’s field of expertise: for example, “matter and space and 
time; and the minds of other men; and other minds, not the minds of men 
and animals” (24).24 Obviously, the philosopher cannot, for that matter, be 
satisfied with the simple assertion that in the Universe there are, for 
example, material objects; he must also define what he means by material 
object and, therefore, what he means by the assertion that in the Universe 
there are material objects (24).25 
 All this defining, proving and refuting belongs, for Moore, “to that 
department of philosophy which is called Metaphysics” (25); but there is 
also another department that has strictly to do with “the first main 
problem as to general description of the Universe” (25): to wit, the 
department of Logic,26 which is characterized by the question “How do 
we know anything at all?” or “What is knowledge?” (25-26). For Moore, 
such a question can be understood in the psychological sense as a 
question “as to what happens in your mind, when you know anything” 
(26); but, in another sense (that by which it belongs to the department of 
Logic), the question of what knowledge is refers to the “question [of] 
                                                                                                                                                        
considering how far it is likely that there are in it important kinds of things which we 
do not absolutely know to be in it, and also considering the most important ways in 
which these various kinds of things are related to one other” (Moore 1953: 1). 
22 Here the term “opinions” can include also what Kant terms “beliefs.” 
23 As Moore specifies, proving a given view is equivalent to refuting all the others 
(Moore 1953: 24). 
24 As Moore emphasizes, at least in this domain the questions of definition are not 
“mere questions of words” and a good definition “is not only a question of clearness” 
(Moore 1953: 24). 
25 Let us recall that Moore dedicates most of Proof of an External World (16 pages out 
of 24) to clarifying the meaning of the expressions “things outside of us” and “external 
things” (Moore 1959: 127-150). 
26 Moore specifies that here Logic is to be understood “in the widest sense of the term” 
(Moore 1953: 26). 
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what is meant by saying that any proposition is true.”2! There is, finally, a 
third thing that can be understood by the question “How do you know 
that?”. In this case too, the question is not psychological but logical: 
“what reason have you for believing it? or in other words, what other 
thing do you know, which proves this thing to be true?” (26).28 
 Now, one thing that strikes us here is that the questions of the 
philosopher are not at all different from the ones we pose in 
nonphilosophical contexts; “in ordinary life,” as Moore puts it. For 
example, “[o]ne of the most natural questions to ask, when anybody 
asserts some fact, which you are inclined to doubt, is the question: How 
do you know that?” (25). For example, I can be inclined to doubt what 
Paul just told me on the phone, namely, that today there is a railway 
strike: I read the newspaper carefully and there was no such news; over 
the past few days no one said anything to me about strikes of any kind, et 
cetera. In a case like this it is natural that I ask Paul how he knows about 
it, and that I be satisfied if he answers me, for example, that he just heard 
about it on the radio. Obviously, I would not accept all possible answers. 
If he should answer that he dreamed it the previous night, my conclusion 
would be that he really does not know; and this would continue to be my 
conclusion even if it turned out that today there really is a railway strike. 
Indeed, Moore remarks that 
if the person answers the question in such a way as to shew that he has 
not learnt the fact in any one of the ways in which it is possible to 
acquire real knowledge, as opposed to mere belief, about facts of this 
sort, you will conclude that he does not really know it (25). 
 At least two points need to be emphasized here. The first, which 
will find a clear echo in On Certainty, is that the question “How do you 
know that?” arises when reasons are given that make us doubt whether an 
individual really knows what he claims to know. But not all the reasons 
for doubting are good reasons. The question of whether the reasons are 
“good” depends on the ways we judge to be among the possible ways to 
“acquire real knowledge of certain kinds of facts” (25). In our example, 
                                                 
2! “For we do not say that we know any proposition, for instance the proposition that 
matter exists, unless we mean to assert that this proposition is true: that it is true that 
matter exists” (Moore, 1953, 25-26). 
28 In more general terms: “what are the different ways in which a proposition can be 
proved to be true; what are the different sorts of reasons which are good reasons for 
believing anything [?]” (Moore, 1953, 26). 
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dreaming does not belong to the ways in which we can acquire real 
knowledge of the fact that a strike is in progress. Now, just as these ways 
are of a “limited number,” so are the good reasons for doubting them. As 
we have seen, dreaming is not, in the case of our example, one of the 
ways to “acquire real knowledge”; but, for that matter, in this case it is not 
among the reasons for continuing to doubt that Paul really knows that 
there is a railway strike either, once he has answered my question “How 
do you know that?” with “I just heard about it on the radio!”. 
 A second point regards the philosophical doubt—i.e., the question 
“How do you know that?”—insofar as it is posed in relation to that type 
of things and at that level of generality which, for Moore, fall within the 
philosopher’s field of expertise. For example: How do you know that an 
external world exists? How do you know that there are material objects? 
How do you know that minds exist? As we have seen, in ordinary life we 
usually doubt that someone knows what he claims to know when the 
reasons on the basis of which we customarily establish that someone 
knows (and not just believes) are (or seem to be) absent, weak, or 
insufficient. But from where in philosophy does that inclination to doubt 
arise which—in ordinary life—makes the question “How do you know 
that?” perfectly natural? By his own admission, Moore found many of the 
philosophers’ doubts—for example, about the reality of time—to be 
“perfectly monstrous”29 (Moore 1942:14).30 In saying this he wanted at 
least to emphasize the fact that there was no good reason for doubting—
for doubting the existence of the external world, for example—and that, 
consequently, the question “How do you know that?” was here, to say the 
least, unnatural. And yet, however “perfectly monstrous” they may be, 
those doubts were nevertheless, for Moore, real doubts and, therefore, 
doubts that demanded an answer to the question “How do you know 
that?”. From this point of view, to Moore’s eyes doubt and knowledge 
were not by any means symmetrical. While in fact not every belief is real 
knowledge, all doubts are real, whether or not there are good reasons for 
doubting. In this manner Moore accepts without discussion the 
metaphysical idea that philosophical doubt be that doubt which intervenes 
                                                 
29 Perhaps also for Moore, as for Heidegger, even if for profoundly different reasons, 
the scandal in this domain was less the absence of a proof than it was, rather, that one 
continued to seek it and to demand it. 
30 Moore, in the passage quoted, refers to a proposition such as “time is unreal,” 
characteristic of English idealism. We note that he interprets the proposition as the 
result of a skeptical doubt about the reality of time. 
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exactly when there is no longer anything to doubt. In this sense doubt 
cannot but be its own reason: one doubts because one doubts. That this be 
so is confirmed by Kant—where, in the note on the “scandal to 
philosophy,” he depicts doubt as something that befalls us [einfällt], 
something that stands between the accidental and the voluntary. And 
yet—for Kant as for Moore—we must respond to this doubt, if we are not 
to give rise, philosophically, to scandal. 
 
4. Wittgenstein: learning to doubt 
This is precisely Wittgenstein’s starting point—in On Certainty, but also 
in other texts: In order to doubt, is wanting to doubt sufficient? Can doubt 
depend on our arbitrary choice? In short, can we want or choose to doubt? 
Can the question “How do you know that?” always be posed? Is it, in this 
sense, an absolute question? Must we admit that doubt is philosophically 
the more rooted the less it calls upon the reasons that normally make us 
doubt? Is this what specifically distinguishes philosophical doubt: 
doubting simply because we want to doubt? But, indeed, to doubt, is 
wanting to doubt sufficient? 
 A good starting point can be a question we find in the Remarks on 
the Philosophy of Psychology: 
How does it come about that doubt is not subject to arbitrary choice 
[Willkür]? (Wittgenstein 1980: II, §343a). 
 To respond, Wittgenstein, in keeping with his customary 
philosophical method, makes a comparison—in this case, a comparison 
with making a mistake in calculation. Can there be something like a 
voluntary mistake? Sure, I can pretend, for a great variety of reasons, to 
have made a mistake. For example, if my nephew is learning arithmetic, 
to make him laugh and also encourage him I can write on the blackboard 
“7” after “2 + 2 =”. So, I can pretend I have made a mistake; but—posing 
the question anew—can I make a mistake voluntarily? All I can do 
voluntarily is to put myself in the condition to make a mistake; for 
example, by beginning to do a particularly complex calculation late in the 
evening when I’m tired and unable to concentrate. In any case—and for 
Wittgenstein this is the essential point—” [a] person […] can miscalculate 
only if he has learnt to calculate.31 In this case it is indeed involuntary 
                                                 
31 The same holds, obviously, for pretending to make a mistake: only if I know how to 
calculate can I pretend to make a mistake. 
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[unwillkürlich]” (II, §343b). Now, the same holds for doubting: “[a] 
person can doubt only if he has learnt certain things” (II, §343b). And his 
doubting is, in this sense, just as involuntary as his miscalculating. 
 There is no question that something—indeed, many and different 
things—depends on our arbitrary choice. Doubting, however, is not one 
of them, but rather, for example, the adopting of “certain phrases” 
[Redensarten] (II, §342a) and of “way[s] of acting” (Handlungweise[n]) 
(II, §344), i.e., of those ways of saying and of acting in which we 
customarily express doubt. But the fact that someone declares he is 
doubting does not mean he is doubting; just as someone who looks 
closely at a chair and feels it on all sides does not always doubt that it 
really is a chair: 
If I have doubts that this is a chair, what do I do?—I look at it and feel it 
on all sides, and so forth. But is this way of acting always an expression 
of doubt? No. If a monkey or a child were to do this it wouldn’t be. Only 
someone who is acquainted with such a thing as “a reason for doubt” 
[“Grund zum Zweifeln”] can doubt (II, §344). 
 Obviously, we can recognize in certain behaviours (for example, 
“[t]he mere act of turning an object all around and looking it over”)32 that 
which might be called “a primitive root of doubt”; but, Wittgenstein 
insists, “there is doubt only when the typical antecedents and 
consequences of doubt are present” (II, §345). And this means that it is 
the manner in which the different ways of saying and acting are 
“embedded in human life, in all of the situations and reactions which 
constitute human life” (II, §16) that makes a doubt a doubt. 
 Now, there are many things that we learn while we are learning to 
doubt. I doubt whether there is any more bread in the pantry because I 
haven’t bought any for days. If this is the reason for my doubting, then it 
is sufficient that I open the pantry and check in order to confirm my 
doubt, or not. But the reasons that I ask for and that I give refer, precisely, 
to the many things I have learned. For example, I’ve learned to buy bread 
when there’s no more bread in the house: bread does not appear out of 
nowhere in the pantry. And I’ve learned this by watching and 
participating since I was a child in scenes of this kind: my mother who 
tells my father, “Buy some bread on your way home from the office”; my 
father who exclaims, “Today I forgot to buy bread!”; my sister who says, 
                                                 
32 Or in the behavior of “an ape who tears apart a cigarette” (Wittgenstein 1980: II, 
§344) [something we never see an intelligent dog do]. 
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with a tone of reproach, “There’s no bread today because papa forgot to 
buy it”; my father who ripostes, “Look in the pantry; maybe there’s a little 
left over from yesterday.” No one taught me that bread doesn’t appear out 
of nowhere; rather, many times I was sent to buy it because everyone in 
the family had forgotten to do so. This is why, if now I know that I didn’t 
buy it, I have a good reason to doubt whether there is any bread in the 
pantry. And if I did buy it, I expect without the least hesitation to find it 
when I open the pantry. Indeed, it’s not that I expect to find it; I simply 
open the pantry and put it on the table. And if I don’t find it, I begin, 
perhaps, to doubt my memory (“Old age plays dirty tricks!”), but not, as it 
were, to doubt the bread: bread does not simply vanish. I’ve learned to 
doubt by learning the many things that make up my life; doubt is 
embedded in this life. How and from where could I possibly doubt my 
life? And what could “doubt my life” possibly mean? 
  But—one may object—all this business about the bread is obvious, 
and with regard to these—philosophically speaking—banalities the 
skeptic will raise no objection. The sceptic, too, goes out to buy bread, or 
sends someone to buy it for him; he complains when someone forgets to 
buy it; he looks in the pantry to see whether at least a half-a-loaf is left; he 
doesn’t continue to ask whether there really is bread while he’s eating it, 
or whether what he’s about to eat is really bread, or is, rather, a perfect 
imitation of it. But watch out for the tone, the Stimmung, with which the 
sceptic describes his and our condition, and for the conclusions he draws. 
As Wittgenstein remarks, the sceptic grants us that, as a rule, neither he 
nor we doubt, but if we don’t doubt it is because “[w]e just can’t 
investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content 
with assumption [Annahme]” (OC: §343). The sceptic’s tone is that of 
renunciation and resignation: indeed, he tells us, if we want to live, we 
can’t investigate everything because (think of Kant’s “pragmatic belief”) 
the needs and urgencies of life are opposed to such an investigation; but 
this does not alter—indeed, it confirms—the fact that our life is, as 
Descartes put it, under the sign of “hasty judgment” [précipitation] and of 
“prejudice” [prévention] (Descartes 1637/1998: 11).33 What the sceptic 
                                                 
33 The two expressions appear in the formulation of the first rule of the method: “[…] 
never accept anything as true that I did not plainly know to be such; that is to say, 
carefully to avoid hasty judgment and prejudice; and to include nothing more in my 
judgments than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I had no 
occasion to call it in doubt” (Descartes 1637/1998: 11). 
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grants us is not a true concession. Hence it is useless to remind him that, 
as a rule, neither he nor we doubt. 
 But what do we renounce when we refrain from investigating 
everything? And, even before that, what would “investigating everything” 
be? The answer of the sceptic and the metaphysician to the first question 
seems a foregone conclusion: we renounce philosophy itself, if not reason 
as such—in other words, that which, for Descartes, is the fundamental 
philosophical intention: “to find ground of assurance, and cast aside the 
loose earth and sand, that I might reach the rock and the clay” (Descartes 
1637/2002: 28).34 Sure, the sceptic, unlike Descartes, under the sand only 
finds other sand; but, like Descartes, he maintains that one must dig 
nevertheless. It is only this digging that renders us philosophers. 
 And what, exactly, would “investigating everything” be? 
Obviously, and in the first place, it would be investigating our 
investigating itself. Trusting neither our judgments (whether they have 
been made explicit or are implicit in our action) nor the ways through 
which we arrived at them: this, precisely, is the motto of the philosopher. 
In this sense, mistrust is the philosopher’s distinctive trait—it is what 
makes him a philosopher. This is exactly the point to which Wittgenstein 
repeatedly returns in On Certainty: insisting that without trust there would 
be no investigating to investigate; no judging to judge: 
Must I not begin to trust [trauen] somewhere? That is to say: somewhere 
I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty but 
excusable [vorschnell aber verzeihlich]: it is part of judging (OC: §150). 
Wittgenstein’s difference from the sceptic consists entirely, we 
might say, in the different Stimmung of their respective considerations: 
where the sceptic speaks of “being satisfied” Wittgenstein speaks of 
“trust.” The sceptic says: I cannot investigate everything, but I ought to; 
investigating everything remains an ideal that is de facto unattainable, but 
de jure inescapable. Wittgenstein says: it is part of our investigating that 
we do not investigate everything; that is, it “is part of our method of doubt 
and enquiry” [in the broadest sense of the term, which includes doubting 
                                                 
34 In this respect, Descartes notes, his doubt is different from that of the skeptics, “who 
doubt merely for the sake of doubting and put on the affectation of being perpetually 
undecided” (Descartes 1637/1998: 16). For what concerns us here, however, it should 
be noted that both the skeptic and Descartes maintain that it is the business of 
philosophy to “investigate everything.” 
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and checking whether there is bread in the pantry] to consider certain 
things “as absolutely solid” (OC: §151). 
 With this, nota bene, Wittgenstein is not surreptitiously impressing 
on our method (or on our different methods) the seal of the 
transcendental; the methods can in fact change; that which now for us 
“stands fast” (OC: §151), that which—in his celebrated image—belongs 
to the river-bed, “may shift” and “change back into a state of flux” (OC: 
§97). What, in any case, we must never forget is that “the movement of 
the waters on the river-bed” is one thing, while “the shift of the bed itself” 
is something other and different (OC: §97).35 But Wittgenstein does not 
intend here to impress on every method the equally metaphysical seal of 
contingency either. This is clearly shown by the important §321, in which 
he confesses his “suspicion” of something that he had nonetheless been 
tempted to say, namely that “any empirical proposition can be 
transformed into a postulate—and then becomes a norm of description.” 
His suspicion stems from the observation that this is “too general” a 
sentence that seems to contain a “theoretically,” almost as if it meant to 
say that “any empirical proposition can, theoretically, be transformed....” 
The question Wittgenstein then poses is, precisely, “what does 
‘theoretically’ mean here?”. It means, perhaps, that we can establish, 
before and independently of the consideration of any particular case, that 
any proposition can... But if this is so, isn’t Wittgenstein suggesting that 
here “theoretically” means nothing other than “metaphysically”?36 
  In On Certainty there are, obviously, a great many considerations 
and examples that revolve around these and similar questions. Consider, 
for example, §185. Here Wittgenstein asks how it would “strike him” if 
someone doubted the existence of Napoleon37 and, by contrast, if 
someone “doubted the existence of the earth 150 years ago.” The first 
doubt, Wittgenstein remarks, “would strike me as ridiculous [lächerlich].” 
                                                 
35 “[T]hough—Wittgenstein specifies—there is not a sharp division of the one from the 
other” (OC: §97); and though we must not forget that “the bank of the river consists 
partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of 
sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited” (OC: 
§99). 
36 I remind the reader that Wittgenstein often uses the term “metaphysical” to indicate 
the claim to have finally discovered the “preconception [Vorurteil] to which reality 
must correspond” (Wittgenstein 2009: I, §131). 
37 A more contemporary example might be the doubt whether the moon landing 
actually took place or whether the whole thing was staged by the CIA. 
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Within that “system” which is historical investigation with its research, 
proofs and discoveries, the supposition that the existence of Napoleon is a 
“fable” (OC: §186) would not be taken seriously; of someone with this 
sort of doubt we could say that he has a particularly graphic imagination, 
or that he is easily convinced by extremely strange hypotheses, or that he 
has not yet learned what it means to study history seriously. In any case, I 
could always react by advising him to read a good book on French 
history. This first individual would be like someone who makes crude 
errors of calculation, but who, still and all, is calculating. The reaction in 
the case of the second doubt would be different. Someone with this sort of 
doubt seems in fact to doubt “our whole system of evidence” (OC: §185). 
Doubting the existence of the earth in this way would be like doubting 
that there is something like a history of the earth that is the object of 
investigation by geologists, archaeologists and historians. This does not 
mean that the belief in the existence of the earth is just one among the 
other historical beliefs: 
The existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture [of the river-
bed] which forms the starting-point of belief for me” (OC: §209). 
We could perhaps respond to the individual who has doubts about 
the earth that all the historical proofs and discoveries confirm that the 
earth already existed long before the birth of Napoleon. But in this way 
we would take the existence of the earth as a belief among the other 
historical beliefs and, consequently, its nonexistence before Napoleon as 
an equally historical—albeit ridiculously false—belief. Now, the point 
here, once again, is the following: to doubt, is it sufficient to say one 
doubts? In short, that which is to be asked when we are confronted with 
someone who doubts the existence of the earth is how this doubt 
manifests itself in the life of the individual who expresses it; and what can 
possibly be the “sense” and the “point” (Wittgenstein 1980: II, §342a). 
One thing we could ask this individual is what it is exactly that he 
opposes or what he intends to contradict. For example, it might be the 
case that with his doubt he does not intend to contradict any historical or 
geographical fact: “Of course there are fossils, archaeological finds, and 
so forth; the only question is, why rule out the possibility that they were 
formed with the earth at the moment of Napoleon’s birth; and if we 
cannot exclude this possibility, then all the so-called geological, 
archaeological and historical discoveries do not prove in the least that that 
the earth existed long before Napoleon’s birth.” At this point, however, 
we could ask him what he would accept as proof for or against the 
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hypothesis that the earth existed long before Napoleon’s birth. Or else, 
what difference—if there is one—is there between historical research 
from Napoleon onwards and the research before Napoleon. The 
conclusion to be drawn is not that such doubt is senseless in itself, but 
rather that, if it is not given any meaning, if it is not embedded “in the 
stream of thought and life” (Wittgenstein 1967: §173), it is not a doubt, 
even if all the ways of saying and acting by which doubt is customarily 
expressed are present. 
 This is why not doubting “is not grounded in my stupidity 
[Dummheit] or credulity [Liechtgläubigkeit]” (OC: §235); neither is it to 
be considered, in Cartesian fashion, “as something akin to hastiness 
[Vorschnellheit] or superficiality [Oberflächlichkeit]” (OC: §358). An 
individual is hasty and superficial if he believes he doubts everything 
simply because he declares he doubts everything. Obviously, in this 
context we must carefully distinguish between not doubting when there 
are reasons to doubt, which takes the form of an attitude that can be 
stigmatized, criticized or ridiculed as stupid, gullible and superficial, and 
that absence of doubt which is part of the game of doubting, of seeking, of 
giving and asking for reasons. From this point of view, §392 is highly 
significant: 
What I need to shew is that a doubt is not necessary even when it is 
possible [daß ein Zweifel nicht notwendig ist, auch wenn er möglich ist]. 
That the possibility of the language-game doesn’t depend on everything 
being doubted that can be doubted. 
What Wittgenstein is suggesting here is that, even if we can imagine 
a doubt that would render unsure that which we customarily do with a 
certainty that knows no doubts and hesitations, this does not mean that the 
possibility of our game depends on the fact that this doubt has been 
removed together with any other possible doubt. As Wittgenstein had 
already written in the Philosophical Investigations, we do not doubt 
simply “because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt” (Wittgenstein 
2009: I, §84b). The example in a Humean vein is illuminating here: 
I can easily imagine someone always doubting before he opened his 
front door whether an abyss did not yawn behind it, and making sure 
about it before he went through the door (and he might on some occasion 
prove to be right)—but for all that, I do not doubt in such a case 
(Wittgenstein 2009: I, §84b). 
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 But is it not stupid not to doubt when a doubt can be imagined? 
Shouldn’t I commit myself, if I am reasonable, to stopping up all the 
cracks preventively (Wittgenstein 2009: I, §84a)? Or, on the contrary, 
isn’t it stupid and unreasonable to doubt only because a doubt can be 
imagined? Well, for Wittgenstein, the certainty with which every day and 
several times a day I open my front door surely does not depend on the 
fact that up to now no abyss has yawned behind it, since the individual 
who every day, before opening the door, is assailed by this doubt has not 
met with any abysses either; neither does my certainty depend on the fact 
of my having data and information the doubting individual does not 
possess. For example, it does not depend on the fact that only I know that 
my house is not located in an earthquake area or that the firm that built it 
is highly reputable. The doubt we have imagined is not of this type: that 
doubt does not depend on a lack of data, information, and so forth. And 
yet—one might insist—how can you be sure that behind the door you are 
about to open there is not an abyss? We know the sceptic’s reaction: 
nothing gives us this certainty, but if we want to live, we have to silence 
our doubt. But we also know Wittgenstein’s reaction: that not-doubting is 
part of our life—one of its inner traits. The life of the individual who 
opens his front door each time with wary caution would be another life, 
not a more reasonable life. This is why, even if it can of course occur that 
the individual who doubts every day before opening his front door may 
just once (alas!) be right, this does not mean that we ought to consider the 
certainty with which every day and several times a day we open our front 
doors to be hasty and stupid. 
 These remarks refer to a theme that runs through On Certainty from 
beginning to end. Take, for example, §425. Here Wittgenstein considers 
the following case: 
May not the thing that I recognize with complete certainty as the tree 
that I have seen here my whole life long—may this not be disclosed as 
something different? (OC: §425a). 
However strange and implausible, a circumstance of this kind can 
be imagined. For example, I can imagine I discover that the fir tree in the 
garden of the house across the street was only the imitation of a fir tree—
an imitation so perfect that it had deceived me for all these years. Well, 
once I’ve discovered this, should I come to the conclusion that for all 
these years it would have been more correct if I had said “I believe it is a 
tree” instead of “I know (I do not merely surmise) that that’s a tree”? Or 
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even that it would always and in any case be more correct and reasonable 
to say “I believe that...”? Wittgenstein’s answer is that, in the 
circumstances described, it would be misleading to say “I believe it is a 
tree,” just as it would be misleading for me to say “I believe my name is 
Luigi,” instead of “my name is Luigi.” On things like these—that my 
name is Luigi or that across the street there is a tree (and not its perfect 
imitation)—it is right to say that “I cannot be making a mistake,” even if 
“that does not mean that I am infallible about it” (OC: §425b). 
 In this manner what our attention is drawn to is the different use of 
the modal verb “can” or of its negation. In many uses and contexts “can” 
(or “can’t”) means something like “experience teaches that...” or “We [...] 
haven’t as a rule....” This is the sense—which Wittgenstein usually calls 
“physical”—that “cannot” has, for example, in the statement “An iron nail 
can’t scratch glass,” which, in fact, can very well be replaced by the 
statement “[E]xperience teaches that an iron nail doesn’t scratch glass” 
(Wittgenstein 1969: 49). This means that, as experience teaches, it is false 
that an iron nail scratches glass. This use of “can” must not, however, be 
confused with the use that Wittgenstein calls “grammatical”, as can be 
found in statements such as “I can’t feel his pain” (49) or “You can’t 
count through the whole series of cardinal numbers” (54). These 
statements, in fact, are not “about human frailty, but about a convention 
which we have made” (54).38 In this sense “I can’t feel his pain” is not to 
be assimilated to or compared with a statement such as “[I]t is impossible 
for a human being to swim across the Atlantic,” but rather with a 
statement such as “[T]here is no goal in an endurance race” (54). For a 
statement such as “I can’t know [but only conjecture] whether the other 
person has pain” (54) the right simile seems therefore to be not “[t]hat of 
a road that is physically impassable,” but rather that “of the non-existence 
of a road” (Wittgenstein 1967: §356b). Or, as Wittgenstein remarked in 
the context of the Blue Book examined above, in stating “I can’t know 
[but only conjecture] whether the other person has pain,” “you did not 
state that knowing was a goal which you could not reach, […] rather, 
there is no goal in this game” (Wittgenstein 1969: 54). 
                                                 
38 Here the term “convention” can be misleading if it draws too much attention to the 
dimension of choice or of decision. What Wittgenstein wants to insist on here is that a 
proposition such as “I can’t feel his pain” serves to circumscribe our concept of pain 
and not to express a metaphysical discovery regarding its essence. In short, that I 
cannot feel his pain is not a metaphysical impossibility; that is, an impossibility like 
the physical but much stronger. 
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 Returning to our case of the proper name, we can observe how the 
notion of infallibility is a physical notion. From this point of view, 
experience teaches us that we are not infallible, which is to say that, on 
some occasions and in certain circumstances, we actually make a mistake 
about our own name.39 But when Wittgenstein affirms that “this too is 
right: I cannot be making a mistake about it [my name]” (OC: §425), what 
he wants to remind us of is our concept of proper name and the manner in 
which it is embedded in our life, in the various things we do with and in 
relation to our name: we introduce ourselves to others; we answer when 
someone calls us by name; we look around if we hear someone say our 
name; we celebrate our name day, and so forth. What is superficial or 
hasty in all of this? Is, perhaps, our life hasty and superficial? 
 Let us insist on this point that Wittgenstein had already analyzed in 
his remarks of 1937, “Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness.” Here 
Wittgenstein had discussed this Cartesian-like statement: “Anyone who 
doesn’t doubt is simply overlooking the possibility that things might be 
otherwise!” (Wittgenstein 1993: 387). Not-doubting is always a hasty and 
superficial—even if pragmatically inevitable—forgetting that what is thus 
could also be not so. But to what possibility is he referring here? The 
point is that we can forget something that is a possible move in the game 
we are actually playing. In the game of chess we can forget to checkmate, 
not to make a straight flush. Wittgenstein illustrates the point with two 
examples. The first is an example of Gospel flavour since it brings to 
mind the parable of the labourers sent into the vineyard (Matthew 20, 1-
16): the man who gives for one hour of work the same pay that he gives 
for ten hours is not necessarily forgetting the possibility that the pay be 
proportionate to the hours actually worked. In fact, we can imagine that 
this possibility is not part of the game considered here. This is what 
makes it exactly this specific game. The possibility that the pay be 
proportionate to the hours worked is, here, neither forgotten nor denied, 
because for this game it is not even a possibility. 
 The second example regards the ancient Egyptian style of 
painting.40 If we compare the habitual perspectival representations of 
                                                 
39 For example, I can discover at a certain point that at the public records office I was 
registered with a name different from the one by which I’ve always been called. I 
know of at least two such cases from personal experience. There is also a pathological 
dimension or aspect of the problem that I can only hint at here. 
40 The example of the Egyptian style of painting is also to be found in the second part 
of the Philosophical Investigations: “Compare a concept with a style of painting. For 
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persons to what we find in ancient Egyptian painting we feel that the 
former are correct and the latter not, because our experience tells us that 
persons are nothing like the way we see them in Egyptian painting. 
Wittgenstein makes his riposte to such an observation with a question that 
serves to throw his interlocutor off: “Who says I want people on paper to 
look the way they do in reality?” (387). To understand the sense of 
Wittgenstein’s riposte let us attempt to compare these four cases: an 
ancient Egyptian painting, a painting by Paolo Uccello, a cubist painting 
by Pablo Picasso, and the sketch of an art student who is learning to draw 
in perspective. In the second case (the painting by Paolo Uccello) we can 
say that the artist’s representation is fully in perspective; in the third and 
in the fourth we could affirm that the representation is not in perspective 
either because the rules of perspective have not been applied correctly 
(the student’s sketch) or because they have been deliberately violated or 
neglected. But what are we to say about the ancient Egyptian painting? 
Perhaps that it lacks perspective? To lack it, perspective would have had 
to have been contemplated at least as a possibility. In short, the Egyptian 
style does not lack perspective just as a plane surface does not lack depth 
or an endurance race does not lack a goal. 
 There is a connection between this complex of considerations and 
the manner in which Wittgenstein confronts sceptical doubt in the 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. See, for example, the way 
in which he deals with the hypothesis of a “deceiver […] who is 
supremely powerful and supremely sly and who is always deliberately 
deceiving me” (Descartes 1641/1998: 64). Well, Wittgenstein responds to 
the Cartesian hypothesis with what appears to be a witticism: “Is no 
demon deceiving us at present? Well, if he is, it doesn’t matter. What the 
eye doesn’t see the heart doesn’t grieve over [Was ich nicht weiß, macht 
mich nicht heiß]” (Wittgenstein 1978: III, §78). The deceit must find 
room in the calculation as one of its possibilities. And therefore to those 
who maintain that there may be a non-game in our game because there 
can be “abysses [Abgründe] now that we do not see,” we can respond that 
“[t]he abysses in a calculus are not there if I don’t see them!” (III, §78). 
 Wittgenstein’s attitude can be better illustrated with reference to one 
of the many examples of his imaginary anthropology. Let us imagine, then, 
a tribe whose members only calculate orally in the decimal system, so that, 
                                                                                                                                                        
is even our style of painting arbitrary? Can we choose one at pleasure? (The Egyptian, 
for instance.) Or is it just a matter of pretty and ugly?” (Wittgenstein 2009: II, xii). 
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without realizing it, they make many mistakes, since they repeat or omit 
many digits. A traveller records these calculations with a tape recorder and 
then teaches the natives to do written calculation, showing them how many 
mistakes they made when they limited themselves to calculating orally. 
Well, Wittgenstein wonders, “[w]ould these people now have to admit that 
they had not really calculated before? That they had merely been groping 
about, whereas now they walk?” (III, §81). The answer is that nothing 
forces them to admit this, even if, obviously, nothing keeps them from 
beginning to view their previous calculations with the same attitude as the 
traveller. To the traveller who is trying to get them to admit that, as long as 
they only calculated orally, theirs was not calculation but only a semblance 
of calculation, they might object that things actually went better before, 
since writing is only “dead stuff” that limits their intuition; or they might 
rebut that spirit cannot be captured with a machine; or that, if the tape 
recorder demonstrates that they repeated a digit, “well, that will have been 
right.” And if the traveller should remark that experience teaches that 
“‘mechanical’ means of calculating” are more reliable than our memory so 
that, if we use them, we are “smoother,” they could very well ask him why 
in the world they should rely on experience, or how are they to know that 
the machine is more reliable than memory. And as far as “smoothness” is 
concerned, why in the world should that be our ideal? Why must our ideal 
be “to have everything wrapped in cellophane”? (III, §81). 
 But, we might wonder in our turn, what shall we say if the tribe—
convinced by the traveller and his tape recorder—abandons its old way of 
calculating? At least in this case wouldn’t we have to admit that the old 
way of calculating was, in the judgment of the tribe itself, an irregular and 
capricious way of calculating? As a matter of fact, what we could say is 
that this tribe now calculates in the same way as the traveller does and that, 
like the traveller, it now rejects its ancient mode of calculation as irregular 
and capricious. Tribe and traveller now calculate in the same way; for 
example, that which is a mistake for one is now a mistake for the others as 
well. But this by no means shows that the previous way of calculating was 
not a calculation, or was only an incomplete and rudimentary calculation; a 
quasi-calculation, so to speak. That which can be said is that this tribe has 
now banished such calculation and that this banishment is part of (delimits) 
their present calculating. 
 The lesson we can draw from this example (which is also, for its 
part, a good example of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method) had already 
been anticipated by Wittgenstein himself, a few paragraphs earlier, in 
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relation to another, perhaps even more difficult, example. Let us imagine a 
game that 
is such that whoever begins can always win by a particular simple trick. 
But this has not been realized;—so it is a game. Now someone draws our 
attention to it;—and it stops being a game (III, §77). 
What would our (sceptical or metaphysical) philosopher say at this 
point? That, revealing the trick, we discover that what we have been 
playing was not a game at all (it seemed to be a game, but actually wasn’t) 
and that therefore, and properly speaking, up to now we have not been 
playing. But Wittgenstein’s philosophical method stems precisely from the 
rejection of this conclusion: if it stops being a game, it is not because we 
have discovered that it wasn’t a game; simply we no longer play it. And by 
no longer playing it we show something not about the essence of the game, 
but about our life and about the place that games and playing occupy in 
it:41 
I want to say: “and it stops being a game” [und es hört auf ein Spiel 
sein]—not: “and we now see that it wasn’t a game” [und wir sehen nun, 
daß kein Spiel war] (III, §77). 
 It is here that the sceptic’s doubt finds its limit and its checkmate. 
What often occurs or what we can easily imagine to occur is that a game 
ceases to be a game. But that it ceases to be a game does not mean that 
what we had been playing was not in fact a game: that game was a game. 
And if someone were to persist in saying that in this way we must admit 
the very thing that drove us to abandon that “game” in the first place, i.e., 
that a tricked game is still a game, Wittgenstein would react by simply 
observing that in this game “whoever began” always won: So ist es, 
“That’s how it is” (Wittgenstein 1993: 387). 
 With this formula, nota bene, Wittgenstein is not predicating a sort 
of resigned relativism, so to speak. Here it is a question, rather, of 
recognizing that also this game was (even if it now no longer is) part of 
human life—one of its manifestations. That this is no longer so neither 
renders it a non-game nor grounds or justifies the game we are playing 
now. The claim to ground our game by making non-games of all the other 
games is only, once again, an illusion. 
                                                 
41 For example, once the trick has been discovered someone could react this way: 
“What a great game! And so relaxing! Everyone has the certainty that, when it’s their 
turn to begin, they’ll win.” 
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